Boxo bitswap/server: DOS unbounded persistent memory leak
cve-program · CVE-2023-25568
PublishedBoxo, formerly known as go-libipfs, is a library for building IPFS applications and implementations. In versions 0.4.0 and 0.5.0, if an attacker is able allocate arbitrary many bytes in the Bitswap server, those allocations are lasting even if the connection is closed. This affects users accepting untrusted connections with the Bitswap server and also affects users using the old API stubs at `github.com/ipfs/go-libipfs/bitswap` because users then transitively import `github.com/ipfs/go-libipfs/bitswap/server`. Boxo versions 0.6.0 and 0.4.1 contain a patch for this issue. As a workaround, those who are using the stub object at `github.com/ipfs/go-libipfs/bitswap` not taking advantage of the features provided by the server can refactor their code to use the new split API that will allow them to run in a client only mode: `github.com/ipfs/go-libipfs/bitswap/client`.
Read the publisher's advisoryeuvd · EUVD-2023-1578
PublishedBoxo, formerly known as go-libipfs, is a library for building IPFS applications and implementations. In versions 0.4.0 and 0.5.0, if an attacker is able allocate arbitrary many bytes in the Bitswap server, those allocations are lasting even if the connection is closed. This affects users accepting untrusted connections with the Bitswap server and also affects users using the old API stubs at `github.com/ipfs/go-libipfs/bitswap` because users then transitively import `github.com/ipfs/go-libipfs/bitswap/server`. Boxo versions 0.6.0 and 0.4.1 contain a patch for this issue. As a workaround, those who are using the stub object at `github.com/ipfs/go-libipfs/bitswap` not taking advantage of the features provided by the server can refactor their code to use the new split API that will allow them to run in a client only mode: `github.com/ipfs/go-libipfs/bitswap/client`.
Read the publisher's advisorynvd · CVE-2023-25568
PublishedBoxo, formerly known as go-libipfs, is a library for building IPFS applications and implementations. In versions 0.4.0 and 0.5.0, if an attacker is able allocate arbitrary many bytes in the Bitswap server, those allocations are lasting even if the connection is closed. This affects users accepting untrusted connections with the Bitswap server and also affects users using the old API stubs at `github.com/ipfs/go-libipfs/bitswap` because users then transitively import `github.com/ipfs/go-libipfs/bitswap/server`. Boxo versions 0.6.0 and 0.4.1 contain a patch for this issue. As a workaround, those who are using the stub object at `github.com/ipfs/go-libipfs/bitswap` not taking advantage of the features provided by the server can refactor their code to use the new split API that will allow them to run in a client only mode: `github.com/ipfs/go-libipfs/bitswap/client`.
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GHSA-m974-xj4j-7qv5
Published### Impact An attacker is able allocate arbitrarily many bytes in the Bitswap server by sending many `WANT_BLOCK` and or `WANT_HAVE` requests which are queued in an unbounded queue, with allocations that persist even if the connection is closed. This affects users accepting untrusted connections with the Bitswap server, this also affects users using the old API stubs at `github.com/ipfs/boxo/bitswap` because it transitively uses `github.com/ipfs/boxo/bitswap/server`. We have [renamed go-libipfs to boxo](https://github.com/ipfs/boxo/issues/215); this document uses both terms interchangeably. The version numbers for both are applicable, as they share the same historical timeline. ### Remediation Apply one of: - Update `boxo` to [`v0.6.0`](https://github.com/ipfs/boxo/releases/tag/v0.6.0) or later - Update `boxo` to [`v0.4.1`](https://github.com/ipfs/boxo/releases/tag/v0.4.1) Note that ***`v0.5.0` is NOT safe***, `v0.4.1` is a backport of the `v0.6.0` security fixes on top of `v0.4.0`. ### Mitigations 1. The server now limits how many wantlist entries per peer it knows. The `MaxQueuedWantlistEntriesPerPeer` option allows configuring how many wantlist entries the server remembers; if a peer sends a wantlist bigger than this (including a sum of multiple delta updates) the server will truncate the wantlist to the match the limit. This defaults to `1024` entries per peer. 2. The server now properly clears state about peers when they disconnect. Peer state is more lazily allocated (only when a wantlist is received in the first place) and is properly cleared when the `PeerDisconnected` callback is received. 