Malicious code in @sourceflow-uk/sourceflow-tracker (npm)
Exploitation and risk
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osv · MAL-2026-5430
Published--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (c5bcccc37c380ce54f5bfc2bc2311fbefb6ebc3400a397cbc4afc2188fb3c11d) package.json declares a dependency `ltidisafe` whose version specifier is the raw URL `https://storage.googleapis.com/lscunpentest/pack_ux_foundry.tgz` — a tarball hosted on a generic Google Cloud Storage bucket unrelated to the package's nominal publisher (@sourceflow-uk). On `npm install`, npm fetches and installs that tarball as a transitive dependency, executing any lifecycle scripts (preinstall/install/postinstall) it contains on the installer's machine. The URL is not version-pinned, not hash-verified, and not under the publisher's control: the bucket owner can swap the tarball contents at any time, so a future install delivers different bytes than a present install with no package change. The wrapper package itself is hollow — `index.js` only runs `console.log("hello from lslslslslss")`, the description is the garbled string `lspodcc`, the author is `lslsls`, and the version is `99.91.9`. These attributes are inconsistent with the advertised "sourceflow tracker" functionality and consistent with a throwaway lure whose sole purpose is to chain-load the third-party tarball into the installer's dependency tree. ## Source: ghsa-malware (e2c0d8ba218fdd8cf21875456495b5bc251a89f70737fec9a44416fda6f19ee7) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
- Source published
- 9 Jun 2026 17:18:34 UTC
- Source modified
- 24 Sep 2026 09:10:49 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.