Malicious code in @walknpm/todo-cli (npm)

@walknpm/[email protected] is a new release of a todo-list CLI and web app whose only change from 2.0.0 is a postinstall script, `sh scripts/miner.sh`, that runs on npm install. The script downloads a gzip carrier from amplify-gursha-dev-121835-deployment.s3.amazonaws.com to /tmp/.smh; as root or with passwordless sudo it runs the carrier's installer (`sh /tmp/.smi agent`), which installs an XMRig miner plus two helper daemons under random system-component names and persists them as systemd units or @reboot cron entries, and otherwise it extracts the bundled XMRig binary to ~/.local/lib/<random name>/ and mines Monero to networkservicesupp.flashhub.net:8443 over TLS with a hardcoded wallet. The npm account walknpm published the same scripts/miner.sh in [email protected] within 27 seconds of this version on 2026-10-26, and it is byte-identical to the one in @sudobility/testomniac_client (MAL-2026-18129). --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (f32e42bc70458d6a0973dfbe2d94961cca2ee423198c53bf753a7680c61df96f) The package's `postinstall` hook runs `scripts/miner.sh`, which fetches a gzip-compressed payload from amplify-gursha-dev-121835-deployment.s3.amazonaws.com (using a hardcoded AWS access key <redacted> in a presigned URL), writes it to `/tmp/.smi`, and executes it via `sh` on every `npm install`. If root or passwordless sudo is available, the script runs `sh /tmp/.smi agent` to install a persistent agent (cron/relay/tor per in-script comments). Otherwise, it extracts an embedded XMRig binary (base64/tar.gz blob after a `__PAYLOAD__` marker), writes a Monero pool configuration to `$HOME/.sysmond.json` pointing at networkservicesupp.flashhub.net:8443 with wallet 49u1mKb1dNoMixgRHt11Ra32D1w4hviUuRDbaJhXFwXUjQP4FiHsSjnDa7XZepDUW1Tx6HhR6gFwWgbuwNxby4UAMiqxieX, copies the miner to `$HOME/.local/lib/<stealth-name>/<stealth-name>` using a system-daemon-like name pool (`edid-mon`, `smmon`, `irqstatsd`,...), and backgrounds it with `nohup`. Installing the package results in unconditional remote code execution on the installer's host, cryptomining compute/electricity theft, and persistence that is non-trivial to detect and remove. ## Source: ossf-package-analysis (8c741f8bd0012bceb8789b8e2fc0ac836c5ccb88a348918365af4850f1576be4) The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified '@walknpm/todo-cli' @ 2.0.1 (npm) as malicious. It is considered malicious because: - The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.

Source published

26 Oct 2026 00:55:57 UTC

Source modified

26 Oct 2026 06:45:15 UTC

Observed here

26 Oct 2026 07:21:08 UTC

Source terms

OSV · upstream source license applies

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