An issue was discovered in the async-h1 crate before 2.3.0 for Rust. Request smuggling can occur when used behind a reverse proxy.
euvd · EUVD-2022-3538 · Published
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async-h1 is an asynchronous HTTP/1.1 parser for Rust (crates.io). There is a request smuggling vulnerability in async-h1 before version 2.3.0. This vulnerability affects any webserver that uses async-h1 behind a reverse proxy, including all such Tide applications. If the server does not read the body of a request which is longer than some buffer length, async-h1 will attempt to read a subsequent request from the body content starting at that offset into the body. One way to exploit this vulnerability would be for an adversary to craft a request such that the body contains a request that would not be noticed by a reverse proxy, allowing it to forge forwarded/x-forwarded headers. If an application trusted the authenticity of these headers, it could be misled by the smuggled request. Another potential concern with this vulnerability is that if a reverse proxy is sending multiple http clients' requests along the same keep-alive connection, it would be possible for the smuggled request to specify a long content and capture another user's request in its body. This content could be captured in a post request to an endpoint that allows the content to be subsequently retrieved by the adversary. This has been addressed in async-h1 2.3.0 and previous versions have been yanked.
Read the publisher's advisoryAn issue was discovered in the async-h1 crate before 2.3.0 for Rust. Request smuggling can occur when used behind a reverse proxy.
Read the publisher's advisoryasync-h1 is an asynchronous HTTP/1.1 parser for Rust (crates.io). There is a request smuggling vulnerability in async-h1 before version 2.3.0. This vulnerability affects any webserver that uses async-h1 behind a reverse proxy, including all such Tide applications. If the server does not read the body of a request which is longer than some buffer length, async-h1 will attempt to read a subsequent request from the body content starting at that offset into the body. One way to exploit this vulnerability would be for an adversary to craft a request such that the body contains a request that would not be noticed by a reverse proxy, allowing it to forge forwarded/x-forwarded headers. If an application trusted the authenticity of these headers, it could be misled by the smuggled request. Another potential concern with this vulnerability is that if a reverse proxy is sending multiple http clients' requests along the same keep-alive connection, it would be possible for the smuggled request to specify a long content and capture another user's request in its body. This content could be captured in a post request to an endpoint that allows the content to be subsequently retrieved by the adversary. This has been addressed in async-h1 2.3.0 and previous versions have been yanked.
Read the publisher's advisoryAn issue was discovered in the async-h1 crate before 2.3.0 for Rust. Request smuggling can occur when used behind a reverse proxy.
Read the publisher's advisoryasync-h1 is an asynchronous HTTP/1.1 parser for Rust (crates.io). There is a request smuggling vulnerability in async-h1 before version 2.3.0. This vulnerability affects any webserver that uses async-h1 behind a reverse proxy, including all such Tide applications. If the server does not read the body of a request which is longer than some buffer length, async-h1 will attempt to read a subsequent request from the body content starting at that offset into the body. One way to exploit this vulnerability would be for an adversary to craft a request such that the body contains a request that would not be noticed by a reverse proxy, allowing it to forge forwarded/x-forwarded headers. If an application trusted the authenticity of these headers, it could be misled by the smuggled request. Another potential concern with this vulnerability is that if a reverse proxy is sending multiple http clients' requests along the same keep-alive connection, it would be possible for the smuggled request to specify a long content and capture another user's request in its body. This content could be captured in a post request to an endpoint that allows the content to be subsequently retrieved by the adversary. This has been addressed in async-h1 2.3.0 and previous versions have been yanked.
Read the publisher's advisoryAn issue was discovered in the async-h1 crate before 2.3.0 for Rust. Request smuggling can occur when used behind a reverse proxy.
Read the publisher's advisory### Impact This vulnerability affects any webserver that uses async-h1 behind a reverse proxy, including all such Tide applications. If the server does not read the body of a request which is longer than some buffer length, async-h1 will attempt to read a subsequent request from the body content starting at that offset into the body. One way to exploit this vulnerability would be for an adversary to craft a request such that the body contains a request that would not be noticed by a reverse proxy, allowing it to forge forwarded/x-forwarded headers. If an application trusted the authenticity of these headers, it could be misled by the smuggled request. Another potential concern with this vulnerability is that if a reverse proxy is sending multiple http clients' requests along the same keep-alive connection, it would be possible for the smuggled request to specify a long content and capture another user's request in its body. This content could be captured in a post request to an endpoint that allows the content to be subsequently retrieved by the adversary. ### Patches This has been addressed in async-h1 2.3.0 and previous versions have been yanked. ### Workarounds none ### References https://github.com/http-rs/async-h1/releases/tag/v2.3.0 ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in [async-h1](https://github.com/http-rs/async-h1) * Contact a core team member on [zulip](https://http-rs.zulip-chat.com) or [discord](https://discord.gg/x2gKzst)
Read the publisher's advisoryAn issue was discovered in the async-h1 crate before 2.3.0 for Rust. Request smuggling can occur when used behind a reverse proxy.
Read the publisher's advisoryThis vulnerability affects any webserver that uses async-h1 behind a reverse proxy, including all such Tide applications. If the server does not read the body of a request which is longer than some buffer length, async-h1 will attempt to read a subsequent request from the body content starting at that offset into the body. One way to exploit this vulnerability would be for an adversary to craft a request such that the body contains a request that would not be noticed by a reverse proxy, allowing it to forge forwarded/x-forwarded headers. If an application trusted the authenticity of these headers, it could be misled by the smuggled request. Another potential concern with this vulnerability is that if a reverse proxy is sending multiple http clients' requests along the same keep-alive connection, it would be possible for the smuggled request to specify a long content and capture another user's request in its body. This content could be captured in a post request to an endpoint that allows the content to be subsequently retrieved by the adversary. The flaw was corrected in commit [7df79f](https://github.com/http-rs/async-h1/commit/7df79f1d5d99fc0f492b315eebc7f0d301a85212) by ensuring that the request body is always consumed from the tcp stream before attempting to read subsequent keep-alive request headers from it.
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