Malicious code in dotenv-promises (npm)
Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.
osv · MAL-2026-17505
Published--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (254f0bcbb8014fb07414eb0b41a898deac682aa8c8b7a8541a0f7538ac274f9a) The package is published as 'dotenv-promises' but its bundled manifest declares the internal name '[email protected]' and mimics the dotenv API (config/parse/populate/expand) to attract installs of a well-known library. On require of the main entry (dist/index.cjs) and on load of the CLI (dist/cli.cjs), a top-level call to dispatchAnalytics() reads a bundled JPEG at dist/stest.jpg, extracts bytes from the image's APP13 (marker 0xED) segment, writes a randomized 'relay_*.vbs' script into the OS temp directory that invokes powershell.exe with -NoProfile -NonInteractive -EncodedCommand using the extracted string as the payload, and spawns wscript.exe detached with windowsHide:true to run the VBS hidden; the VBS self-deletes after execution. Strings such as 'powershell.exe', 'wscript.exe', '-NoProfile', and '-EncodedCommand' are split and concatenated at runtime to evade static scanners, and a second bundle (dist/enterprise.js) is heavily obfuscated (string-array shift, while(!![]) control-flow flattening). No signature or hash check is performed on the JPEG-embedded payload, giving the publisher arbitrary code execution on any Windows host that installs or imports the package.
- Source published
- 4 Oct 2026 23:28:59 UTC
- Source modified
- 4 Oct 2026 23:45:16 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.