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In Saml2 Authentication Services for ASP.NET versions before 1.0.2, and between 2.0.0 and 2.6.0, there is a…

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 6.5 MEDIUMCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary 7.3 HIGHCVSS 2.0 · [email protected] · Primary 4.9 MEDIUMCheck source for fixed versionsKEV status unknown

Historical advisory recorded 24 Oct 2026 17:17:15 UTC. Read the latest advisory.

nvd · CVE-2020-5268

Published

In Saml2 Authentication Services for ASP.NET versions before 1.0.2, and between 2.0.0 and 2.6.0, there is a vulnerability in how tokens are validated in some cases. Saml2 tokens are usually used as bearer tokens - a caller that presents a token is assumed to be the subject of the token. There is also support in the Saml2 protocol for issuing tokens that is tied to a subject through other means, e.g. holder-of-key where possession of a private key must be proved. The Sustainsys.Saml2 library incorrectly treats all incoming tokens as bearer tokens, even though they have another subject confirmation method specified. This could be used by an attacker that could get access to Saml2 tokens with another subject confirmation method than bearer. The attacker could then use such a token to create a log in session. This vulnerability is patched in versions 1.0.2 and 2.7.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

nvd · CVE-2020-5268

Published

In Saml2 Authentication Services for ASP.NET versions before 1.0.2, and between 2.0.0 and 2.6.0, there is a vulnerability in how tokens are validated in some cases. Saml2 tokens are usually used as bearer tokens - a caller that presents a t…

In Saml2 Authentication Services for ASP.NET versions before 1.0.2, and between 2.0.0 and 2.6.0, there is a vulnerability in how tokens are validated in some cases. Saml2 tokens are usually used as bearer tokens - a caller that presents a token is assumed to be the subject of the token. There is also support in the Saml2 protocol for issuing tokens that is tied to a subject through other means, e.g. holder-of-key where possession of a private key must be proved. The Sustainsys.Saml2 library incorrectly treats all incoming tokens as bearer tokens, even though they have another subject confirmation method specified. This could be used by an attacker that could get access to Saml2 tokens with another subject confirmation method than bearer. The attacker could then use such a token to create a log in session. This vulnerability is patched in versions 1.0.2 and 2.7.0.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Modified

Weakness classifications: CWE-303 · CWE-287

Original publisher date fields

published: 2020-04-21T17:15:13.053

lastModified: 2026-06-17T03:21:10.170

1 source CPE criteria · context only
  • cpe:2.3:a:sustainsys:saml2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

Source published
21 Apr 2020 17:15:13 UTC
Source modified
17 Jun 2026 03:21:10 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 17:17:15 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 6.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary · 7.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

CVSS 2.0 · [email protected] · Primary · 4.9 AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:N

ChangeIntel

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Sources read 19 Nov 05:53 UTC · 273 of 275 readable · 269 fully read · documentation 469/469 current