3. The server now ignores CIDs above some size. Clients were able to send any CID as long as the total protobuf message were bellow the 4MiB limit. This is allowed to allocate lots of memory with very little entries. This can be configured using the `MaxCidSize` option and defaults to `168 bytes`. 4. The server now closes the connection if an inline CID is requested (either as `WANT_*` or `CANCEL`). The attack were more effective if done with CIDs that are present in target's blockstore, this is because this will push longer-lasting jobs on some priority queue. Since inline CID are literal data (instead of hashes of data), everyone always "has" any inline CID (since instead of loading the data from disk, it can be extracted from the CID). It makes no sense for anyone to ever ask you about an inline CID since they could also just parse it themselves. Thus, as a defensive measure, we kill the connection with peers that ask about an inline CID. ### Vulnerable symbols - `github.com/ipfs/go-libipfs/bitswap/server/internal/decision.(*Engine).MessageReceived` - `github.com/ipfs/go-libipfs/bitswap/server/internal/decision.(*Engine).NotifyNewBlocks` - `github.com/ipfs/go-libipfs/bitswap/server/internal/decision.(*Engine).findOrCreate` - `github.com/ipfs/go-libipfs/bitswap/server/internal/decision.(*Engine).PeerConnected` ### Patches - https://github.com/ipfs/boxo/commit/9cb5cb54d40b57084d1221ba83b9e6bb3fcc3197 (mitigations 1 and 2) - https://github.com/ipfs/boxo/commit/62cbac40b96f49e39cd7fedc77ee6b56adce4916 (mitigations 3 and 4) - https://github.com/ipfs/boxo/commit/baa748b682fabb21a4c1f7628a8af348d4645974 (tests) ### Workarounds If you are using the stubs at `github.com/ipfs/go-libipfs/bitswap` and not taking advantage of the features provided by the server, refactoring your code to use the new split API will allow you to run in a client-only mode using: [`github.com/ipfs/boxo/bitswap/client`](https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/ipfs/boxo/bitswap/client).
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GHSA-q3j6-22wf-3jh9
PublishedThis package has been moved to [`github.com/ipfs/boxo/bitswap`](https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/ipfs/boxo/bitswap), this vulnerability is tracked there: https://github.com/ipfs/boxo/security/advisories/GHSA-m974-xj4j-7qv5 (`CVE-2023-25568`) ### Remediation This is a two step process: 1. Apply one of: - (**recommended**) upgrade from `github.com/ipfs/go-bitswap` to `github.com/ipfs/boxo/bitswap`. - If you are still using `github.com/ipfs/go-bitswap` and cannot upgrade to `boxo`, you can upgrade to `github.com/ipfs/[email protected]`, this will replace the `go-bitswap` implementation by stubs which points to `boxo`. 2. Open https://github.com/ipfs/boxo/security/advisories/GHSA-m974-xj4j-7qv5 and then follow `boxo`'s remediation section. ### Vulnerable symbols - `>= v0.9.0; < v0.12.0` - `github.com/ipfs/go-bitswap/server/internal/decision.(*Engine).MessageReceived` - `github.com/ipfs/go-bitswap/server/internal/decision.(*Engine).NotifyNewBlocks` - `github.com/ipfs/go-bitswap/server/internal/decision.(*Engine).findOrCreate` - `github.com/ipfs/go-bitswap/server/internal/decision.(*Engine).PeerConnected` - `v0.8.0` - `github.com/ipfs/go-bitswap/internal/decision.(*Engine).MessageReceived` - `github.com/ipfs/go-bitswap/internal/decision.(*Engine).NotifyNewBlocks` - `github.com/ipfs/go-bitswap/internal/decision.(*Engine).findOrCreate` - `github.com/ipfs/go-bitswap/internal/decision.(*Engine).PeerConnected` - `< v0.8.0` - `github.com/ipfs/go-bitswap/internal/decision.(*Engine).MessageReceived` - `github.com/ipfs/go-bitswap/internal/decision.(*Engine).receiveBlocksFrom` - `github.com/ipfs/go-bitswap/internal/decision.(*Engine).findOrCreate` - `github.com/ipfs/go-bitswap/internal/decision.(*Engine).PeerConnected` ### Workarounds If you are using the stubs at `github.com/ipfs/go-bitswap` and not taking advantage of the features provided by the server, refactoring your code to use the new split API will allows you to run in a client-only mode using: [`github.com/ipfs/go-bitswap/client`](https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/ipfs/go-bitswap/client).
