Memory exhaustion from an unchecked SSH packet length
Historical advisory saved 12 Nov 2026 08:55:36 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.
osv · RUSTSEC-2024-0450
PublishedWhen reading a packet, russh took the 4-byte packet length sent by the peer and sized its receive buffer from it without any upper bound. The length is fully controlled by the other side of the connection and is read before authentication, so an unauthenticated client can claim packets of up to about 4 GiB and make a server allocate that much memory per connection. A few such connections are enough to run the process out of memory. From 0.44.1, lengths above 256 KiB are rejected with `Error::PacketSize` before the buffer is sized.
- Source published
- 14 Aug 2024 12:00:00 UTC
- Source modified
- 12 Nov 2026 08:00:04 UTC
- Saved here
- 12 Nov 2026 08:55:36 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H