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Hickory DNS through 0.26.0-alpha.1 DNSSEC Validation Bypass via Unrelated RRset

Exploitation and risk

Source status

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cve-program · CVE-2026-123581

Published

Hickory DNS hickory-proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 contain a DNSSEC validation flaw that accepts a response as a positive answer when any valid RRset appears in the answer section, without checking that the RRset is responsive to the query. Attackers can supply signed but unrelated RRsets so that responses lacking matching records are validated as positive answers instead of as no-data responses.

Source published
8 Nov 2026 01:38:15 UTC
Source modified
10 Nov 2026 17:57:50 UTC
Saved here
10 Nov 2026 19:21:22 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · 6.9 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

CVSS 3.1 · 5.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

euvd · EUVD-2026-119340

Published

Hickory DNS hickory-proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 contain a DNSSEC validation flaw that accepts a response as a positive answer when any valid RRset appears in the answer section, without checking that the RRset is responsive to the query. Attackers can supply signed but unrelated RRsets so that responses lacking matching records are validated as positive answers instead of as no-data responses.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Nov 8, 2026, 1:38:15 AM

dateUpdated: Nov 10, 2026, 5:57:50 PM

Source published
Nov 8, 2026, 1:38:15 AM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Nov 10, 2026, 5:57:50 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
12 Nov 2026 15:19:03 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

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Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 6.9 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

nvd · CVE-2026-123581

Published

Hickory DNS hickory-proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 contain a DNSSEC validation flaw that accepts a response as a positive answer when any valid RRset appears in the answer section, without checking that the RRset is responsive to the query. Attackers can supply signed but unrelated RRsets so that responses lacking matching records are validated as positive answers instead of as no-data responses.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-345

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-11-08T02:16:51.693

lastModified: 2026-11-10T22:15:59.797

Source published
8 Nov 2026 02:16:51 UTC
Source modified
10 Nov 2026 22:15:59 UTC
Saved here
12 Nov 2026 15:18:38 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 6.9 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 5.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

osv · RUSTSEC-2026-0512

Published

Up to 0.26.0-alpha.1, hickory-proto's DNSSEC validation treated a response with a non-empty answer section as a positive answer if its records validated, without checking that any of them matched the queried name and type. Someone who can answer or modify DNS responses could return a genuine signed RRset for another name or type and have it accepted as a validated answer. From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto releases (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.

Source published
3 Sep 2026 12:00:00 UTC
Source modified
12 Nov 2026 14:40:54 UTC
Saved here
12 Nov 2026 15:18:33 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

osv · RUSTSEC-2026-0520

Published

When a response had a non-empty answer section, DNSSEC validation treated it as a positive answer as long as the records in it validated. It did not check that any of those records had the queried name and either the queried type or type CNAME. An attacker who can answer or modify DNS responses can therefore return a genuine, signed RRset for some other name or type, and have it accepted as a validated answer to the query instead of being handled as a response with no matching data. This affects DNSSEC validation through `DnssecDnsHandle` when built with `dnssec-ring` or `dnssec-aws-lc-rs`. The fix requires at least one answer record that matches the query name and is either of the queried type or a CNAME, both for positive responses and when NSEC records are checked. It is in 0.26.2.

Source published
3 Sep 2026 12:00:00 UTC
Source modified
12 Nov 2026 14:40:54 UTC
Saved here
12 Nov 2026 15:18:33 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 12 Nov 19:39 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 272 fully read · documentation 469/469 current