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russh: Agent server never calls `Agent::confirm`, so keys added with the confirm constraint (`ssh-add -c`) sign without confirmation

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cve-program · CVE-2026-116794

Published

russh is a Rust SSH client and server library that includes an SSH agent protocol implementation. From 0.50.0-beta.12 until 0.65.0, the agent server's Connection::try_sign path in russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs recognizes SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM but returns a hard-coded successful result instead of calling Agent::confirm. In applications that override Agent::confirm to require user approval or another policy check, a process that can reach the agent socket, including the remote side of a forwarded agent, can use a key added through ssh-add -c without that check and can authenticate or sign data as the user while the key remains loaded. The separate Agent::confirm_request hook still runs for every signing request, so checks implemented there remain effective, and implementations that retain the default always-successful Agent::confirm do not lose an approval check through this regression. This issue is fixed in version 0.65.0.

Source published
28 Oct 2026 17:06:57 UTC
Source modified
3 Nov 2026 13:08:40 UTC
Saved here
3 Nov 2026 14:57:17 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · 8.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N

euvd · EUVD-2026-112267

Published

russh is a Rust SSH client and server library that includes an SSH agent protocol implementation. From 0.50.0-beta.12 until 0.65.0, the agent server's Connection::try_sign path in russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs recognizes SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM but returns a hard-coded successful result instead of calling Agent::confirm. In applications that override Agent::confirm to require user approval or another policy check, a process that can reach the agent socket, including the remote side of a forwarded agent, can use a key added through ssh-add -c without that check and can authenticate or sign data as the user while the key remains loaded. The separate Agent::confirm_request hook still runs for every signing request, so checks implemented there remain effective, and implementations that retain the default always-successful Agent::confirm do not lose an approval check through this regression. This issue is fixed in version 0.65.0.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Oct 28, 2026, 5:06:57 PM

dateUpdated: Nov 3, 2026, 1:08:40 PM

1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases

RHSA-2026:93904: Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Hardened Images RPMs Security Update

CVE-2026-111061 · CVE-2026-116696 · CVE-2026-116773 · CVE-2026-116774 · CVE-2026-116794

Source published
Oct 28, 2026, 5:06:57 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Nov 3, 2026, 1:08:40 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
20 Nov 2026 12:11:56 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

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Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 8.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N

nvd · CVE-2026-116794

Published

russh is a Rust SSH client and server library that includes an SSH agent protocol implementation. From 0.50.0-beta.12 until 0.65.0, the agent server's Connection::try_sign path in russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs recognizes SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM but returns a hard-coded successful result instead of calling Agent::confirm. In applications that override Agent::confirm to require user approval or another policy check, a process that can reach the agent socket, including the remote side of a forwarded agent, can use a key added through ssh-add -c without that check and can authenticate or sign data as the user while the key remains loaded. The separate Agent::confirm_request hook still runs for every signing request, so checks implemented there remain effective, and implementations that retain the default always-successful Agent::confirm do not lose an approval check through this regression. This issue is fixed in version 0.65.0.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-862

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-10-28T18:17:14.127

lastModified: 2026-11-04T23:10:00.223

Source published
28 Oct 2026 18:17:14 UTC
Source modified
4 Nov 2026 23:10:00 UTC
Saved here
6 Nov 2026 01:43:49 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 8.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

