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containerd-shim API Exposed to Host Network Containers

CVSS 3.1 5.2 MEDIUMEUVD CVSS 3.1 5.2 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 5.2 MEDIUMCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary 5.2 MEDIUMCVSS 2.0 · [email protected] · Primary 3.6 LOWCVSS_V3 Publisher rating MODERATEFixed by github.com/containerd/containerd 1.3.9Fixed by github.com/containerd/containerd 1.4.3osv · severity unknownFixed by github.com/containerd/containerd 1.3.9Fixed by github.com/containerd/containerd 1.4.3KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2020-15257

Published

containerd is an industry-standard container runtime and is available as a daemon for Linux and Windows. In containerd before versions 1.3.9 and 1.4.3, the containerd-shim API is improperly exposed to host network containers. Access controls for the shim’s API socket verified that the connecting process had an effective UID of 0, but did not otherwise restrict access to the abstract Unix domain socket. This would allow malicious containers running in the same network namespace as the shim, with an effective UID of 0 but otherwise reduced privileges, to cause new processes to be run with elevated privileges. This vulnerability has been fixed in containerd 1.3.9 and 1.4.3. Users should update to these versions as soon as they are released. It should be noted that containers started with an old version of containerd-shim should be stopped and restarted, as running containers will continue to be vulnerable even after an upgrade. If you are not providing the ability for untrusted users to start containers in the same network namespace as the shim (typically the "host" network namespace, for example with docker run --net=host or hostNetwork: true in a Kubernetes pod) and run with an effective UID of 0, you are not vulnerable to this issue. If you are running containers with a vulnerable configuration, you can deny access to all abstract sockets with AppArmor by adding a line similar to deny unix addr=@**, to your policy. It is best practice to run containers with a reduced set of privileges, with a non-zero UID, and with isolated namespaces. The containerd maintainers strongly advise against sharing namespaces with the host. Reducing the set of isolation mechanisms used for a container necessarily increases that container's privilege, regardless of what container runtime is used for running that container.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2021-0915

Published

containerd is an industry-standard container runtime and is available as a daemon for Linux and Windows. In containerd before versions 1.3.9 and 1.4.3, the containerd-shim API is improperly exposed to host network containers. Access controls for the shim’s API socket verified that the connecting process had an effective UID of 0, but did not otherwise restrict access to the abstract Unix domain socket. This would allow malicious containers running in the same network namespace as the shim, with an effective UID of 0 but otherwise reduced privileges, to cause new processes to be run with elevated privileges. This vulnerability has been fixed in containerd 1.3.9 and 1.4.3. Users should update to these versions as soon as they are released. It should be noted that containers started with an old version of containerd-shim should be stopped and restarted, as running containers will continue to be vulnerable even after an upgrade. If you are not providing the ability for untrusted users to start containers in the same network namespace as the shim (typically the "host" network namespace, for example with docker run --net=host or hostNetwork: true in a Kubernetes pod) and run with an effective UID of 0, you are not vulnerable to this issue. If you are running containers with a vulnerable configuration, you can deny access to all abstract sockets with AppArmor by adding a line similar to deny unix addr=@**, to your policy. It is best practice to run containers with a reduced set of privileges, with a non-zero UID, and with isolated namespaces. The containerd maintainers strongly advise against sharing namespaces with the host. Reducing the set of isolation mechanisms used for a container necessarily increases that container's privilege, regardless of what container runtime is used for running that container.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2020-15257

Published

containerd is an industry-standard container runtime and is available as a daemon for Linux and Windows. In containerd before versions 1.3.9 and 1.4.3, the containerd-shim API is improperly exposed to host network containers. Access controls for the shim’s API socket verified that the connecting process had an effective UID of 0, but did not otherwise restrict access to the abstract Unix domain socket. This would allow malicious containers running in the same network namespace as the shim, with an effective UID of 0 but otherwise reduced privileges, to cause new processes to be run with elevated privileges. This vulnerability has been fixed in containerd 1.3.9 and 1.4.3. Users should update to these versions as soon as they are released. It should be noted that containers started with an old version of containerd-shim should be stopped and restarted, as running containers will continue to be vulnerable even after an upgrade. If you are not providing the ability for untrusted users to start containers in the same network namespace as the shim (typically the "host" network namespace, for example with docker run --net=host or hostNetwork: true in a Kubernetes pod) and run with an effective UID of 0, you are not vulnerable to this issue. If you are running containers with a vulnerable configuration, you can deny access to all abstract sockets with AppArmor by adding a line similar to deny unix addr=@**, to your policy. It is best practice to run containers with a reduced set of privileges, with a non-zero UID, and with isolated namespaces. The containerd maintainers strongly advise against sharing namespaces with the host. Reducing the set of isolation mechanisms used for a container necessarily increases that container's privilege, regardless of what container runtime is used for running that container.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-36xw-fx78-c5r4

