Malicious code in @alannxd/baileys (npm)

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (8d2dd15da8d647385c59765df516101c97dbd343f01574a204a87b8cdaeaef3c) This is a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp library. On every `require('@alannxd/baileys')`, the package's main entry (`lib/index.js`) performs an unconditional HTTPS GET to `https://raw.githubusercontent.com/alannzxd/xclient/refs/heads/main/information.json` on a mutable branch of the author's personal GitHub repo and prints one string from the response via `console.log`. The response body is only logged — it is not passed to `eval`/`exec`/`Function`/`require` — so this is a covert usage phone-home (leaks installer IP + User-Agent + import-time signal to the author on each load) rather than a remote-code-execution channel. Separately, `package.json` declares `"libsignal": "npm:@alannxd/libsignal-node@latest"`, aliasing the well-known `libsignal` import specifier to an author-scoped package tracked at `latest`; every `require('libsignal')` inside this package resolves to whatever the author currently publishes there, giving the author a persistent mutable code channel into consumers' dependency trees. The `ping` and `child_process`/HTTP patterns matched by pattern rules resolve to Baileys' normal media-upload and connectivity code paths (POST/GET against WhatsApp media endpoints), not to attacker infrastructure. No credential harvesting, no environment scraping, no filesystem enumeration, and no exfiltration of caller data were observed in the traced code. Concerns are undisclosed import-time beacon to author-controlled mutable infrastructure and an unpinned author-controlled alias overriding a well-known module name — both consent/transparency issues warranting human review of maintainer trust before recommending this fork. ## Source: ghsa-malware (840c3322267f13ca6fa905016fabb93a923c1a490fa0584d9e173f0f0a8f71d0) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Source published

21 Oct 2026 03:24:45 UTC

Source modified

29 Oct 2026 14:30:32 UTC

Observed here

29 Oct 2026 15:12:22 UTC

Source terms

OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.