Malicious code in imgdecode (npm)

CISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.

No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (8d35e9f4292a2c57b47ea07b9202c69623374c4c6afaa588ff849d213ffbbef2) [email protected] presents itself as a native image buffer decoder but ships a 224-byte index.js whose only runtime effect on require is to load the sibling package 'imgbundle' and attempt to require./prebuilds/win32-x64/imgdecode.node, swallowing errors. The exported API is a single load() that returns null, which does not correspond to the README's advertised exec(cmd, args) interface. The bundled prebuilds/win32-x64/imgdecode.node is a 703 KB Windows PE containing a non-standard.fptable3 section and obfuscated Windows API name fragments (e.g. 'EXClos', 'E\eHan', 'EPSlee' consistent with Close/Handle/Sleep under API-name hashing or XOR-stub packing) and no normal Node-API registration symbols — characteristics of packed/obfuscated native code, not a legitimate image-decoder addon. A.node file loaded via require executes native code in the host Node process immediately on module load, so any consumer that imports imgdecode on a win32-x64 host runs the packed binary, while all other platforms silently pull in and execute whatever code the imgbundle dependency contains. The combination of a facade JS stub, a README/API mismatch, a generic throwaway author identity, and a packed Windows PE delivered via require is a dependency-forwarder plus native-dropper shape rather than a working library. ## Source: ghsa-malware (3c49d68e668c31b846588dba958146553f2f144a6778073dfeeffd14af78faf4) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Source published

22 Oct 2026 19:24:45 UTC

Source modified

29 Oct 2026 14:30:41 UTC

Observed here

29 Oct 2026 15:12:22 UTC

Source terms

OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.