Published

## Impact Access controls for the shim’s API socket verified that the connecting process had an effective UID of 0, but did not otherwise restrict access to the abstract Unix domain socket. This would allow malicious containers running in the same network namespace as the shim, with an effective UID of 0 but otherwise reduced privileges, to cause new processes to be run with elevated privileges. ### Specific Go Packages Affected github.com/containerd/containerd/cmd ## Patches This vulnerability has been fixed in containerd 1.3.9 and 1.4.3. Users should update to these versions as soon as they are released. It should be noted that containers started with an old version of containerd-shim should be stopped and restarted, as running containers will continue to be vulnerable even after an upgrade. ## Workarounds If you are not providing the ability for untrusted users to start containers in the same network namespace as the shim (typically the "host" network namespace, for example with `docker run --net=host` or `hostNetwork: true` in a Kubernetes pod) and run with an effective UID of 0, you are not vulnerable to this issue. If you are running containers with a vulnerable configuration, you can deny access to all abstract sockets with AppArmor by adding a line similar to `deny unix addr=@**,` to your policy. It is best practice to run containers with a reduced set of privileges, with a non-zero UID, and with isolated namespaces. The containerd maintainers strongly advise against sharing namespaces with the host. Reducing the set of isolation mechanisms used for a container necessarily increases that container's privilege, regardless of what container runtime is used for running that container. ## Credits The containerd maintainers would like to thank Jeff Dileo of NCC Group for responsibly disclosing this issue in accordance with the [containerd security policy](https://github.com/containerd/project/blob/master/SECURITY.md) and for reviewing the patch. ## For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * [Open an issue](https://github.com/containerd/containerd/issues/new/choose) * Email us at [email protected] if you think you’ve found a security bug.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GO-2022-0784

Published

containerd-shim API Exposed to Host Network Containers in github.com/containerd/containerd

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

Exploitation and risk

Source status

CISA KEV lists vulnerabilities known to be exploited. FIRST EPSS estimates the likelihood of exploitation in the next 30 days. An unavailable score does not mean zero risk.

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This view includes predictions for CVE identifiers explicitly listed in public NuGet advisories. Microsoft release pages have their own prediction coverage. Check source status for the scope and latest checks.

No exploitation or prediction data is available here for these CVEs. This does not mean they are safe or unlikely to be exploited.

cve-program · CVE-2020-15257

Published

containerd-shim API Exposed to Host Network Containers

containerd is an industry-standard container runtime and is available as a daemon for Linux and Windows. In containerd before versions 1.3.9 and 1.4.3, the containerd-shim API is improperly exposed to host network containers. Access controls for the shim’s API socket verified that the connecting process had an effective UID of 0, but did not otherwise restrict access to the abstract Unix domain socket. This would allow malicious containers running in the same network namespace as the shim, with an effective UID of 0 but otherwise reduced privileges, to cause new processes to be run with elevated privileges. This vulnerability has been fixed in containerd 1.3.9 and 1.4.3. Users should update to these versions as soon as they are released. It should be noted that containers started with an old version of containerd-shim should be stopped and restarted, as running containers will continue to be vulnerable even after an upgrade. If you are not providing the ability for untrusted users to start containers in the same network namespace as the shim (typically the "host" network namespace, for example with docker run --net=host or hostNetwork: true in a Kubernetes pod) and run with an effective UID of 0, you are not vulnerable to this issue. If you are running containers with a vulnerable configuration, you can deny access to all abstract sockets with AppArmor by adding a line similar to deny unix addr=@**, to your policy. It is best practice to run containers with a reduced set of privileges, with a non-zero UID, and with isolated namespaces. The containerd maintainers strongly advise against sharing namespaces with the host. Reducing the set of isolation mechanisms used for a container necessarily increases that container's privilege, regardless of what container runtime is used for running that container.

