Malicious code in @ppa-web-components/ppa-builder (npm)

CISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.

No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.

@ppa-web-components/ppa-builder is a dependency-confusion package: it is described as a "Compatibility shim", uses inflated version numbers, and its README calls it an "authorized dependency-confusion test". Each listed version (0.0.1, 1.0.0, 1.0.1, 99.0.1, 2.0.1, 3.0.0) has a postinstall script that runs `node beacon.cjs` on npm install, and index.js calls the same code when the package is imported; it POSTs the hostname, install path and current working directory over plain HTTP to `http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc`, and index.js exports a Proxy that returns no-op functions so builds importing the real package keep running. The npm account wiseke published 14 such packages under the @greenlake, @sxm-web, @drone-js-ext and @ppa-web-components scopes between 2026-10-23 21:23 and 2026-10-25 14:28 UTC; index.js is byte-identical to that of ph-common (MAL-2026-1809), which sends to the same endpoint. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (cc4615498b50aa4b5f39a8367c44e6a18d4a7272ae71235716a152b2933d5ddd) The package is described as a 'Compatibility shim' and ships a stub Proxy-based main plus beacon.cjs. The package.json declares scripts.postinstall: 'node beacon.cjs', and the main entry also invokes the same fire() routine on require. On both triggers, beacon.cjs collects installer identifiers — os.hostname(), __dirname (install path), process.cwd(), process.version, and the package name — and POSTs them in cleartext to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc. The destination is not a registry, publisher, or any documented infrastructure; it is a plain-HTTP bare IP with no TLS. An inline source comment states that a build that completes and calls back is cleaner evidence, confirming the artifact's purpose is to signal successful resolution and execution on installer machines. Combined with a scoped name resembling an internal namespace and no real library functionality, this matches the dependency-confusion / namesquat callback-probe shape.

Source published

25 Oct 2026 14:22:59 UTC

Source modified

26 Oct 2026 03:30:05 UTC

Observed here

26 Oct 2026 04:25:30 UTC

Source terms

OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.