osv · GHSA-vp5q-ff62-jwqv

Published

### Summary The agent server in `russh::keys::agent::server` never calls `Agent::confirm` before signing with a key that was added with the confirm constraint. That constraint is `SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM` (RFC 9987 §5.2.7.2), which is what `ssh-add -c` sends. The call was replaced by a hard-coded `true` in 3e04597 ("Native async traits encore", #455), first released in 0.50.0-beta.12. Every release since, up to and including 0.64.1, signs requests for confirm-constrained keys without asking the `Agent` implementation. A user who added a key with `-c` is therefore never asked to confirm. ### Details `Connection::try_sign` notes that the key needs confirmation, then awaits a ready future instead of the agent ([server.rs L348-L360 at v0.64.1](https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/blob/e5d80a07dc554480b6ea3b2e14adfc190407b627/russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs#L348-L360)): ```rust let agent = if needs_confirm { let (agent, ok) = { let _pk = key.clone(); Box::new(futures::future::ready((agent, true))) } .await; if !ok { return Ok((agent, false)); } agent } else { agent }; ``` Before [3e04597](https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/commit/3e04597dc54e36bfc85c21996f7d8d9d224e9826) the first statement was `let (agent, ok) = agent.confirm(key.clone()).await;`. `try_sign` was checked in the published crates on crates.io: - Every russh release from 0.50.0-beta.12 to 0.64.1 (52 versions) has the hard-coded `true`. - russh 0.50.0-beta.8 to beta.11 call `agent.confirm`. - Earlier russh releases have no agent server. It lived in russh-keys, and no russh-keys release is affected. Not affected: - `Agent` implementations that keep the default `confirm`, which returns `true` anyway. - Checks made in `Agent::confirm_request`, which is still called with `MessageType::Sign` for every sign request ([L158-L159](https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/blob/e5d80a07dc554480b6ea3b2e14adfc190407b627/russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs#L158-L159)). - The agent client, and the SSH client and server. ### PoC 1. Add this test to `mod test` in `russh/src/keys/mod.rs`. It uses the module's existing `Incoming` helper and `ED25519_KEY`. 2. Run `cargo test -p russh --lib keys::test::test_agent_confirms_keys_added_with_the_confirm_constraint`. ```rust #[tokio::test] #[cfg(unix)] async fn test_agent_confirms_keys_added_with_the_confirm_constraint() { use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering}; // An agent whose user refuses every confirmation prompt. #[derive(Clone)] struct Refuse(std::sync::Arc<AtomicUsize>); impl agent::server::Agent for Refuse { fn confirm( self, _: std::sync::Arc<PrivateKey>, ) -> Box<dyn Future<Output = (Self, bool)> + Send + Unpin> { self.0.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst); Box::new(futures::future::ready((self, false))) } } let prompts = std::sync::Arc::new(AtomicUsize::new(0)); let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap(); let agent_path = dir.path().join("agent"); let mut listener = tokio::net::UnixListener::bind(&agent_path).unwrap(); let agent = Refuse(prompts.clone()); tokio::spawn(async move { agent::server::serve( Incoming { listener: &mut listener, }, agent, ) .await }); let key = decode_secret_key(ED25519_KEY, Some("blabla")).unwrap(); let public = key.public_key().clone(); let stream = tokio::net::UnixStream::connect(&agent_path).await.unwrap(); let mut client = agent::client::AgentClient::connect(stream); // What `ssh-add -c` sends. client .add_identity(&key, &[agent::Constraint::Confirm]) .await .unwrap(); let signed = client .sign_request(&AgentIdentity::from(public), None, b"data".to_vec()) .await; let confirm_calls = prompts.load(Ordering::SeqCst); assert!( signed.is_err(), "the agent signed with a confirm-constrained key without asking: \ Agent::confirm was called {confirm_calls} time(s)" ); assert_eq!( confirm_calls, 1, "Agent::confirm should be asked exactly once" ); } ``` On v0.64.1 (e5d80a0) the test fails: ``` the agent signed with a confirm-constrained key without asking: Agent::confirm was called 0 time(s) ``` With the fix below it passes, and so do all 46 `keys::` tests. ### Impact A russh-based agent whose `Agent::confirm` asks the user, or applies any other check, signs every request for a confirm-constrained key without running that check. Anyone who can talk to the agent can then use the key without the user's approval: - other local processes of the user; - the remote host, when the agent is forwarded (`ssh -A`). Preventing exactly this is the purpose of the confirm constraint. RFC 9987 §10 names it as what stops an attacker with access to the agent from "stealing use of those keys". Because the agent accepts the constraint, `ssh-add -c` reports success and the user believes the key is protected. RFC 9987 §5.2.7 says an agent that does not support a constraint MUST refuse the key instead. The private key itself is not exposed. The impact is unauthorized use of it for as long as the attacker can reach the agent: logging in to other hosts as the user, or signing data such as git commits. **Known affected downstream user** (from its public code; not tested): Proton Pass desktop, which uses russh 0.62.7. - It adds every key with `Constraint::Confirm` ([mod.rs L332](https://github.com/ProtonMail/WebClients/blob/64862561fea883c1b4360b7338a0102eaad5c0fb/applications/pass-desktop/native/napi/src/ssh_agent/mod.rs#L332)). - It uses `Agent::confirm` as its "Pass is unlocked" check before signing, and defers `MessageType::Sign` from `confirm_request` to it ([L75-L100](https://github.com/ProtonMail/WebClients/blob/64862561fea883c1b4360b7338a0102eaad5c0fb/applications/pass-desktop/native/napi/src/ssh_agent/mod.rs#L75-L100)). That check never runs. - Proton also removes keys from the agent on lock and logout ([ssh-agent.middleware.ts L23-L27](https://github.com/ProtonMail/WebClients/blob/64862561fea883c1b4360b7338a0102eaad5c0fb/applications/pass/src/app/Store/ssh-agent.middleware.ts#L23-L27)). So the exposure there is limited to states in which keys stay loaded while Pass is not unlocked. Their own code notes, for example, that the agent persists across renderer reloads and account switches. ### Suggested fix ```diff --- a/russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs +++ b/russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs @@ -346,11 +346,7 @@ impl<S: AsyncRead + AsyncWrite + Send + Unpin + 'static, A: Agent + Send + Sync } }; let agent = if needs_confirm { - let (agent, ok) = { - let _pk = key.clone(); - Box::new(futures::future::ready((agent, true))) - } - .await; + let (agent, ok) = agent.confirm(key.clone()).await; if !ok { return Ok((agent, false)); } ``` When `confirm` returns `false`, `try_sign` returns `false` and the agent answers `SSH_AGENT_FAILURE`, as it did before the regression. **Compatibility note for the release notes:** `confirm` is called again for confirm-constrained keys, so implementations that stub it out will now hit that stub. - For example, Litterbox implements `confirm` as `todo!()` ([agent.rs L81-L87](https://github.com/Gerharddc/Litterbox/blob/c2cc67b80926affecbaa5905a7480af17b1270f2/litterbox/src/agent.rs#L81-L87)). - Each connection runs in its own task, so such a panic ends only that connection. **Related but separate:** with the default `confirm`, the agent still accepts the confirm constraint without enforcing it. Given RFC 9987 §5.2.7, refusing such keys when the application does not implement `confirm` may be worth considering.

