Public mode

No access to your tenant or devices. Every item links to its source. What this means

Sources need attention Customize Public modeDiscuss ChangeIntel on Discord

request smuggling in async-h1

CVSS 3.1 6.8 MEDIUMcve-program · severity unknownEUVD CVSS 3.1 6.8 euvd · severity unknownCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 6.8 MEDIUMCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary 7.5 HIGHCVSS 2.0 · [email protected] · Primary 5.8 MEDIUMCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary 6.1 MEDIUMCVSS 2.0 · [email protected] · Primary 4.3 MEDIUMCVSS_V3 Publisher rating MODERATEFixed by async-h1 2.3.0CVSS_V3 Publisher rating MODERATEFixed by async-h1 2.3.0osv · severity unknownFixed by async-h1 2.3.0KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2020-26281

Published

async-h1 is an asynchronous HTTP/1.1 parser for Rust (crates.io). There is a request smuggling vulnerability in async-h1 before version 2.3.0. This vulnerability affects any webserver that uses async-h1 behind a reverse proxy, including all such Tide applications. If the server does not read the body of a request which is longer than some buffer length, async-h1 will attempt to read a subsequent request from the body content starting at that offset into the body. One way to exploit this vulnerability would be for an adversary to craft a request such that the body contains a request that would not be noticed by a reverse proxy, allowing it to forge forwarded/x-forwarded headers. If an application trusted the authenticity of these headers, it could be misled by the smuggled request. Another potential concern with this vulnerability is that if a reverse proxy is sending multiple http clients' requests along the same keep-alive connection, it would be possible for the smuggled request to specify a long content and capture another user's request in its body. This content could be captured in a post request to an endpoint that allows the content to be subsequently retrieved by the adversary. This has been addressed in async-h1 2.3.0 and previous versions have been yanked.

Read the publisher's advisory

cve-program · CVE-2020-36202

Published

An issue was discovered in the async-h1 crate before 2.3.0 for Rust. Request smuggling can occur when used behind a reverse proxy.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2021-2157

Published

async-h1 is an asynchronous HTTP/1.1 parser for Rust (crates.io). There is a request smuggling vulnerability in async-h1 before version 2.3.0. This vulnerability affects any webserver that uses async-h1 behind a reverse proxy, including all such Tide applications. If the server does not read the body of a request which is longer than some buffer length, async-h1 will attempt to read a subsequent request from the body content starting at that offset into the body. One way to exploit this vulnerability would be for an adversary to craft a request such that the body contains a request that would not be noticed by a reverse proxy, allowing it to forge forwarded/x-forwarded headers. If an application trusted the authenticity of these headers, it could be misled by the smuggled request. Another potential concern with this vulnerability is that if a reverse proxy is sending multiple http clients' requests along the same keep-alive connection, it would be possible for the smuggled request to specify a long content and capture another user's request in its body. This content could be captured in a post request to an endpoint that allows the content to be subsequently retrieved by the adversary. This has been addressed in async-h1 2.3.0 and previous versions have been yanked.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2022-3538

Published

An issue was discovered in the async-h1 crate before 2.3.0 for Rust. Request smuggling can occur when used behind a reverse proxy.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2020-26281

Published

async-h1 is an asynchronous HTTP/1.1 parser for Rust (crates.io). There is a request smuggling vulnerability in async-h1 before version 2.3.0. This vulnerability affects any webserver that uses async-h1 behind a reverse proxy, including all such Tide applications. If the server does not read the body of a request which is longer than some buffer length, async-h1 will attempt to read a subsequent request from the body content starting at that offset into the body. One way to exploit this vulnerability would be for an adversary to craft a request such that the body contains a request that would not be noticed by a reverse proxy, allowing it to forge forwarded/x-forwarded headers. If an application trusted the authenticity of these headers, it could be misled by the smuggled request. Another potential concern with this vulnerability is that if a reverse proxy is sending multiple http clients' requests along the same keep-alive connection, it would be possible for the smuggled request to specify a long content and capture another user's request in its body. This content could be captured in a post request to an endpoint that allows the content to be subsequently retrieved by the adversary. This has been addressed in async-h1 2.3.0 and previous versions have been yanked.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2020-36202

