A message-forgery issue was discovered in crypto/openpgp/clearsign/clearsign.go in supplementary Go…
Historical advisory recorded 24 Oct 2026 15:17:27 UTC. Read the latest advisory.
nvd · CVE-2019-11841
PublishedA message-forgery issue was discovered in crypto/openpgp/clearsign/clearsign.go in supplementary Go cryptography libraries 2019-03-25. According to the OpenPGP Message Format specification in RFC 4880 chapter 7, a cleartext signed message can contain one or more optional "Hash" Armor Headers. The "Hash" Armor Header specifies the message digest algorithm(s) used for the signature. However, the Go clearsign package ignores the value of this header, which allows an attacker to spoof it. Consequently, an attacker can lead a victim to believe the signature was generated using a different message digest algorithm than what was actually used. Moreover, since the library skips Armor Header parsing in general, an attacker can not only embed arbitrary Armor Headers, but also prepend arbitrary text to cleartext messages without invalidating the signatures.
Read the publisher's advisoryAffected versions, risk and source history
nvd · CVE-2019-11841
PublishedA message-forgery issue was discovered in crypto/openpgp/clearsign/clearsign.go in supplementary Go cryptography libraries 2019-03-25. According to the OpenPGP Message Format specification in RFC 4880 chapter 7, a cleartext signed message c…
A message-forgery issue was discovered in crypto/openpgp/clearsign/clearsign.go in supplementary Go cryptography libraries 2019-03-25. According to the OpenPGP Message Format specification in RFC 4880 chapter 7, a cleartext signed message can contain one or more optional "Hash" Armor Headers. The "Hash" Armor Header specifies the message digest algorithm(s) used for the signature. However, the Go clearsign package ignores the value of this header, which allows an attacker to spoof it. Consequently, an attacker can lead a victim to believe the signature was generated using a different message digest algorithm than what was actually used. Moreover, since the library skips Armor Header parsing in general, an attacker can not only embed arbitrary Armor Headers, but also prepend arbitrary text to cleartext messages without invalidating the signatures.
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Modified
Weakness classifications: CWE-347
Original publisher date fields
published: 2019-05-22T17:29:00.287
lastModified: 2026-06-17T02:13:43.560
3 source CPE criteria · context only
- cpe:2.3:a:golang:crypto:2019-03-25:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
- cpe:2.3:o:debian:debian_linux:8.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
- cpe:2.3:o:debian:debian_linux:9.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.
- Source published
- 22 May 2019 17:29:00 UTC
- Source modified
- 17 Jun 2026 02:13:43 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 15:17:27 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary · 5.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
CVSS 2.0 · [email protected] · Primary · 4.3 AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:N