Context isolation bypass via nested unserializable return value in Electron
cve-program · CVE-2023-29198
PublishedElectron is a framework which lets you write cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Electron apps using `contextIsolation` and `contextBridge` are affected. This is a context isolation bypass, meaning that code running in the main world context in the renderer can reach into the isolated Electron context and perform privileged actions. This issue is only exploitable if an API exposed to the main world via `contextBridge` can return an object or array that contains a javascript object which cannot be serialized, for instance, a canvas rendering context. This would normally result in an exception being thrown `Error: object could not be cloned`. The app side workaround is to ensure that such a case is not possible. Ensure all values returned from a function exposed over the context bridge are supported. This issue has been fixed in versions `25.0.0-alpha.2`, `24.0.1`, `23.2.3`, and `22.3.6`.
Read the publisher's advisoryeuvd · EUVD-2023-2557
PublishedElectron is a framework which lets you write cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Electron apps using `contextIsolation` and `contextBridge` are affected. This is a context isolation bypass, meaning that code running in the main world context in the renderer can reach into the isolated Electron context and perform privileged actions. This issue is only exploitable if an API exposed to the main world via `contextBridge` can return an object or array that contains a javascript object which cannot be serialized, for instance, a canvas rendering context. This would normally result in an exception being thrown `Error: object could not be cloned`. The app side workaround is to ensure that such a case is not possible. Ensure all values returned from a function exposed over the context bridge are supported. This issue has been fixed in versions `25.0.0-alpha.2`, `24.0.1`, `23.2.3`, and `22.3.6`.
Read the publisher's advisorynvd · CVE-2023-29198
PublishedElectron is a framework which lets you write cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Electron apps using `contextIsolation` and `contextBridge` are affected. This is a context isolation bypass, meaning that code running in the main world context in the renderer can reach into the isolated Electron context and perform privileged actions. This issue is only exploitable if an API exposed to the main world via `contextBridge` can return an object or array that contains a javascript object which cannot be serialized, for instance, a canvas rendering context. This would normally result in an exception being thrown `Error: object could not be cloned`. The app side workaround is to ensure that such a case is not possible. Ensure all values returned from a function exposed over the context bridge are supported. This issue has been fixed in versions `25.0.0-alpha.2`, `24.0.1`, `23.2.3`, and `22.3.6`.
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GHSA-p7v2-p9m8-qqg7
Published### Impact Apps using `contextIsolation` and `contextBridge` are affected. This is a context isolation bypass, meaning that code running in the main world context in the renderer can reach into the isolated Electron context and perform privileged actions. ### Workarounds This issue is exploitable under either of two conditions: * If an API exposed to the main world via `contextBridge` can return an object or array that contains a JS object which cannot be serialized, for instance, a canvas rendering context. This would normally result in an exception being thrown `Error: object could not be cloned`. * If an API exposed to the main world via `contextBridge` has a return value that throws a user-generated exception while being sent over the bridge, for instance a dynamic getter property on an object that throws an error when being computed. The app side workaround is to ensure that such a case is not possible. Ensure all values returned from a function exposed over the context bridge are [supported](https://www.electronjs.org/docs/latest/api/context-bridge#parameter--error--return-type-support) and that any objects returned from functions do not have dynamic getters that can throw exceptions. Auditing your exposed API is likely to be quite difficult so we strongly recommend you update to a patched version of Electron. ### Fixed Versions * `25.0.0-alpha.2` * `24.0.1` * `23.2.3` * `22.3.6` ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected])
Read the publisher's advisoryAffected versions, risk and source history
Exploitation and risk
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cve-program · CVE-2023-29198
PublishedContext isolation bypass via nested unserializable return value in Electron
Electron is a framework which lets you write cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Electron apps using `contextIsolation` and `contextBridge` are affected. This is a context isolation bypass, meaning that code running in the main world context in the renderer can reach into the isolated Electron context and perform privileged actions. This issue is only exploitable if an API exposed to the main world via `contextBridge` can return an object or array that contains a javascript object which cannot be serialized, for instance, a canvas rendering context. This would normally result in an exception being thrown `Error: object could not be cloned`. The app side workaround is to ensure that such a case is not possible. Ensure all values returned from a function exposed over the context bridge are supported. This issue has been fixed in versions `25.0.0-alpha.2`, `24.0.1`, `23.2.3`, and `22.3.6`.