Source published
1 Dec 2020 02:30:16 UTC
Source modified
4 Aug 2024 13:15:19 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · 5.2 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

euvd · EUVD-2021-0915

Published

containerd is an industry-standard container runtime and is available as a daemon for Linux and Windows. In containerd before versions 1.3.9 and 1.4.3, the containerd-shim API is improperly exposed to host network containers. Access control…

containerd is an industry-standard container runtime and is available as a daemon for Linux and Windows. In containerd before versions 1.3.9 and 1.4.3, the containerd-shim API is improperly exposed to host network containers. Access controls for the shim’s API socket verified that the connecting process had an effective UID of 0, but did not otherwise restrict access to the abstract Unix domain socket. This would allow malicious containers running in the same network namespace as the shim, with an effective UID of 0 but otherwise reduced privileges, to cause new processes to be run with elevated privileges. This vulnerability has been fixed in containerd 1.3.9 and 1.4.3. Users should update to these versions as soon as they are released. It should be noted that containers started with an old version of containerd-shim should be stopped and restarted, as running containers will continue to be vulnerable even after an upgrade. If you are not providing the ability for untrusted users to start containers in the same network namespace as the shim (typically the "host" network namespace, for example with docker run --net=host or hostNetwork: true in a Kubernetes pod) and run with an effective UID of 0, you are not vulnerable to this issue. If you are running containers with a vulnerable configuration, you can deny access to all abstract sockets with AppArmor by adding a line similar to deny unix addr=@**, to your policy. It is best practice to run containers with a reduced set of privileges, with a non-zero UID, and with isolated namespaces. The containerd maintainers strongly advise against sharing namespaces with the host. Reducing the set of isolation mechanisms used for a container necessarily increases that container's privilege, regardless of what container runtime is used for running that container.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Dec 1, 2020, 2:30:16 AM

dateUpdated: Aug 4, 2024, 1:15:19 PM

10 related source bulletins · separate from aliases

SUSE-SU-2025:03540-1: Security update for docker-stable

CVE-2014-3499 · CVE-2014-5277 · CVE-2014-6407 · CVE-2014-6408 · CVE-2014-8178 · CVE-2014-8179 · CVE-2014-9356 · CVE-2014-9357 · CVE-2014-9358 · CVE-2015-3627 · CVE-2015-3629 · CVE-2015-3630 · CVE-2015-3631 · CVE-2016-3697 · CVE-2016-8867 · CVE-2016-9962 · CVE-2017-14992 · CVE-2017-16539 · CVE-2018-10892 · CVE-2018-15664 · CVE-2018-16873 · CVE-2018-16874 · CVE-2018-16875 · CVE-2018-20699 · CVE-2019-13509 · CVE-2019-14271 · CVE-2020-12912 · CVE-2020-13401 · CVE-2020-15257 · CVE-2020-8694 · CVE-2020-8695 · CVE-2021-21284 · CVE-2021-21285 · CVE-2021-41089 · CVE-2021-41091 · CVE-2021-41092 · CVE-2021-41103 · CVE-2021-41190 · CVE-2021-43565 · CVE-2022-24769 · CVE-2022-27191 · CVE-2022-36109 · CVE-2023-28840 · CVE-2023-28841 · CVE-2023-28842 · CVE-2024-23650 · CVE-2024-23651 · CVE-2024-23652 · CVE-2024-23653 · CVE-2024-29018 · CVE-2024-41110 · CVE-2025-22868 · CVE-2025-22869

openSUSE-SU-2024:10693-1: containerd-1.4.8-2.2 on GA media

CVE-2016-9962 · CVE-2018-16873 · CVE-2018-16874 · CVE-2018-16875 · CVE-2019-5736 · CVE-2020-15157 · CVE-2020-15257 · CVE-2021-21334 · CVE-2021-32760

openSUSE-SU-2021:0278-1: Security update for containerd, docker, docker-runc, golang-github-docker-libnetwork

CVE-2020-15257 · CVE-2021-21284 · CVE-2021-21285

RHSA-2022:2183: Red Hat Security Advisory: Release of containers for OSP 16.2.z director operator tech preview

