BIP-322 address ownership verification bypass for P2WPKH and P2SH-P2WPKH addresses

CISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.

No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.

Affected versions of `bip322` accepted a BIP-322 proof created with an attacker-controlled private key as a valid signature for an unrelated victim P2WPKH or P2SH-P2WPKH address, allowing complete authentication bypass in applications using `verify_simple`, `verify_simple_encoded`, `verify_full`, or `verify_full_encoded` as proof that a user controls a Bitcoin address. In `verify_full`, the verifier obtained the public key from the caller-controlled witness and passed it to `verify_full_p2wpkh`, where the supposed public-key mismatch check read the key from the same witness and compared it with itself: ```rust let witness_pub_key = &witness.to_vec()[1]; if &pub_key.to_bytes() != witness_pub_key { return Err(Error::PublicKeyMismatch); } ``` Since `pub_key` was originally parsed from that exact witness element, this comparison was tautological. The code verified that the signature was valid for the public key embedded in the witness, but never verified that this public key hashes to the claimed address, violating BIP-322's requirement that the `message_signature` satisfy the `message_challenge` (the claimed address's scriptPubKey). As a result, an attacker could select any victim P2WPKH or P2SH-P2WPKH address, construct the BIP-322 challenge for that address and message, sign it with their own unrelated private key, and have the proof accepted. No victim key or victim interaction was required. Application-level nonces do not mitigate this, since the attacker can construct and sign the current challenge message with their own key. P2TR verification is not affected: the public key is derived from the address's witness program rather than from the caller-controlled witness. The flaw was corrected in commit [e8accbe](https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/bip322/commit/e8accbe7d39f48f030e44f333b4796e28f6aad80) by deriving the expected scriptPubKey from the witness public key (`P2WPKH(HASH160(pubkey))`, wrapped in P2SH for the nested case) and requiring it to exactly equal the scriptPubKey of the claimed address before signature verification, failing with `Error::PublicKeyMismatch` otherwise. The fix is included in version [0.0.11](https://crates.io/crates/bip322/0.0.11). Affected versions 0.0.6 through 0.0.10 have been yanked from crates.io. There is no known workaround that mitigates the vulnerability. Upgrading to version 0.0.11 is the recommended course of action.

Source published

14 Aug 2026 12:00:00 UTC

Source modified

9 Oct 2026 08:15:18 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:19:54 UTC

Source terms

OSV · upstream source license applies

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CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N