OpenZeppelin Contracts's MerkleProof multiproofs may allow proving arbitrary leaves for specific trees
cve-program · CVE-2023-34459
PublishedOpenZeppelin Contracts is a library for smart contract development. Starting in version 4.7.0 and prior to version 4.9.2, when the `verifyMultiProof`, `verifyMultiProofCalldata`, `procesprocessMultiProof`, or `processMultiProofCalldat` functions are in use, it is possible to construct merkle trees that allow forging a valid multiproof for an arbitrary set of leaves. A contract may be vulnerable if it uses multiproofs for verification and the merkle tree that is processed includes a node with value 0 at depth 1 (just under the root). This could happen inadvertedly for balanced trees with 3 leaves or less, if the leaves are not hashed. This could happen deliberately if a malicious tree builder includes such a node in the tree. A contract is not vulnerable if it uses single-leaf proving (`verify`, `verifyCalldata`, `processProof`, or `processProofCalldata`), or if it uses multiproofs with a known tree that has hashed leaves. Standard merkle trees produced or validated with the @openzeppelin/merkle-tree library are safe. The problem has been patched in version 4.9.2. Some workarounds are available. For those using multiproofs: When constructing merkle trees hash the leaves and do not insert empty nodes in your trees. Using the @openzeppelin/merkle-tree package eliminates this issue. Do not accept user-provided merkle roots without reconstructing at least the first level of the tree. Verify the merkle tree structure by reconstructing it from the leaves.
Read the publisher's advisoryeuvd · EUVD-2023-1907
PublishedOpenZeppelin Contracts is a library for smart contract development. Starting in version 4.7.0 and prior to version 4.9.2, when the `verifyMultiProof`, `verifyMultiProofCalldata`, `procesprocessMultiProof`, or `processMultiProofCalldat` functions are in use, it is possible to construct merkle trees that allow forging a valid multiproof for an arbitrary set of leaves. A contract may be vulnerable if it uses multiproofs for verification and the merkle tree that is processed includes a node with value 0 at depth 1 (just under the root). This could happen inadvertedly for balanced trees with 3 leaves or less, if the leaves are not hashed. This could happen deliberately if a malicious tree builder includes such a node in the tree. A contract is not vulnerable if it uses single-leaf proving (`verify`, `verifyCalldata`, `processProof`, or `processProofCalldata`), or if it uses multiproofs with a known tree that has hashed leaves. Standard merkle trees produced or validated with the @openzeppelin/merkle-tree library are safe. The problem has been patched in version 4.9.2. Some workarounds are available. For those using multiproofs: When constructing merkle trees hash the leaves and do not insert empty nodes in your trees. Using the @openzeppelin/merkle-tree package eliminates this issue. Do not accept user-provided merkle roots without reconstructing at least the first level of the tree. Verify the merkle tree structure by reconstructing it from the leaves.
Read the publisher's advisorynvd · CVE-2023-34459
PublishedOpenZeppelin Contracts is a library for smart contract development. Starting in version 4.7.0 and prior to version 4.9.2, when the `verifyMultiProof`, `verifyMultiProofCalldata`, `procesprocessMultiProof`, or `processMultiProofCalldat` functions are in use, it is possible to construct merkle trees that allow forging a valid multiproof for an arbitrary set of leaves. A contract may be vulnerable if it uses multiproofs for verification and the merkle tree that is processed includes a node with value 0 at depth 1 (just under the root). This could happen inadvertedly for balanced trees with 3 leaves or less, if the leaves are not hashed. This could happen deliberately if a malicious tree builder includes such a node in the tree. A contract is not vulnerable if it uses single-leaf proving (`verify`, `verifyCalldata`, `processProof`, or `processProofCalldata`), or if it uses multiproofs with a known tree that has hashed leaves. Standard merkle trees produced or validated with the @openzeppelin/merkle-tree library are safe. The problem has been patched in version 4.9.2. Some workarounds are available. For those using multiproofs: When constructing merkle trees hash the leaves and do not insert empty nodes in your trees. Using the @openzeppelin/merkle-tree package eliminates this issue. Do not accept user-provided merkle roots without reconstructing at least the first level of the tree. Verify the merkle tree structure by reconstructing it from the leaves.
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GHSA-wprv-93r4-jj2p
Published### Impact When the `verifyMultiProof`, `verifyMultiProofCalldata`, `processMultiProof`, or `processMultiProofCalldata` functions are in use, it is possible to construct merkle trees that allow forging a valid multiproof for an arbitrary set of leaves. A contract may be vulnerable if it uses multiproofs for verification and the merkle tree that is processed includes a node with value 0 at depth 1 (just under the root). This could happen inadvertently for balanced trees with 3 leaves or less, if the leaves are not hashed. This could happen deliberately if a malicious tree builder includes such a node in the tree. A contract is not vulnerable if it uses single-leaf proving (`verify`, `verifyCalldata`, `processProof`, or `processProofCalldata`), or if it uses multiproofs with a known tree that has hashed leaves. Standard merkle trees produced or validated with the [@openzeppelin/merkle-tree](https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/merkle-tree) library are safe. ### Patches The problem has been patched in 4.9.2. ### Workarounds If you are using multiproofs: When constructing merkle trees hash the leaves and do not insert empty nodes in your trees. Using the [@openzeppelin/merkle-tree](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@openzeppelin/merkle-tree) package eliminates this issue. Do not accept user-provided merkle roots without reconstructing at least the first level of the tree. Verify the merkle tree structure by reconstructing it from the leaves.
Read the publisher's advisoryAffected versions, risk and source history
Related advisories and sources
Publishers link these advisories through the identifiers shown below. A shared identifier or date alone does not tell you whether your software is affected or whether the advisories describe the same cause.
CVE-2023-34459 · CVE overview and exploitation status
cve-program · CVE-2023-34459
- https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/security/advisories/GHSA-wprv-93r4-jj2p
- https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/commit/4d2383e17186be3e8ccf5a442e9686ecc7de1c55
- https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/releases/tag/v4.9.2
euvd · EUVD-2023-1907
- https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/security/advisories/GHSA-wprv-93r4-jj2p
- https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/commit/4d2383e17186be3e8ccf5a442e9686ecc7de1c55
- https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/releases/tag/v4.9.2
nvd · CVE-2023-34459
- https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/commit/4d2383e17186be3e8ccf5a442e9686ecc7de1c55
- https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/releases/tag/v4.9.2
- https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/security/advisories/GHSA-wprv-93r4-jj2p
osv · GHSA-wprv-93r4-jj2p
- https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/security/advisories/GHSA-wprv-93r4-jj2p
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-34459
- https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/commit/4d2383e17186be3e8ccf5a442e9686ecc7de1c55
- https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts
- https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/releases/tag/v4.9.2
Related changes
Linked by CVE identifierNo related changes are available here.