Possible bypass of token claim validation when OAuth2 Introspection caching is enabled
cve-program · CVE-2021-32701
PublishedORY Oathkeeper is an Identity & Access Proxy (IAP) and Access Control Decision API that authorizes HTTP requests based on sets of Access Rules. When you make a request to an endpoint that requires the scope `foo` using an access token granted with that `foo` scope, introspection will be valid and that token will be cached. The problem comes when a second requests to an endpoint that requires the scope `bar` is made before the cache has expired. Whether the token is granted or not to the `bar` scope, introspection will be valid. A patch will be released with `v0.38.12-beta.1`. Per default, caching is disabled for the `oauth2_introspection` authenticator. When caching is disabled, this vulnerability does not exist. The cache is checked in [`func (a *AuthenticatorOAuth2Introspection) Authenticate(...)`](https://github.com/ory/oathkeeper/blob/6a31df1c3779425e05db1c2a381166b087cb29a4/pipeline/authn/authenticator_oauth2_introspection.go#L152). From [`tokenFromCache()`](https://github.com/ory/oathkeeper/blob/6a31df1c3779425e05db1c2a381166b087cb29a4/pipeline/authn/authenticator_oauth2_introspection.go#L97) it seems that it only validates the token expiration date, but ignores whether the token has or not the proper scopes. The vulnerability was introduced in PR #424. During review, we failed to require appropriate test coverage by the submitter which is the primary reason that the vulnerability passed the review process.
Read the publisher's advisoryeuvd · EUVD-2021-1410
PublishedORY Oathkeeper is an Identity & Access Proxy (IAP) and Access Control Decision API that authorizes HTTP requests based on sets of Access Rules. When you make a request to an endpoint that requires the scope `foo` using an access token granted with that `foo` scope, introspection will be valid and that token will be cached. The problem comes when a second requests to an endpoint that requires the scope `bar` is made before the cache has expired. Whether the token is granted or not to the `bar` scope, introspection will be valid. A patch will be released with `v0.38.12-beta.1`. Per default, caching is disabled for the `oauth2_introspection` authenticator. When caching is disabled, this vulnerability does not exist. The cache is checked in [`func (a *AuthenticatorOAuth2Introspection) Authenticate(...)`](https://github.com/ory/oathkeeper/blob/6a31df1c3779425e05db1c2a381166b087cb29a4/pipeline/authn/authenticator_oauth2_introspection.go#L152). From [`tokenFromCache()`](https://github.com/ory/oathkeeper/blob/6a31df1c3779425e05db1c2a381166b087cb29a4/pipeline/authn/authenticator_oauth2_introspection.go#L97) it seems that it only validates the token expiration date, but ignores whether the token has or not the proper scopes. The vulnerability was introduced in PR #424. During review, we failed to require appropriate test coverage by the submitter which is the primary reason that the vulnerability passed the review process.
Read the publisher's advisorynvd · CVE-2021-32701
PublishedORY Oathkeeper is an Identity & Access Proxy (IAP) and Access Control Decision API that authorizes HTTP requests based on sets of Access Rules. When you make a request to an endpoint that requires the scope `foo` using an access token granted with that `foo` scope, introspection will be valid and that token will be cached. The problem comes when a second requests to an endpoint that requires the scope `bar` is made before the cache has expired. Whether the token is granted or not to the `bar` scope, introspection will be valid. A patch will be released with `v0.38.12-beta.1`. Per default, caching is disabled for the `oauth2_introspection` authenticator. When caching is disabled, this vulnerability does not exist. The cache is checked in [`func (a *AuthenticatorOAuth2Introspection) Authenticate(...)`](https://github.com/ory/oathkeeper/blob/6a31df1c3779425e05db1c2a381166b087cb29a4/pipeline/authn/authenticator_oauth2_introspection.go#L152). From [`tokenFromCache()`](https://github.com/ory/oathkeeper/blob/6a31df1c3779425e05db1c2a381166b087cb29a4/pipeline/authn/authenticator_oauth2_introspection.go#L97) it seems that it only validates the token expiration date, but ignores whether the token has or not the proper scopes. The vulnerability was introduced in PR #424. During review, we failed to require appropriate test coverage by the submitter which is the primary reason that the vulnerability passed the review process.
