msgpack5 is a msgpack v5 implementation for node.js and the browser. In msgpack5 before versions 3.6.1, 4.5.1, and 5.2.1 there is a "Prototype Poisoning" vulnerability. When msgpack5 decodes a map containing a key "__proto__", it assigns the decoded value to __proto__. Object.prototype.__proto__ is an accessor property for the receiver's prototype. If the value corresponding to the key __proto__ decodes to an object or null, msgpack5 sets the decoded object's prototype to that value. An attacker who can submit crafted MessagePack data to a service can use this to produce values that appear to be of other types; may have unexpected prototype properties and methods (for example length, numeric properties, and push et al if __proto__'s value decodes to an Array); and/or may throw unexpected exceptions when used (for example if the __proto__ value decodes to a Map or Date). Other unexpected behavior might be produced for other types. There is no effect on the global prototype. This "prototype poisoning" is sort of a very limited inversion of a prototype pollution attack. Only the decoded value's prototype is affected, and it can only be set to msgpack5 values (though if the victim makes use of custom codecs, anything could be a msgpack5 value). We have not found a way to escalate this to true prototype pollution (absent other bugs in the consumer's code). This has been fixed in msgpack5 version 3.6.1, 4.5.1, and 5.2.1. See the referenced GitHub Security Advisory for an example and more details.
msgpack5 is a msgpack v5 implementation for node.js and the browser. In msgpack5 before versions 3.6.1, 4.5.1, and 5.2.1 there is a "Prototype Poisoning" vulnerability. When msgpack5 decodes a map containing a key "__proto__", it assigns the decoded value to __proto__. Object.prototype.__proto__ is an accessor property for the receiver's prototype. If the value corresponding to the key __proto__ decodes to an object or null, msgpack5 sets the decoded object's prototype to that value. An attacker who can submit crafted MessagePack data to a service can use this to produce values that appear to be of other types; may have unexpected prototype properties and methods (for example length, numeric properties, and push et al if __proto__'s value decodes to an Array); and/or may throw unexpected exceptions when used (for example if the __proto__ value decodes to a Map or Date). Other unexpected behavior might be produced for other types. There is no effect on the global prototype. This "prototype poisoning" is sort of a very limited inversion of a prototype pollution attack. Only the decoded value's prototype is affected, and it can only be set to msgpack5 values (though if the victim makes use of custom codecs, anything could be a msgpack5 value). We have not found a way to escalate this to true prototype pollution (absent other bugs in the consumer's code). This has been fixed in msgpack5 version 3.6.1, 4.5.1, and 5.2.1. See the referenced GitHub Security Advisory for an example and more details.
msgpack5 is a msgpack v5 implementation for node.js and the browser. In msgpack5 before versions 3.6.1, 4.5.1, and 5.2.1 there is a "Prototype Poisoning" vulnerability. When msgpack5 decodes a map containing a key "__proto__", it assigns the decoded value to __proto__. Object.prototype.__proto__ is an accessor property for the receiver's prototype. If the value corresponding to the key __proto__ decodes to an object or null, msgpack5 sets the decoded object's prototype to that value. An attacker who can submit crafted MessagePack data to a service can use this to produce values that appear to be of other types; may have unexpected prototype properties and methods (for example length, numeric properties, and push et al if __proto__'s value decodes to an Array); and/or may throw unexpected exceptions when used (for example if the __proto__ value decodes to a Map or Date). Other unexpected behavior might be produced for other types. There is no effect on the global prototype. This "prototype poisoning" is sort of a very limited inversion of a prototype pollution attack. Only the decoded value's prototype is affected, and it can only be set to msgpack5 values (though if the victim makes use of custom codecs, anything could be a msgpack5 value). We have not found a way to escalate this to true prototype pollution (absent other bugs in the consumer's code). This has been fixed in msgpack5 version 3.6.1, 4.5.1, and 5.2.1. See the referenced GitHub Security Advisory for an example and more details.
### Impact
The issue is as follows: when `msgpack5` decodes a map containing a
key `"__proto__"`, it assigns the decoded value to `__proto__`. As you
are no doubt aware, `Object.prototype.__proto__` is an accessor
property for the receiver's prototype. If the value corresponding to
the key `__proto__` decodes to an object or `null`, `msgpack5` sets
the decoded object's prototype to that value.
An attacker who can submit crafted MessagePack data to a service can
use this to produce values that appear to be of other types; may have
unexpected prototype properties and methods (for example `length`,
numeric properties, and `push` et al if `__proto__`'s value decodes to
an `Array`); and/or may throw unexpected exceptions when used (for
example if the `__proto__` value decodes to a `Map` or `Date`). Other
unexpected behavior might be produced for other types.
There is no effect on the global prototype.
An example:
```js
const msgpack5 = require('msgpack5')();
const payload = {};
Object.defineProperty(payload, '__proto__', {
value: new Map().set(1, 2),
enumerable: true
});
const encoded = msgpack5.encode(payload);
console.log(encoded); // <Buffer 81 a9 5f 5f 70 72 6f 74 6f 5f 5f 81 01 02>
const decoded = msgpack5.decode(encoded);
// decoded's prototype has been overwritten
console.log(Object.getPrototypeOf(decoded)); // Map(1) { 1 => 2 }
console.log(decoded.get); // [Function: get]
// decoded appears to most common typechecks to be a Map
console.log(decoded instanceof Map); // true
console.log(decoded.toString()); // [object Map]
console.log(Object.prototype.toString.call(decoded)); // [object Map]
console.log(decoded.constructor.name); // Map
console.log(Object.getPrototypeOf(decoded).constructor.name); // Map
// decoded is not, however, a Map
console.log(Object.getPrototypeOf(decoded) === Map.prototype); // false
// using decoded as though it were a Map throws
try {
decoded.get(1);
} catch (error) {
console.log(error); // TypeError: Method Map.prototype.get called
// on incompatible receiver #<Map>
}
try {
decoded.size;
} catch (error) {
console.log(error); // TypeError: Method get Map.prototype.size
// called on incompatible receiver #<Map>
}
// re-encoding the decoded value throws
try {
msgpack5.encode(decoded);
} catch (error) {
console.log(error); // TypeError: Method Map.prototype.entries
// called on incompatible receiver #<Map>
}
```
This "prototype poisoning" is sort of a very limited inversion of a
prototype pollution attack. Only the decoded value's prototype is
affected, and it can only be set to `msgpack5` values (though if the
victim makes use of custom codecs, anything could be a `msgpack5`
value). We have not found a way to escalate this to true prototype
pollution (absent other bugs in the consumer's code).
### Patches
Versions v5.2.1, v4.5.1, v3.6.1 include the fix.
### Workarounds
Always validate incoming data after parsing before doing any processing.
### For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
* Open an issue in [example link to repo](http://example.com)
* Email us at [example email address](mailto:[email protected])
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Mar 12, 2021, 5:00:19 PM
dateUpdated: Aug 3, 2024, 6:09:15 PM
1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases
msrc_CVE-2021-21368: Prototype poisoning
CVE-2021-21368
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.