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OAuth authorization code exposure in Dex

CVSS 3.1 9.3 CRITICALEUVD CVSS 3.1 9.3 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 9.3 CRITICALCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary 6.5 MEDIUMCVSS_V3 Publisher rating CRITICALFixed by github.com/dexidp/dex 2.35.0KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2022-39222

Published

Dex is an identity service that uses OpenID Connect to drive authentication for other apps. Dex instances with public clients (and by extension, clients accepting tokens issued by those Dex instances) are affected by this vulnerability if they are running a version prior to 2.35.0. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by making a victim navigate to a malicious website and guiding them through the OIDC flow, stealing the OAuth authorization code in the process. The authorization code then can be exchanged by the attacker for a token, gaining access to applications accepting that token. Version 2.35.0 has introduced a fix for this issue. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this issue.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2022-7166

Published

Dex is an identity service that uses OpenID Connect to drive authentication for other apps. Dex instances with public clients (and by extension, clients accepting tokens issued by those Dex instances) are affected by this vulnerability if they are running a version prior to 2.35.0. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by making a victim navigate to a malicious website and guiding them through the OIDC flow, stealing the OAuth authorization code in the process. The authorization code then can be exchanged by the attacker for a token, gaining access to applications accepting that token. Version 2.35.0 has introduced a fix for this issue. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this issue.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2022-39222

Published

Dex is an identity service that uses OpenID Connect to drive authentication for other apps. Dex instances with public clients (and by extension, clients accepting tokens issued by those Dex instances) are affected by this vulnerability if they are running a version prior to 2.35.0. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by making a victim navigate to a malicious website and guiding them through the OIDC flow, stealing the OAuth authorization code in the process. The authorization code then can be exchanged by the attacker for a token, gaining access to applications accepting that token. Version 2.35.0 has introduced a fix for this issue. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this issue.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-vh7g-p26c-j2cw

Published

### Impact Dex instances with public clients (and by extension, clients accepting tokens issued by those Dex instances) are affected by this vulnerability. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by making a victim navigate to a malicious website and guiding them through the OIDC flow, stealing the OAuth authorization code in the process. The authorization code then can be exchanged by the attacker for a token, gaining access to applications accepting that token. ### Steps to reproduce 1) A victim navigates to a malicious website 2) The webserver initiates a connection with a Dex instance directly - https://dexexample.com/auth/https:%252F%252Faccounts.google.com?access_type=online&client_id=example&nonce=2AaJAimQU9CbeOFsNra1d7CJTWB&redirect_uri=http%3A%2F%2Flocalhost%3A40393%2Fauth%2Fcallback&response_type=code&scope=openid+email&state=2AaJAjhpUmsB25csCo5muvorMTl. In this example, the Dex instance is hosted on `dexexample.com`, and the connector is `accounts.google.com`. 3) Dex returns a 302 Redirect to the connector IDP, https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/v2/auth?client_id=237800849078-hri2ndt7gdafpf34kq8crd5sik9pe3so.apps.googleusercontent.com&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fdexexample.com%2Fauth%2Fcallback&response_type=code&scope=openid+email&state=g3dkmpontsr3ugocoddjx72ef. The attacker records the state parameter value g3dkmpontsr3ugocoddjx72ef which will be used as the request ID later on. 4) The malicious website redirects the victim’s browser to the connector IDP. 5) The user authenticates to the connector IDP. If they have authenticated before, they may not be presented with an authentication challenge. The user will silently be taken through the following steps: Authentication with the connector IDP, which redirects the browser to the Dex callback with a code - https://dexexample.com/callback?state=g3dkmpontsr3ugocoddjx72ef&code=4%2F0AX4XfWizg1PQEQNl18hmP0_YQ3iUYII2ed13n9ikKr_ZcV7uCZpZaPcIlxBzX5QwFIcs-w&scope=email+openid+https%3A%2F%[2Fwww.googleapis.com](http://2fwww.googleapis.com/)%2Fauth%2Fuserinfo.email&authuser=0&hd=[google.com](http://google.com/)&prompt=none Dex handles the callback, fetching the user claims from the connector IDP, persisting them and generating an OAuth code. Then Dex redirects the browser to the approval endpoint https://dexexample.com/approval?req=g3dkmpontsr3ugocoddjx72ef. Note that the req parameter is the same as the attacker's recorded state parameter. Dex uses the request ID to look up the OAuth code, and builds a redirect to the original callback with the code - http://localhost:40393/auth/callback?code=bz5p3oov2wlh5k3rboa4atxas&state=2AaJAjhpUmsB25csCo5muvorMTl. In step 2., when the webserver initiates the connection to Dex and receives the redirect to the connector IDP, the webserver will persist the connector state parameter (`g3dkmpontsr3ugocoddjx72ef`), which is used as the request ID to later look up the OAuth code. As the user goes through the authentication flow with the connector IDP, the webserver will repeatedly request `/approval?req=<state>`. Once the user has successfully authenticated, if the webserver is able to call /approval before the victim’s browser calls `/approval`, then an attacker can fetch the Dex OAuth code which can be exchanged for an ID token using the `/token` endpoint. Note that PKCE does not defend against this attack since the webserver initiates the request to Dex with a known code challenge. ### Fix The request has been made unpredictable with message authentication. This was accomplished by creating an [HMAC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMAC) using a randomly generated per-request secret. This secret is persisted between the initial login request and the approval request. Since the HMAC is derived using a secret key, its value cannot be known to an attacker, so they will be unable to poll `/approval` for the code. ### Patches Update to 2.35.0. ### Workarounds No known workarounds (without impacting behavior) for existing versions. Disabling public clients is the only way to defend against attacks exploiting this vulnerability. ### References ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Start a new [discussion](https://github.com/dexidp/dex/discussions/new?category=q-a) * Email us at [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected])

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Affected versions, risk and source history

cve-program · CVE-2022-39222

Published

dex

Vendor product

Publisher's version information

Shown as published. These rules are not interpreted as NuGet package version ranges.

{
                    "vendor": "dexidp",
                    "product": "dex",
                    "versions": [
                        {
                            "version": "< 2.35.0",
                            "status": "affected"
                        }
                    ]
                }

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

euvd · EUVD-2022-7166

Published

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Oct 6, 2022, 12:00:00 AM

dateUpdated: Apr 22, 2025, 5:20:02 PM

2 related source bulletins · separate from aliases

WID-SEC-W-2023-3113: Red Hat Advanced Cluster Security: Schwachstelle ermöglicht Offenlegung von Informationen

CVE-2022-39222

RHSA-2023:7725: Red Hat Security Advisory: RHACS 4.3 enhancement and security update

CVE-2022-39222

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

nvd · CVE-2022-39222

Published

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Modified

Weakness classifications: CWE-200 · CWE-862

Original publisher date fields

published: 2022-10-06T18:16:09.037

lastModified: 2026-06-17T04:57:56.790

1 source CPE criteria · context only
  • cpe:2.3:a:linuxfoundation:dex:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

osv · GHSA-vh7g-p26c-j2cw

Published

github.com/dexidp/dex

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 2.35.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

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