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GHSA-qvp4-rpmr-xwrr
Published### Impact When you make a request to an endpoint that requires the scope `foo` using an access token granted with that `foo` scope, introspection will be valid and that token will be cached. The problem comes when a second requests to an endpoint that requires the scope `bar` is made before the cache has expired. Whether the token is granted or not to the `bar` scope, introspection will be valid. ### Patches A patch will be released with `v0.38.12-beta.1`. ### Workarounds Per default, caching is disabled for the `oauth2_introspection` authenticator. When caching is disabled, this vulnerability does not exist. ### Trace The cache is checked in [`func (a *AuthenticatorOAuth2Introspection) Authenticate(...)`](https://github.com/ory/oathkeeper/blob/6a31df1c3779425e05db1c2a381166b087cb29a4/pipeline/authn/authenticator_oauth2_introspection.go#L152). From [`tokenFromCache()`](https://github.com/ory/oathkeeper/blob/6a31df1c3779425e05db1c2a381166b087cb29a4/pipeline/authn/authenticator_oauth2_introspection.go#L97) it seems that it only validates the token expiration date, but ignores whether the token has or not the proper scopes. ### Post-Mortem The vulnerability was introduced in PR #424. During review, we failed to require appropriate test coverage by the submitter which is the primary reason that the vulnerability passed the review process. To avoid this from happening again we enabled codecov with a strict policy on the Ory Oathkeeper repository: Without an increase in code coverage the PR can not be merged. To address this issue and any regressions we have added a test suite ensuring that the cache behaviour is correct in the different scenarios: - Scope strategy is `none`, cache is enabled, and `requested_scope` is not empty -> cache will not be used; - Scope strategy is `none`, cache is enabled, and `requested_scope` is empty -> cache will be used; - Scope strategy is not `none`, cache is enabled, and `requested_scope` is not empty -> cache will be used; as well as validating if `iss`, `aud`, `exp`, `token_use`, and scope are validated. Additionally, we added [CodeQL scanning](https://github.com/ory/oathkeeper/commit/64ac7562669287d391cd72dfd43c5d71ff9f89a1) to the CI.
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GHSA-vfvf-6gx5-mqv6
PublishedORY Oathkeeper is an Identity & Access Proxy (IAP) and Access Control Decision API that authorizes HTTP requests based on sets of Access Rules. When you make a request to an endpoint that requires the scope `foo` using an access token granted with that `foo` scope, introspection will be valid and that token will be cached. The problem comes when a second requests to an endpoint that requires the scope `bar` is made before the cache has expired. Whether the token is granted or not to the `bar` scope, introspection will be valid. A patch will be released with `v0.38.12-beta.1`. Per default, caching is disabled for the `oauth2_introspection` authenticator. When caching is disabled, this vulnerability does not exist. The cache is checked in [`func (a *AuthenticatorOAuth2Introspection) Authenticate(...)`](https://github.com/ory/oathkeeper/blob/6a31df1c3779425e05db1c2a381166b087cb29a4/pipeline/authn/authenticator_oauth2_introspection.go#L152). From [`tokenFromCache()`](https://github.com/ory/oathkeeper/blob/6a31df1c3779425e05db1c2a381166b087cb29a4/pipeline/authn/authenticator_oauth2_introspection.go#L97) it seems that it only validates the token expiration date, but ignores whether the token has or not the proper scopes. The vulnerability was introduced in PR #424. During review, we failed to require appropriate test coverage by the submitter which is the primary reason that the vulnerability passed the review process.
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GO-2022-0406
PublishedPossible bypass of token claim validation when OAuth2 Introspection caching is enabled in github.com/ory/oathkeeper
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GO-2022-0920
PublishedIncorrect Authorization in ORY Oathkeeper in github.com/ory/oathkeeper
Read the publisher's advisoryAffected versions, risk and source history
Related advisories and sources
Publishers link these advisories through the identifiers shown below. A shared identifier or date alone does not tell you whether your software is affected or whether the advisories describe the same cause.
CVE-2021-32701 · CVE overview and exploitation status
cve-program · CVE-2021-32701
- https://github.com/ory/oathkeeper/security/advisories/GHSA-qvp4-rpmr-xwrr
- https://github.com/ory/oathkeeper/pull/424
- https://github.com/ory/oathkeeper/commit/1f9f625c1a49e134ae2299ee95b8cf158feec932
euvd · EUVD-2021-1410
- https://github.com/ory/oathkeeper/security/advisories/GHSA-qvp4-rpmr-xwrr
- https://github.com/ory/oathkeeper/pull/424
- https://github.com/ory/oathkeeper/commit/1f9f625c1a49e134ae2299ee95b8cf158feec932
nvd · CVE-2021-32701
- https://github.com/ory/oathkeeper/commit/1f9f625c1a49e134ae2299ee95b8cf158feec932
- https://github.com/ory/oathkeeper/pull/424
- https://github.com/ory/oathkeeper/security/advisories/GHSA-qvp4-rpmr-xwrr
osv · GHSA-qvp4-rpmr-xwrr
osv · GHSA-vfvf-6gx5-mqv6
- https://github.com/ory/oathkeeper/security/advisories/GHSA-qvp4-rpmr-xwrr
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-32701
- https://github.com/ory/oathkeeper/pull/424
- https://github.com/ory/oathkeeper/commit/1f9f625c1a49e134ae2299ee95b8cf158feec932
osv · GO-2022-0406
osv · GO-2022-0920
Related changes
Linked by CVE identifierNo related changes are available here.