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CRLF Injection in Nodejs ‘undici’ via Content-Type

CVSS 3.1 5.3 MEDIUMEUVD CVSS 3.1 5.3 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 5.3 MEDIUMCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary 5.3 MEDIUMCVSS_V3 Publisher rating MODERATEFixed by undici 5.8.2KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2022-35948

Published

undici is an HTTP/1.1 client, written from scratch for Node.js.`=< [email protected]` users are vulnerable to _CRLF Injection_ on headers when using unsanitized input as request headers, more specifically, inside the `content-type` header. Example: ``` import { request } from 'undici' const unsanitizedContentTypeInput = 'application/json\r\n\r\nGET /foo2 HTTP/1.1' await request('http://localhost:3000, { method: 'GET', headers: { 'content-type': unsanitizedContentTypeInput }, }) ``` The above snippet will perform two requests in a single `request` API call: 1) `http://localhost:3000/` 2) `http://localhost:3000/foo2` This issue was patched in Undici v5.8.1. Sanitize input when sending content-type headers using user input as a workaround.

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euvd · EUVD-2022-6547

Published

undici is an HTTP/1.1 client, written from scratch for Node.js.`=< [email protected]` users are vulnerable to _CRLF Injection_ on headers when using unsanitized input as request headers, more specifically, inside the `content-type` header. Example: ``` import { request } from 'undici' const unsanitizedContentTypeInput = 'application/json\r\n\r\nGET /foo2 HTTP/1.1' await request('http://localhost:3000, { method: 'GET', headers: { 'content-type': unsanitizedContentTypeInput }, }) ``` The above snippet will perform two requests in a single `request` API call: 1) `http://localhost:3000/` 2) `http://localhost:3000/foo2` This issue was patched in Undici v5.8.1. Sanitize input when sending content-type headers using user input as a workaround.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2022-35948

Published

undici is an HTTP/1.1 client, written from scratch for Node.js.`=< [email protected]` users are vulnerable to _CRLF Injection_ on headers when using unsanitized input as request headers, more specifically, inside the `content-type` header. Example: ``` import { request } from 'undici' const unsanitizedContentTypeInput = 'application/json\r\n\r\nGET /foo2 HTTP/1.1' await request('http://localhost:3000, { method: 'GET', headers: { 'content-type': unsanitizedContentTypeInput }, }) ``` The above snippet will perform two requests in a single `request` API call: 1) `http://localhost:3000/` 2) `http://localhost:3000/foo2` This issue was patched in Undici v5.8.1. Sanitize input when sending content-type headers using user input as a workaround.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-f772-66g8-q5h3

Published

### Impact `=< [email protected]` users are vulnerable to _CRLF Injection_ on headers when using unsanitized input as request headers, more specifically, inside the `content-type` header. Example: ``` import { request } from 'undici' const unsanitizedContentTypeInput = 'application/json\r\n\r\nGET /foo2 HTTP/1.1' await request('http://localhost:3000, { method: 'GET', headers: { 'content-type': unsanitizedContentTypeInput }, }) ``` The above snippet will perform two requests in a single `request` API call: 1) `http://localhost:3000/` 2) `http://localhost:3000/foo2` ### Patches This issue was patched in Undici v5.8.1 ### Workarounds Sanitize input when sending content-type headers using user input. ## For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: - Open an issue in [undici repository](https://github.com/nodejs/undici/issues) - To make a report, follow the [SECURITY](https://github.com/nodejs/node/blob/HEAD/SECURITY.md) document

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Sources read 22 Nov 04:54 UTC · 273 of 275 readable · 269 fully read · documentation 469/469 current