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GO-2023-1766
PublishedAn attacker can cause a Bitswap server to allocate and leak unbounded amounts of memory.
Read the publisher's advisoryAffected versions, risk and source history
Related advisories and sources
Publishers link these advisories through the identifiers shown below. A shared identifier or date alone does not tell you whether your software is affected or whether the advisories describe the same cause.
CVE-2023-25568 · CVE overview and exploitation status
cve-program · CVE-2023-25568
- https://github.com/ipfs/boxo/commit/62cbac40b96f49e39cd7fedc77ee6b56adce4916
- https://github.com/ipfs/boxo/commit/9cb5cb54d40b57084d1221ba83b9e6bb3fcc3197
- https://github.com/ipfs/boxo/commit/baa748b682fabb21a4c1f7628a8af348d4645974
- https://github.com/ipfs/go-libipfs/security/advisories/GHSA-m974-xj4j-7qv5
euvd · EUVD-2023-1578
- https://github.com/ipfs/boxo/commit/62cbac40b96f49e39cd7fedc77ee6b56adce4916
- https://github.com/ipfs/boxo/commit/9cb5cb54d40b57084d1221ba83b9e6bb3fcc3197
- https://github.com/ipfs/boxo/commit/baa748b682fabb21a4c1f7628a8af348d4645974
- https://github.com/ipfs/go-libipfs/security/advisories/GHSA-m974-xj4j-7qv5
nvd · CVE-2023-25568
- https://github.com/ipfs/boxo/commit/62cbac40b96f49e39cd7fedc77ee6b56adce4916
- https://github.com/ipfs/boxo/commit/9cb5cb54d40b57084d1221ba83b9e6bb3fcc3197
- https://github.com/ipfs/boxo/commit/baa748b682fabb21a4c1f7628a8af348d4645974
- https://github.com/ipfs/go-libipfs/security/advisories/GHSA-m974-xj4j-7qv5
osv · GHSA-m974-xj4j-7qv5
- https://github.com/ipfs/boxo/security/advisories/GHSA-m974-xj4j-7qv5
- https://github.com/ipfs/go-libipfs/security/advisories/GHSA-m974-xj4j-7qv5
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-25568
- https://github.com/ipfs/boxo/commit/62cbac40b96f49e39cd7fedc77ee6b56adce4916
- https://github.com/ipfs/boxo/commit/9cb5cb54d40b57084d1221ba83b9e6bb3fcc3197
- https://github.com/ipfs/boxo/commit/baa748b682fabb21a4c1f7628a8af348d4645974
- https://github.com/ipfs/boxo
osv · GHSA-q3j6-22wf-3jh9
- https://github.com/ipfs/boxo/security/advisories/GHSA-m974-xj4j-7qv5
- https://github.com/ipfs/go-bitswap/security/advisories/GHSA-q3j6-22wf-3jh9
- https://github.com/ipfs/go-libipfs/security/advisories/GHSA-m974-xj4j-7qv5
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-25568
- https://github.com/ipfs/boxo/commit/62cbac40b96f49e39cd7fedc77ee6b56adce4916
- https://github.com/ipfs/boxo/commit/9cb5cb54d40b57084d1221ba83b9e6bb3fcc3197
- https://github.com/ipfs/go-bitswap
osv · GO-2023-1766
Related changes
Linked by CVE identifierNo related changes are available here.