Miniflux is a feed reader. Since v2.0.25, Miniflux will automatically proxy images served over HTTP to prevent mixed content errors.
When an outbound request made by the Go HTTP client fails, the `html.ServerError` is returned unescaped without the expected Content Security Policy header added to valid responses.
By creating an RSS feed item with the inline description containing an `<img>` tag with a `srcset` attribute pointing to an invalid URL like `http:a<script>alert(1)</script>`, we can coerce the proxy handler into an error condition where the invalid URL is returned unescaped and in full.
This results in JavaScript execution on the Miniflux instance as soon as the user is convinced (e.g. by a message in the alt text) to open the broken image.
An attacker can execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of a victim Miniflux user when they open a broken image in a crafted RSS feed. This can be used to perform actions on the Miniflux instance as that user and gain administrative access to the Miniflux instance if it is reachable and the victim is an administrator.
A patch is available in version 2.0.43. As a workaround sisable image proxy; default value is `http-only`.
Miniflux is a feed reader. Since v2.0.25, Miniflux will automatically proxy images served over HTTP to prevent mixed content errors.
When an outbound request made by the Go HTTP client fails, the `html.ServerError` is returned unescaped without the expected Content Security Policy header added to valid responses.
By creating an RSS feed item with the inline description containing an `<img>` tag with a `srcset` attribute pointing to an invalid URL like `http:a<script>alert(1)</script>`, we can coerce the proxy handler into an error condition where the invalid URL is returned unescaped and in full.
This results in JavaScript execution on the Miniflux instance as soon as the user is convinced (e.g. by a message in the alt text) to open the broken image.
An attacker can execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of a victim Miniflux user when they open a broken image in a crafted RSS feed. This can be used to perform actions on the Miniflux instance as that user and gain administrative access to the Miniflux instance if it is reachable and the victim is an administrator.
A patch is available in version 2.0.43. As a workaround sisable image proxy; default value is `http-only`.
Miniflux is a feed reader. Since v2.0.25, Miniflux will automatically proxy images served over HTTP to prevent mixed content errors.
When an outbound request made by the Go HTTP client fails, the `html.ServerError` is returned unescaped without the expected Content Security Policy header added to valid responses.
By creating an RSS feed item with the inline description containing an `<img>` tag with a `srcset` attribute pointing to an invalid URL like `http:a<script>alert(1)</script>`, we can coerce the proxy handler into an error condition where the invalid URL is returned unescaped and in full.
This results in JavaScript execution on the Miniflux instance as soon as the user is convinced (e.g. by a message in the alt text) to open the broken image.
An attacker can execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of a victim Miniflux user when they open a broken image in a crafted RSS feed. This can be used to perform actions on the Miniflux instance as that user and gain administrative access to the Miniflux instance if it is reachable and the victim is an administrator.
A patch is available in version 2.0.43. As a workaround sisable image proxy; default value is `http-only`.
### Impact
Since [v2.0.25](https://github.com/miniflux/v2/releases/tag/2.0.25), Miniflux will automatically [proxy](https://miniflux.app/docs/configuration.html#proxy-images) images served over HTTP to prevent mixed content errors.
When an outbound request made by the Go HTTP client fails, the `html.ServerError` is [returned](https://github.com/miniflux/v2/blob/b2fd84e0d376a3af6329b9bb2e772ce38a25c31c/ui/proxy.go#L76) unescaped without the expected Content Security Policy [header](https://github.com/miniflux/v2/blob/b2fd84e0d376a3af6329b9bb2e772ce38a25c31c/ui/proxy.go#L90) added to valid responses.
By creating an RSS feed item with the inline description containing an `<img>` tag with a `srcset` attribute pointing to an invalid URL like `http:a<script>alert(1)</script>`, we can coerce the proxy handler into an error condition where the invalid URL is returned unescaped and in full.
This results in JavaScript execution on the Miniflux instance as soon as the user is convinced (e.g. by a message in the alt text) to open the broken image.
An attacker can execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of a victim Miniflux user when they open a broken image in a crafted RSS feed. This can be used to perform actions on the Miniflux instance as that user and gain administrative access to the Miniflux instance if it is reachable and the victim is an administrator.
### Patches
PR #1746 fixes the problem. Available in Miniflux >= 2.0.43.
### Workarounds
- Disable image proxy (default value is `http-only`).
### References
- https://miniflux.app/docs/configuration.html#proxy-images
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Mar 17, 2023, 7:04:00 PM
dateUpdated: Feb 25, 2025, 2:53:55 PM
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.