Published

An issue was discovered in the async-h1 crate before 2.3.0 for Rust. Request smuggling can occur when used behind a reverse proxy.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-4vr9-8cjf-vf9c

Published

### Impact This vulnerability affects any webserver that uses async-h1 behind a reverse proxy, including all such Tide applications. If the server does not read the body of a request which is longer than some buffer length, async-h1 will attempt to read a subsequent request from the body content starting at that offset into the body. One way to exploit this vulnerability would be for an adversary to craft a request such that the body contains a request that would not be noticed by a reverse proxy, allowing it to forge forwarded/x-forwarded headers. If an application trusted the authenticity of these headers, it could be misled by the smuggled request. Another potential concern with this vulnerability is that if a reverse proxy is sending multiple http clients' requests along the same keep-alive connection, it would be possible for the smuggled request to specify a long content and capture another user's request in its body. This content could be captured in a post request to an endpoint that allows the content to be subsequently retrieved by the adversary. ### Patches This has been addressed in async-h1 2.3.0 and previous versions have been yanked. ### Workarounds none ### References https://github.com/http-rs/async-h1/releases/tag/v2.3.0 ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in [async-h1](https://github.com/http-rs/async-h1) * Contact a core team member on [zulip](https://http-rs.zulip-chat.com) or [discord](https://discord.gg/x2gKzst)

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-c8rq-crxj-mj9m

Published

An issue was discovered in the async-h1 crate before 2.3.0 for Rust. Request smuggling can occur when used behind a reverse proxy.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · RUSTSEC-2020-0093

Published

This vulnerability affects any webserver that uses async-h1 behind a reverse proxy, including all such Tide applications. If the server does not read the body of a request which is longer than some buffer length, async-h1 will attempt to read a subsequent request from the body content starting at that offset into the body. One way to exploit this vulnerability would be for an adversary to craft a request such that the body contains a request that would not be noticed by a reverse proxy, allowing it to forge forwarded/x-forwarded headers. If an application trusted the authenticity of these headers, it could be misled by the smuggled request. Another potential concern with this vulnerability is that if a reverse proxy is sending multiple http clients' requests along the same keep-alive connection, it would be possible for the smuggled request to specify a long content and capture another user's request in its body. This content could be captured in a post request to an endpoint that allows the content to be subsequently retrieved by the adversary. The flaw was corrected in commit [7df79f](https://github.com/http-rs/async-h1/commit/7df79f1d5d99fc0f492b315eebc7f0d301a85212) by ensuring that the request body is always consumed from the tcp stream before attempting to read subsequent keep-alive request headers from it.

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

Related advisories and sources

Publishers link these advisories through the identifiers shown below. A shared identifier or date alone does not tell you whether your software is affected or whether the advisories describe the same cause.

CVE-2020-26281 · CVE overview and exploitation status

CVE-2020-36202 · CVE overview and exploitation status

EUVD-2021-2157

GHSA-4vr9-8cjf-vf9c

EUVD-2022-3538

GHSA-c8rq-crxj-mj9m

RUSTSEC-2020-0093

cve-program · CVE-2020-26281

cve-program · CVE-2020-36202

euvd · EUVD-2021-2157

euvd · EUVD-2022-3538

nvd · CVE-2020-26281

nvd · CVE-2020-36202

osv · GHSA-4vr9-8cjf-vf9c

osv · GHSA-c8rq-crxj-mj9m

osv · RUSTSEC-2020-0093

Related changes

Linked by CVE identifier

No related changes are available here.

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 19 Nov 05:53 UTC · 273 of 275 readable · 269 fully read · documentation 469/469 current