Source published
30 Oct 2026 22:59:08 UTC
Source modified
12 Nov 2026 08:10:57 UTC
Saved here
12 Nov 2026 08:55:36 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N

Publisher rating · HIGH

osv · RUSTSEC-2026-0495

Published

A key added to an SSH agent with the confirm constraint (what `ssh-add -c` sends) must not be used to sign until the user approves each use. russh's agent server (`russh::keys::agent::server`) accepted the constraint, but when a sign request arrived for such a key it used a fixed `true` in place of the result of `Agent::confirm`, so the application's confirmation step never ran. This started in 0.50.0-beta.12; 0.50.0-beta.8 to beta.11 still called `confirm`, and earlier russh releases have no agent server. Any process that can reach the agent, including a remote host when the agent is forwarded, can then sign with the protected key without the user's approval, for example to log in elsewhere as the user. The private key itself is not disclosed. Agents whose `Agent::confirm` keeps the default, which always returns `true`, behave the same before and after the fix. From 0.65.0 the agent server calls `Agent::confirm` for confirm-constrained keys and refuses to sign when it returns `false`. Implementations that left `confirm` unimplemented (for example as `todo!()`) will now reach that code.

Source published
30 Oct 2026 12:00:00 UTC
Source modified
12 Nov 2026 08:00:04 UTC
Saved here
12 Nov 2026 08:55:36 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

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Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

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