- Source published
- 6 Sep 2023 20:13:56 UTC
- Source modified
- 26 Sep 2024 15:12:58 UTC
- Saved here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · 6.0 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L
euvd · EUVD-2023-2557
PublishedElectron is a framework which lets you write cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Electron apps using `contextIsolation` and `contextBridge` are affected. This is a context isolation bypass, meaning that code …
Electron is a framework which lets you write cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Electron apps using `contextIsolation` and `contextBridge` are affected. This is a context isolation bypass, meaning that code running in the main world context in the renderer can reach into the isolated Electron context and perform privileged actions. This issue is only exploitable if an API exposed to the main world via `contextBridge` can return an object or array that contains a javascript object which cannot be serialized, for instance, a canvas rendering context. This would normally result in an exception being thrown `Error: object could not be cloned`. The app side workaround is to ensure that such a case is not possible. Ensure all values returned from a function exposed over the context bridge are supported. This issue has been fixed in versions `25.0.0-alpha.2`, `24.0.1`, `23.2.3`, and `22.3.6`.
Additional publisher context
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Sep 6, 2023, 8:13:56 PM
dateUpdated: Sep 26, 2024, 3:12:58 PM
- Source published
- Sep 6, 2023, 8:13:56 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Sep 26, 2024, 3:12:58 PM (timezone not stated)
- Saved here
- 18 Nov 2026 04:34:54 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 6.0 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L
nvd · CVE-2023-29198
PublishedElectron is a framework which lets you write cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Electron apps using `contextIsolation` and `contextBridge` are affected. This is a context isolation bypass, meaning that code …
Electron is a framework which lets you write cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Electron apps using `contextIsolation` and `contextBridge` are affected. This is a context isolation bypass, meaning that code running in the main world context in the renderer can reach into the isolated Electron context and perform privileged actions. This issue is only exploitable if an API exposed to the main world via `contextBridge` can return an object or array that contains a javascript object which cannot be serialized, for instance, a canvas rendering context. This would normally result in an exception being thrown `Error: object could not be cloned`. The app side workaround is to ensure that such a case is not possible. Ensure all values returned from a function exposed over the context bridge are supported. This issue has been fixed in versions `25.0.0-alpha.2`, `24.0.1`, `23.2.3`, and `22.3.6`.
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Modified
Weakness classifications: CWE-754
Original publisher date fields
published: 2023-09-06T21:15:11.560
lastModified: 2026-06-17T05:49:35.453
17 source CPE criteria · context only
- cpe:2.3:a:electronjs:electron:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
- cpe:2.3:a:electronjs:electron:24.0.0:-:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
- cpe:2.3:a:electronjs:electron:24.0.0:alpha1:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
- cpe:2.3:a:electronjs:electron:24.0.0:alpha2:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
- cpe:2.3:a:electronjs:electron:24.0.0:alpha3:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
- cpe:2.3:a:electronjs:electron:24.0.0:alpha4:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
- cpe:2.3:a:electronjs:electron:24.0.0:alpha5:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
- cpe:2.3:a:electronjs:electron:24.0.0:alpha6:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
- cpe:2.3:a:electronjs:electron:24.0.0:alpha7:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
- cpe:2.3:a:electronjs:electron:24.0.0:beta1:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
- cpe:2.3:a:electronjs:electron:24.0.0:beta2:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
- cpe:2.3:a:electronjs:electron:24.0.0:beta3:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
- cpe:2.3:a:electronjs:electron:24.0.0:beta4:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
- cpe:2.3:a:electronjs:electron:24.0.0:beta5:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
- cpe:2.3:a:electronjs:electron:24.0.0:beta6:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
- cpe:2.3:a:electronjs:electron:24.0.0:beta7:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
- cpe:2.3:a:electronjs:electron:25.0.0:alpha1:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.
- Source published
- 6 Sep 2023 21:15:11 UTC
- Source modified
- 17 Jun 2026 05:49:35 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 22:17:10 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 6.0 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary · 8.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
osv · GHSA-p7v2-p9m8-qqg7
PublishedElectron context isolation bypass via nested unserializable return value
### Impact Apps using `contextIsolation` and `contextBridge` are affected. This is a context isolation bypass, meaning that code running in the main world context in the renderer can reach into the isolated Electron context and perform privileged actions. ### Workarounds This issue is exploitable under either of two conditions: * If an API exposed to the main world via `contextBridge` can return an object or array that contains a JS object which cannot be serialized, for instance, a canvas rendering context. This would normally result in an exception being thrown `Error: object could not be cloned`. * If an API exposed to the main world via `contextBridge` has a return value that throws a user-generated exception while being sent over the bridge, for instance a dynamic getter property on an object that throws an error when being computed. The app side workaround is to ensure that such a case is not possible. Ensure all values returned from a function exposed over the context bridge are [supported](https://www.electronjs.org/docs/latest/api/context-bridge#parameter--error--return-type-support) and that any objects returned from functions do not have dynamic getters that can throw exceptions. Auditing your exposed API is likely to be quite difficult so we strongly recommend you update to a patched version of Electron. ### Fixed Versions * `25.0.0-alpha.2` * `24.0.1` * `23.2.3` * `22.3.6` ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected])
- Source published
- 6 Sep 2023 19:50:58 UTC
- Source modified
- 10 Sep 2026 03:49:58 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L
Publisher rating · MODERATE