CVE-2019-11253 · CVE-2019-19794 · CVE-2020-15257 · CVE-2021-29482 · CVE-2021-32760

openSUSE-SU-2025:15589-1: docker-stable-24.0.9_ce-15.1 on GA media

CVE-2014-3499 · CVE-2014-5277 · CVE-2014-6407 · CVE-2014-6408 · CVE-2014-8178 · CVE-2014-8179 · CVE-2014-9356 · CVE-2014-9357 · CVE-2014-9358 · CVE-2015-3627 · CVE-2015-3629 · CVE-2015-3630 · CVE-2015-3631 · CVE-2016-3697 · CVE-2016-8867 · CVE-2016-9962 · CVE-2017-14992 · CVE-2017-16539 · CVE-2018-10892 · CVE-2018-15664 · CVE-2018-16873 · CVE-2018-16874 · CVE-2018-16875 · CVE-2018-20699 · CVE-2019-13509 · CVE-2019-14271 · CVE-2020-12912 · CVE-2020-13401 · CVE-2020-15257 · CVE-2020-8694 · CVE-2020-8695 · CVE-2021-21284 · CVE-2021-41089 · CVE-2021-41092 · CVE-2021-41190 · CVE-2021-43565 · CVE-2022-24769 · CVE-2022-36109 · CVE-2023-28840 · CVE-2023-28841 · CVE-2023-28842 · CVE-2024-23651 · CVE-2024-23652

WID-SEC-W-2023-2947: Docker und Kubernetes: Schwachstelle ermöglicht Privilegieneskalation

CVE-2020-15257

openSUSE-SU-2024:10722-1: docker-20.10.6_ce-2.1 on GA media

CVE-2016-9962 · CVE-2017-14992 · CVE-2017-16539 · CVE-2018-10892 · CVE-2018-15664 · CVE-2018-16873 · CVE-2018-16874 · CVE-2018-16875 · CVE-2018-20699 · CVE-2019-13509 · CVE-2019-14271 · CVE-2020-13401 · CVE-2020-15257 · CVE-2021-21284

SUSE-SU-2020:3938-1: Security update for containerd, docker, docker-runc, golang-github-docker-libnetwork

CVE-2020-15257

SUSE-SU-2025:03545-1: Security update for docker-stable

CVE-2014-3499 · CVE-2014-5277 · CVE-2014-6407 · CVE-2014-6408 · CVE-2014-8178 · CVE-2014-8179 · CVE-2014-9356 · CVE-2014-9357 · CVE-2014-9358 · CVE-2015-3627 · CVE-2015-3629 · CVE-2015-3630 · CVE-2015-3631 · CVE-2016-3697 · CVE-2016-8867 · CVE-2016-9962 · CVE-2017-14992 · CVE-2017-16539 · CVE-2018-10892 · CVE-2018-15664 · CVE-2018-16873 · CVE-2018-16874 · CVE-2018-16875 · CVE-2018-20699 · CVE-2019-13509 · CVE-2019-14271 · CVE-2020-12912 · CVE-2020-13401 · CVE-2020-15257 · CVE-2020-8694 · CVE-2020-8695 · CVE-2021-21284 · CVE-2021-21285 · CVE-2021-41089 · CVE-2021-41091 · CVE-2021-41092 · CVE-2021-41103 · CVE-2021-41190 · CVE-2021-43565 · CVE-2022-24769 · CVE-2022-27191 · CVE-2022-36109 · CVE-2023-28840 · CVE-2023-28841 · CVE-2023-28842 · CVE-2024-23650 · CVE-2024-23651 · CVE-2024-23652 · CVE-2024-23653 · CVE-2024-29018 · CVE-2024-41110 · CVE-2025-22868 · CVE-2025-22869

SUSE-SU-2021:0435-1: Security update for containerd, docker, docker-runc, golang-github-docker-libnetwork

