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Open Redirect in OAuth2 Proxy

CVSS 3.1 7.1 HIGHEUVD CVSS 3.1 7.1 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 7.1 HIGHCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary 6.1 MEDIUMCVSS 2.0 · [email protected] · Primary 5.8 MEDIUMCVSS_V3 Publisher rating HIGHFixed by github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy 5.1.1KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2020-11053

Published

In OAuth2 Proxy before 5.1.1, there is an open redirect vulnerability. Users can provide a redirect address for the proxy to send the authenticated user to at the end of the authentication flow. This is expected to be the original URL that the user was trying to access. This redirect URL is checked within the proxy and validated before redirecting the user to prevent malicious actors providing redirects to potentially harmful sites. However, by crafting a redirect URL with HTML encoded whitespace characters the validation could be bypassed and allow a redirect to any URL provided. This has been patched in 5.1.1.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2021-2541

Published

In OAuth2 Proxy before 5.1.1, there is an open redirect vulnerability. Users can provide a redirect address for the proxy to send the authenticated user to at the end of the authentication flow. This is expected to be the original URL that the user was trying to access. This redirect URL is checked within the proxy and validated before redirecting the user to prevent malicious actors providing redirects to potentially harmful sites. However, by crafting a redirect URL with HTML encoded whitespace characters the validation could be bypassed and allow a redirect to any URL provided. This has been patched in 5.1.1.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2020-11053

Published

In OAuth2 Proxy before 5.1.1, there is an open redirect vulnerability. Users can provide a redirect address for the proxy to send the authenticated user to at the end of the authentication flow. This is expected to be the original URL that the user was trying to access. This redirect URL is checked within the proxy and validated before redirecting the user to prevent malicious actors providing redirects to potentially harmful sites. However, by crafting a redirect URL with HTML encoded whitespace characters the validation could be bypassed and allow a redirect to any URL provided. This has been patched in 5.1.1.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-j7px-6hwj-hpjg

Published

### Impact As users can provide a redirect address for the proxy to send the authenticated user to at the end of the authentication flow. This is expected to be the original URL that the user was trying to access. This redirect URL is checked within the proxy and validated before redirecting the user to prevent malicious actors providing redirects to potentially harmful sites. However, by crafting a redirect URL with HTML encoded whitespace characters (eg. `%0a`, `%0b`,`%09`,`%0d`) the validation could be bypassed and allow a redirect to any URL provided. ### Patches @rootxharsh and @iamnoooob provided this patch as potential solution: ``` From 4b941f56eda310b5c4dc8080b7635a6bfabccad4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Harsh Jaiswal <[email protected]> Date: Fri, 1 May 2020 20:38:31 +0530 Subject: [PATCH] Fixes redirect issue --- oauthproxy.go | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/oauthproxy.go b/oauthproxy.go index 1e9bb7c..f8beb4d 100644 --- a/oauthproxy.go +++ b/oauthproxy.go @@ -577,8 +577,9 @@ func validOptionalPort(port string) bool { // IsValidRedirect checks whether the redirect URL is whitelisted func (p *OAuthProxy) IsValidRedirect(redirect string) bool { + matched, _ := regexp.MatchString(`^/\s+/|\\`, redirect) switch { - case strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "/") && !strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "//") && !strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "/\\"): + case strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "/") && !strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "//") && !matched: return true case strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "http://") || strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "https://"): redirectURL, err := url.Parse(redirect) -- 2.17.1 ``` This issue was also reported to us separately by @mik317 several hours later The fix was implemented in [#xxx]() and released as version 5.1.1

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Affected versions, risk and source history

cve-program · CVE-2020-11053

Published

OAuth2 Proxy

Vendor product

Publisher's version information

Shown as published. These rules are not interpreted as NuGet package version ranges.

{
                    "product": "OAuth2 Proxy",
                    "vendor": "OAuth2 Proxy",
                    "versions": [
                        {
                            "status": "affected",
                            "version": "< 5.1.1"
                        }
                    ]
                }

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

euvd · EUVD-2021-2541

Published

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: May 7, 2020, 8:30:13 PM

dateUpdated: Aug 4, 2024, 11:21:14 AM

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

nvd · CVE-2020-11053

Published

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Modified

Weakness classifications: CWE-601

Original publisher date fields

published: 2020-05-07T21:15:11.530

lastModified: 2026-06-17T02:48:57.090

1 source CPE criteria · context only
  • cpe:2.3:a:oauth2_proxy_project:oauth2_proxy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

osv · GHSA-j7px-6hwj-hpjg

Published

github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 5.1.1

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 19 Nov 06:56 UTC · 273 of 275 readable · 269 fully read · documentation 469/469 current