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Rojo development server vulnerable to DNS rebinding, allowing unauthenticated read/write access and local program execution

Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:19:54 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.

osv · RUSTSEC-2026-0279

Published

Rojo's `rojo serve` command starts an unauthenticated HTTP API on localhost (default port 34872) with no `Host` or `Origin` header validation. While direct cross-origin `fetch()` requests from a malicious website are blocked by the browser's default CORS policy, an attacker can use DNS rebinding to bypass this restriction entirely. The serve API is a two-way sync protocol. Once a DNS rebind is established, a malicious webpage visited by a developer running `rojo serve` can, without any further user interaction: - **Read the full project source:** `GET /api/rojo` returns the session ID, root instance ID, and project name. `GET /api/read/{id}` enumerates the complete instance tree including all script contents, exposing proprietary game logic, configuration, and any secrets embedded in source files. - **Write to project files on disk:** `POST /api/write` pushes changes back through Rojo's sync pipeline, allowing an attacker to inject arbitrary Lua into the developer's project. If the developer then publishes their game, the injected code executes on every player's client — a supply chain attack vector. - **Launch local programs:** `POST /api/open/{id}` calls the OS-level `opener::open()` function, which invokes the platform's default handler (`open` on macOS, `xdg-open` on Linux, `start` on Windows) for the target file. Exploitation requires only that `rojo serve` is running (the standard Roblox development workflow) and that the developer visits an attacker-controlled webpage in any browser on the same machine. The port is a fixed well-known default (34872), there is no authentication, and no user interaction is needed beyond the initial page visit. The flaw was corrected in [#1270](https://github.com/rojo-rbx/rojo/pull/1270), which adds `Host`/`Origin` header validation to reject cross-origin requests, gates `/api/open` to loopback clients regardless of validated origin, and emits a warning when the server binds to a non-loopback address Reported by [Aiden Mohan](https://github.com/AidenMohan).

Source published
2 Jun 2026 12:00:00 UTC
Source modified
25 Sep 2026 12:00:03 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:54 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

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