Spoofed malformed UDP datagrams abort DNS lookups
Historical advisory saved 12 Nov 2026 15:18:33 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.
osv · RUSTSEC-2026-0517
PublishedWhile waiting for a reply on a UDP connection, the client parsed every datagram that arrived from the name server's address and port before checking its message ID. If parsing failed, the attempt ended with an error instead of dropping the datagram and waiting for the real reply. The receive loop also gave up after three datagrams. An off-path attacker who can guess the client's source port, but not the transaction ID, can send one malformed datagram with a spoofed source address and make the pending lookup fail. The fix reads the message ID from the first two bytes before parsing, ignores short datagrams and datagrams with the wrong ID, keeps listening until the outer timeout, and only then parses the response. It is in 0.26.2.
- Source published
- 3 Sep 2026 12:00:00 UTC
- Source modified
- 12 Nov 2026 14:30:06 UTC
- Saved here
- 12 Nov 2026 15:18:33 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
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Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H