CVE-2020-15257 · CVE-2021-21284 · CVE-2021-21285

Source published
Dec 1, 2020, 2:30:16 AM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Aug 4, 2024, 1:15:19 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
17 Nov 2026 23:30:49 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 5.2 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

nvd · CVE-2020-15257

Published

containerd is an industry-standard container runtime and is available as a daemon for Linux and Windows. In containerd before versions 1.3.9 and 1.4.3, the containerd-shim API is improperly exposed to host network containers. Access control…

containerd is an industry-standard container runtime and is available as a daemon for Linux and Windows. In containerd before versions 1.3.9 and 1.4.3, the containerd-shim API is improperly exposed to host network containers. Access controls for the shim’s API socket verified that the connecting process had an effective UID of 0, but did not otherwise restrict access to the abstract Unix domain socket. This would allow malicious containers running in the same network namespace as the shim, with an effective UID of 0 but otherwise reduced privileges, to cause new processes to be run with elevated privileges. This vulnerability has been fixed in containerd 1.3.9 and 1.4.3. Users should update to these versions as soon as they are released. It should be noted that containers started with an old version of containerd-shim should be stopped and restarted, as running containers will continue to be vulnerable even after an upgrade. If you are not providing the ability for untrusted users to start containers in the same network namespace as the shim (typically the "host" network namespace, for example with docker run --net=host or hostNetwork: true in a Kubernetes pod) and run with an effective UID of 0, you are not vulnerable to this issue. If you are running containers with a vulnerable configuration, you can deny access to all abstract sockets with AppArmor by adding a line similar to deny unix addr=@**, to your policy. It is best practice to run containers with a reduced set of privileges, with a non-zero UID, and with isolated namespaces. The containerd maintainers strongly advise against sharing namespaces with the host. Reducing the set of isolation mechanisms used for a container necessarily increases that container's privilege, regardless of what container runtime is used for running that container.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Modified

Weakness classifications: CWE-669

Original publisher date fields

published: 2020-12-01T03:15:11.257

lastModified: 2026-06-17T02:56:22.470

3 source CPE criteria · context only
  • cpe:2.3:a:linuxfoundation:containerd:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:fedoraproject:fedora:33:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:debian:debian_linux:10.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

Source published
1 Dec 2020 03:15:11 UTC
Source modified
17 Jun 2026 02:56:22 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 16:17:26 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 5.2 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary · 5.2 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

CVSS 2.0 · [email protected] · Primary · 3.6 AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:N

osv · GHSA-36xw-fx78-c5r4

Published

containerd-shim API Exposed to Host Network Containers

## Impact Access controls for the shim’s API socket verified that the connecting process had an effective UID of 0, but did not otherwise restrict access to the abstract Unix domain socket. This would allow malicious containers running in the same network namespace as the shim, with an effective UID of 0 but otherwise reduced privileges, to cause new processes to be run with elevated privileges. ### Specific Go Packages Affected github.com/containerd/containerd/cmd ## Patches This vulnerability has been fixed in containerd 1.3.9 and 1.4.3. Users should update to these versions as soon as they are released. It should be noted that containers started with an old version of containerd-shim should be stopped and restarted, as running containers will continue to be vulnerable even after an upgrade. ## Workarounds If you are not providing the ability for untrusted users to start containers in the same network namespace as the shim (typically the "host" network namespace, for example with `docker run --net=host` or `hostNetwork: true` in a Kubernetes pod) and run with an effective UID of 0, you are not vulnerable to this issue. If you are running containers with a vulnerable configuration, you can deny access to all abstract sockets with AppArmor by adding a line similar to `deny unix addr=@**,` to your policy. It is best practice to run containers with a reduced set of privileges, with a non-zero UID, and with isolated namespaces. The containerd maintainers strongly advise against sharing namespaces with the host. Reducing the set of isolation mechanisms used for a container necessarily increases that container's privilege, regardless of what container runtime is used for running that container. ## Credits The containerd maintainers would like to thank Jeff Dileo of NCC Group for responsibly disclosing this issue in accordance with the [containerd security policy](https://github.com/containerd/project/blob/master/SECURITY.md) and for reviewing the patch. ## For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * [Open an issue](https://github.com/containerd/containerd/issues/new/choose) * Email us at [email protected] if you think you’ve found a security bug.

Source published
24 May 2021 17:00:22 UTC
Source modified
10 Sep 2026 03:49:04 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

Publisher rating · MODERATE

osv · GO-2022-0784

Published

containerd-shim API Exposed to Host Network Containers in github.com/containerd/containerd

containerd-shim API Exposed to Host Network Containers in github.com/containerd/containerd

Source published
21 Aug 2024 15:28:59 UTC
Source modified
4 Feb 2026 02:49:36 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 19 Nov 05:53 UTC · 273 of 275 readable · 269 fully read · documentation 469/469 current