Public mode

No access to your tenant or devices. Every item links to its source. What this means

Sources need attention Customize Public modeDiscuss ChangeIntel on Discord

pqc_kyber: AVX2 backend skips Fujisaki-Okamoto implicit rejection, enabling chosen-ciphertext key recovery

Exploitation and risk

Source status

CISA KEV lists vulnerabilities known to be exploited. FIRST EPSS estimates the likelihood of exploitation in the next 30 days. An unavailable score does not mean zero risk.

Which CVEs have scores here?

This view includes predictions for CVE identifiers explicitly listed in public NuGet advisories. Microsoft release pages have their own prediction coverage. Check source status for the scope and latest checks.

No exploitation or prediction data is available here for these CVEs. This does not mean they are safe or unlikely to be exploited.

osv · RUSTSEC-2026-0290

Published

## Summary When `pqc_kyber` is built with the opt-in `avx2` feature on x86_64, its constant-time conditional-move routine `cmov` is a no-op: it never performs the copy. That `cmov` is exactly the step that applies the Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO) implicit rejection during decapsulation. With it disabled, decapsulating an *invalid* ciphertext no longer returns a key-independent pseudorandom value; it returns a value that depends on the decrypted plaintext of the attacker-chosen ciphertext. This restores the chosen-ciphertext decryption oracle that the FO transform exists to remove, and yields full recovery of the static secret key. The attack requires no timing measurement, no side channel, and no faults; only the ability to submit ciphertexts to a decapsulation operation under a reused key pair and observe the resulting shared secret. See the linked pull request for the root cause, the reachable call path, and reproduction details. ## Affected configuration Reachable only in builds with `features = ["avx2"]` on an x86_64 target. The default (reference) backend and all non-x86_64 targets are unaffected. ## Impact Complete IND-CCA break. The plaintext-checking oracle drives a standard chosen-ciphertext key-recovery attack and extracts the entire static secret key. Any protocol reusing a Kyber key pair across decapsulations (static or long-term KEM keys, KEMTLS, HPKE recipients, pinned keys) is exposed; ephemeral-only key shares are not. The defect was verified end to end on ML-KEM-768: the full secret key was recovered in 4,272 decapsulation queries. ## Maintenance status The crate is unmaintained (last release 0.7.1, August 2023); no patched version exists or is expected. ## Mitigation - If remaining on this crate, do not enable the `avx2` feature; the default reference backend performs implicit rejection correctly. - Do not reuse a Kyber key pair across decapsulations. ## Credit Reported by 007bsd.

Source published
16 Aug 2026 12:00:00 UTC
Source modified
18 Sep 2026 09:15:05 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:54 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 13 Nov 05:08 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 272 fully read · documentation 469/469 current