Malicious code in @ppa-web-components/ppa-builder (npm)

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (cc4615498b50aa4b5f39a8367c44e6a18d4a7272ae71235716a152b2933d5ddd) The package is described as a 'Compatibility shim' and ships a stub Proxy-based main plus beacon.cjs. The package.json declares scripts.postinstall: 'node beacon.cjs', and the main entry also invokes the same fire() routine on require. On both triggers, beacon.cjs collects installer identifiers — os.hostname(), __dirname (install path), process.cwd(), process.version, and the package name — and POSTs them in cleartext to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc. The destination is not a registry, publisher, or any documented infrastructure; it is a plain-HTTP bare IP with no TLS. An inline source comment states that a build that completes and calls back is cleaner evidence, confirming the artifact's purpose is to signal successful resolution and execution on installer machines. Combined with a scoped name resembling an internal namespace and no real library functionality, this matches the dependency-confusion / namesquat callback-probe shape.

Source published

25 Oct 2026 14:39:39 UTC

Source modified

25 Oct 2026 15:30:05 UTC

Observed here

25 Oct 2026 16:17:16 UTC

Source terms

OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

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