gost (GO Simple Tunnel) is a simple tunnel written in golang. Sensitive secrets such as passwords, token and API keys should be compared only using a constant-time comparison function. Untrusted input, sourced from a HTTP header, is compared directly with a secret. Since this comparison is not secure, an attacker can mount a side-channel timing attack to guess the password. As a workaround, this can be easily fixed using a constant time comparing function such as `crypto/subtle`'s `ConstantTimeCompare`.
gost (GO Simple Tunnel) is a simple tunnel written in golang. Sensitive secrets such as passwords, token and API keys should be compared only using a constant-time comparison function. Untrusted input, sourced from a HTTP header, is compared directly with a secret. Since this comparison is not secure, an attacker can mount a side-channel timing attack to guess the password. As a workaround, this can be easily fixed using a constant time comparing function such as `crypto/subtle`'s `ConstantTimeCompare`.
gost (GO Simple Tunnel) is a simple tunnel written in golang. Sensitive secrets such as passwords, token and API keys should be compared only using a constant-time comparison function. Untrusted input, sourced from a HTTP header, is compared directly with a secret. Since this comparison is not secure, an attacker can mount a side-channel timing attack to guess the password. As a workaround, this can be easily fixed using a constant time comparing function such as `crypto/subtle`'s `ConstantTimeCompare`.
[Timing attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timing_attack) occur when an attacker can guess a secret by observing a difference in processing time for valid and invalid inputs. Sensitive secrets such as passwords, token and API keys should be compared only using a constant-time comparision function.
More information on this attack type can be found in [this blog post](https://verboselogging.com/2012/08/20/a-timing-attack-in-action).
# Root Cause Analysis
In this case, the vulnerability occurs due to the following code.
https://github.com/ginuerzh/gost/blob/1c62376e0880e4094bd3731e06bd4f7842638f6a/auth.go#L46-L46
Here, a untrusted input, sourced from a HTTP header, is compared directly with a secret.
Since, this comparision is not secure, an attacker can mount a side-channel timing attack to guess the password.
# Remediation
This can be easily fixed using a constant time comparing function such as `crypto/subtle`'s `ConstantTimeCompare`.
An example fix can be found in https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/commit/48870911974adddaa4c99c8089e79b7d787fa820 Alternatively, one can apply the patch below
```
From d18cff85e1a565f688f717fd8f2cacea62ff9dbf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Porcupiney Hairs <[email protected]>
Date: Sun, 7 May 2023 01:03:33 +0530
Subject: [PATCH] Fix : Timing attack
---
auth.go | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/auth.go b/auth.go
index 1be96e9..be13f23 100644
--- a/auth.go
+++ b/auth.go
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package gost
import (
"bufio"
+ "crypto/subtle"
"io"
"strings"
"sync"
@@ -43,7 +44,8 @@ func (au *LocalAuthenticator) Authenticate(user, password string) bool {
}
v, ok := au.kvs[user]
- return ok && (v == "" || password == v)
+ passOk := subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(password), []byte(v)) == 0
+ return ok && (v == "" || passOk)
}
// Add adds a key-value pair to the Authenticator.
--
2.25.1
```
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datePublished: May 30, 2023, 3:06:06 AM
dateUpdated: Jan 10, 2025, 8:45:20 PM
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.