NextAuth.js is an open source authentication solution for Next.js applications. `next-auth` applications using OAuth provider versions before `v4.20.1` have been found to be subject to an authentication vulnerability. A bad actor who can read traffic on the victim's network or who is able to social engineer the victim to click a manipulated login link could intercept and tamper with the authorization URL to **log in as the victim**, bypassing the CSRF protection. This is due to a partial failure during a compromised OAuth session where a session code is erroneously generated. This issue has been addressed in version 4.20.1. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade may using Advanced Initialization, manually check the callback request for state, pkce, and nonce against the provider configuration to prevent this issue. See the linked GHSA for details.
NextAuth.js is an open source authentication solution for Next.js applications. `next-auth` applications using OAuth provider versions before `v4.20.1` have been found to be subject to an authentication vulnerability. A bad actor who can read traffic on the victim's network or who is able to social engineer the victim to click a manipulated login link could intercept and tamper with the authorization URL to **log in as the victim**, bypassing the CSRF protection. This is due to a partial failure during a compromised OAuth session where a session code is erroneously generated. This issue has been addressed in version 4.20.1. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade may using Advanced Initialization, manually check the callback request for state, pkce, and nonce against the provider configuration to prevent this issue. See the linked GHSA for details.
NextAuth.js is an open source authentication solution for Next.js applications. `next-auth` applications using OAuth provider versions before `v4.20.1` have been found to be subject to an authentication vulnerability. A bad actor who can read traffic on the victim's network or who is able to social engineer the victim to click a manipulated login link could intercept and tamper with the authorization URL to **log in as the victim**, bypassing the CSRF protection. This is due to a partial failure during a compromised OAuth session where a session code is erroneously generated. This issue has been addressed in version 4.20.1. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade may using Advanced Initialization, manually check the callback request for state, pkce, and nonce against the provider configuration to prevent this issue. See the linked GHSA for details.
### Impact
`next-auth` applications using OAuth provider versions before `v4.20.1` are affected.
A bad actor who can spy on the victim's network or able to social engineer the victim to click a manipulated login link could intercept and tamper with the authorization URL to **log in as the victim**, bypassing the CSRF protection.
As an example, an attack can happen in the following scenario.
> TL;DR: The attacker steals the victim's authenticated callback by intercepting and tampering with the authorization URL created by `next-auth`.
1. The victim attempts to log in to the `next-auth` site. For example https://next-auth-example.vercel.app/
2. `next-auth` sets the `checks` cookies according to how the OAuth provider is configured. In this case, `state` and `pkce` are set by default for the Google Provider.
<img width="1971" alt="Screen Shot 2023-03-03 at 09 54 26" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/31528554/222619750-a2062bb8-99eb-4985-a75c-d75acd3da67e.png">
3. The attacker intercepts the returned authorization URL, strips away the OAuth check (nonce, state, pkce), and returns the URL _without_ the check to the victim's browser. For example:
From
```https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/v2/auth/oauthchooseaccount?client_id=client_id&scope=openid%20email%20profile&response_type=code&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fnext-auth-example.vercel.app%2Fapi%2Fauth%2Fcallback%2Fgoogle&state=state&code_challenge=code_challenge&code_challenge_method=S256&service=lso&o2v=2&flowName=GeneralOAuthFlow```
to
```https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/v2/auth/oauthchooseaccount?client_id=client_id&scope=openid%20email%20profile&response_type=code&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fnext-auth-example.vercel.app%2Fapi%2Fauth%2Fcallback%2Fgoogle&service=lso&o2v=2&flowName=GeneralOAuthFlow```.
Notice the parameters `state`, `code_challenge` and `code_verifier` are removed from the victim's address bar.
4. The victim attempts to log in using their OAuth account.
5. The Authorization Server logs the victim in and calls back to the `next-auth` `api/auth/callback/:providerId`endpoint.
5.1. The attacker intercepts and logs this callback URL for later use.
5.2. `next-auth` checks the callback call from OAuth Authorization Server (doesn't have checks) and compares the checks with the cookies set (has checks) at step 2. This check will fail, resulting in the victim isn't logged in. However, at this step, the Authorization Server has already accepted the victim's request to log in and generated/sent a `code` in the URL.
6. The attacker now has an authorization URL with the `code` that the AS will exchange for valid `access_token`/`id_token` and can log in as the victim automatically. They can open a new browser window and paste in the URL logged at step 5.1 and log in as the victim.
### Patches
We patched the vulnerability in `next-auth` `v4.20.1`
To upgrade, run one of the following:
```
npm i next-auth@latest
```
```
yarn add next-auth@latest
```
```
pnpm add next-auth@latest
```
### Workarounds
Upgrading to `latest` is the recommended way to fix this issue. However, using [Advanced Initialization](https://next-auth.js.org/configuration/initialization#advanced-initialization), developers can manually check the [callback request](https://next-auth.js.org/getting-started/rest-api#getpost-apiauthcallbackprovider) for `state`, `pkce`, and `nonce` against the provider configuration, and abort the sign-in process if there is a mismatch. Check out the [source code](https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/blob/v4/packages/next-auth/src/core/lib/oauth/checks.ts) for help.
### References
- [CSRF](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749#section-10.12)
- [PKCE vs nonce](https://danielfett.de/2020/05/16/pkce-vs-nonce-equivalent-or-not/)
- [OAuth provider options](https://next-auth.js.org/configuration/providers/oauth)
- [`checks` provider config](https://authjs.dev/reference/core/providers#checks)
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Mar 9, 2023, 8:37:11 PM
dateUpdated: Feb 25, 2025, 2:59:02 PM
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.