Potential use-after-free due to lack of panic safety in `InlineVec::clear` and `SerVec::clear`
Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:19:54 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.
osv · RUSTSEC-2026-0122
Published`InlineVec::clear()` and `SerVec::clear()` in `rkyv` were not panic-safe. Both functions iterate over their elements and call `drop_in_place` on each, updating `self.len` only *after* the loop. If an element's `Drop` implementation panics during the loop, `self.len` is left at its original value. A subsequent invocation of `clear()` on the same container then re-visits the already-freed elements: - `InlineVec::clear()` is called again from `InlineVec`'s own `Drop` implementation when the value is later dropped. - `SerVec::clear()` is called again by `SerVec::with_capacity()` after the user closure returns. ## Impact - **CWE-415 (Double Free):** heap corruption when the element type is one that owns memory, such as `Box<T>` or `Vec<T>` - **CWE-416 (Use-After-Free):** memory corruption when an element is accessed following a caught panic Both types of undefined behavior can be invoked in safe Rust, but only if unwinding panics are enabled and `std::panic::catch_unwind` is used.
- Source published
- 23 Apr 2026 12:00:00 UTC
- Source modified
- 16 May 2026 07:08:02 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:54 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
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