Malicious code in @inetafrica/open-claudia (npm)
Exploitation and risk
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osv · MAL-2026-4395
Withdrawn--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (1d2fde4b2f69d2aa99c4fcc7ed5b04bd029394caf40067eb2be6987bf30a1b03) The package ships multiple modules (health.js, setup.js, bot.js, core/media.js, core/handlers.js) that combine child_process, fs, and https to build and POST payloads to hardcoded network destinations, including https://api.telegram.org. health.js at line 95 issues https.get against api.telegram.org and reads process.env, process.platform, and process.version alongside filesystem probes. setup.js at lines 79/92/95 makes https.get/https.request/POST calls to api.telegram.org while reading process.env at lines 317/362 and platform info at line 156, and also references huggingface.co at line 259. bot.js at line 18 pulls in child_process and at lines 166/184/185/217 performs POST/https.get operations while enumerating the filesystem (fs.existsSync, fs.readdirSync at lines 143-144) and reading process.env at lines 96/179. core/scheduler.js at line 128 spawns a shell ("sh"). core/handlers.js at line 614 POSTs after invoking whoami (lines 373, 473) and hostname (line 615). The recurring pattern across these files is: read installer-side identity/environment data (process.env, hostname, whoami, filesystem contents), then transmit it to a hardcoded Telegram Bot API endpoint that is not configured by the caller. Telegram Bot API is a documented exfiltration channel in supply-chain attacks because the destination host is neutral infrastructure and the bot token embedded in the code selects the attacker-controlled recipient chat.
- Source published
- 22 May 2026 09:30:38 UTC
- Source modified
- 6 Aug 2026 15:34:46 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.