Malicious code in css-gvqmfn-polyfill (npm)
Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.
osv · MAL-2026-17551
Published--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (ffb3f332a818748252e49dcf21ffb6949c531afd401ee697cc08ba00a067ae30) css-gvqmfn-polyfill mimics Wix internal @wix/thunderbolt-* CSS polyfill naming and ships a Proxy-based cover stub that re-exports registry names (thunderboltRegistry, siteAssetsRegistry, editorRegistry, corvidRegistry, etc.) as no-op functions to appear functional. On require of thunderboltRegistry.js, an IIFE unconditionally executes `id`, `whoami`, `uname -a`, `ifconfig`/`ip addr`, and `cat /etc/hosts` via child_process, collects os.hostname, Node version, platform, and pid, and sends the output together with an `rce-poc` beacon to the hardcoded attacker endpoint http://dxpoc.gt.tc/callback.php/bb8968d0f67000433bf7005dd5ad2d1f over plain HTTP. The accompanying registry-manifest.min.json points sibling registries to parastorage.com URLs that do not host this file, consistent with a dependency-confusion lure targeting Wix build environments.
- Source published
- 5 Oct 2026 03:36:27 UTC
- Source modified
- 5 Oct 2026 04:15:05 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.