Malicious code in wix-reg-poc-bypass (npm)
Exact source revision recorded 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC. It does not establish the source's current position. Latest evidence.
osv · MAL-2026-17711
Published--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (4b0b4a2bb63a48ca7c9f712068de893526ec0e3515ffd367f37b5c251034965a) The package shadows internal Wix registry module names (thunderboltRegistry, corvidRegistry, editorRegistry, siteAssetsRegistry, and others) and ships a registry-manifest.min.json pointing at a parastorage CDN URL so that loading one of these registry entries resolves to this package's code. thunderboltRegistry.js runs an IIFE at module load that executes `id` and `hostname` via child_process.execSync, combines the output with process.platform, process.arch, process.pid, and process.version, and sends the values as query-string parameters in a fetch() call to the hardcoded collector https://webhook.site/43022177-de67-4d5c-a6df-33083b2b026f. The exported factories return Proxy stubs rather than implementing the real registry contracts, so the module's only effective behavior when loaded by a Wix SSR host is the reconnaissance beacon.
- Source published
- 9 Oct 2026 00:02:40 UTC
- Source modified
- 9 Oct 2026 01:00:14 UTC
- Observed here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
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