Public mode

No access to your tenant or devices. Every item links to its source. What this means

Sources need attention Customize Public modeDiscuss ChangeIntel on Discord

n/a · authentication bypass

cve-program · severity unknowneuvd · severity unknownCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary 6.5 MEDIUMPublisher rating HIGHFixed by github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2 2.9.23Fixed by github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2 2.10.2osv · severity unknownFixed by github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2 2.9.23Fixed by github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2 2.10.2KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2023-47090

Published

NATS nats-server before 2.9.23 and 2.10.x before 2.10.2 has an authentication bypass. An implicit $G user in an authorization block can sometimes be used for unauthenticated access, even when the intention of the configuration was for each user to have an account. The earliest affected version is 2.2.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2023-2730

Published

NATS nats-server before 2.9.23 and 2.10.x before 2.10.2 has an authentication bypass. An implicit $G user in an authorization block can sometimes be used for unauthenticated access, even when the intention of the configuration was for each user to have an account. The earliest affected version is 2.2.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2023-47090

Published

NATS nats-server before 2.9.23 and 2.10.x before 2.10.2 has an authentication bypass. An implicit $G user in an authorization block can sometimes be used for unauthenticated access, even when the intention of the configuration was for each user to have an account. The earliest affected version is 2.2.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-fr2g-9hjm-wr23

Published

## Background NATS.io is a high performance open source pub-sub distributed communication technology, built for the cloud, on-premise, IoT, and edge computing. NATS users exist within accounts, and once using accounts, the old authorization block is not applicable. ## Problem Description Without any authorization rules in the nats-server, users can connect without authentication. Before nats-server 2.2.0, all authentication and authorization rules for a nats-server lived in an "authorization" block, defining users. With nats-server 2.2.0 all users live inside accounts. When using the authorization block, whose syntax predates this, those users will be placed into the implicit global account, "$G". Users inside accounts go into the newer "accounts" block. If an "accounts" block is defined, in simple deployment scenarios this is often used only to enable client access to the system account. When the only account added is the system account "$SYS", the nats-server would create an implicit user in "$G" and set it as the `no_auth_user` account, enabling the same "without authentication" logic as without any rules. This preserved the ability to connect simply, and then add one authenticated login for system access. But with an "authorization" block, this is wrong. Users exist in the global account, with login rules. And in simple testing, they might still connect fine without administrators seeing that authentication has been disabled. The blind-spot on our part came from encouraging and documenting a switch to using only "accounts", instead of "authorization". In the fixed versions, using an "authorization" block will inhibit the implicit creation of a "$G" user and setting it as the `no_auth_user` target. In unfixed versions, just creating a second account, with no users, will also inhibit this behavior. ## Affected versions NATS Server: * 2.2.0 up to and including 2.9.22 and 2.10.1 * Fixed with nats-io/nats-server: 2.10.2 and backported to 2.9.23 ## Workarounds In the "accounts" block, define a second non-system account, leave it empty. accounts { SYS: { users: [ { user: sysuser, password: makemeasandwich } ] } DUMMY: {} # for security, before 2.10.2 } system_account: SYS ## Solution Any one of these: 1. Upgrade the NATS server to at least 2.10.2 (or 2.9.23) 2. Or define a dummy account 3. Or complete the migration of authorization entries to be inside a named account in the "accounts" block ## Credits Problem reported by Alex Herrington. Addressed publicly in a GitHub Discussion prior to this advisory.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GO-2023-2133

Published

Without any authorization rules in the nats-server, users can connect without authentication. Before nats-server 2.2.0, all authentication and authorization rules for a nats-server lived in an "authorization" block, defining users. With nats-server 2.2.0 all users live inside accounts. When using the authorization block, whose syntax predates this, those users will be placed into the implicit global account, "$G". Users inside accounts go into the newer "accounts" block. If an "accounts" block is defined, in simple deployment scenarios this is often used only to enable client access to the system account. When the only account added is the system account "$SYS", the nats-server would create an implicit user in "$G" and set it as the "no_auth_user" account, enabling the same "without authentication" logic as without any rules. This preserved the ability to connect simply, and then add one authenticated login for system access. But with an "authorization" block, this is wrong. Users exist in the global account, with login rules. And in simple testing, they might still connect fine without administrators seeing that authentication has been disabled. In the fixed versions, using an "authorization" block will inhibit the implicit creation of a "$G" user and setting it as the "no_auth_user" target. In unfixed versions, just creating a second account, with no users, will also inhibit this behavior.

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

Exploitation and risk

Source status

CISA KEV lists vulnerabilities known to be exploited. FIRST EPSS estimates the likelihood of exploitation in the next 30 days. An unavailable score does not mean zero risk.

Which CVEs have scores here?

This view includes predictions for CVE identifiers explicitly listed in public NuGet advisories. Microsoft release pages have their own prediction coverage. Check source status for the scope and latest checks.

No exploitation or prediction data is available here for these CVEs. This does not mean they are safe or unlikely to be exploited.

cve-program · CVE-2023-47090

Published

NATS nats-server before 2.9.23 and 2.10.x before 2.10.2 has an authentication bypass. An implicit $G user in an authorization block can sometimes be used for unauthenticated access, even when the intention of the configuration was for each …

NATS nats-server before 2.9.23 and 2.10.x before 2.10.2 has an authentication bypass. An implicit $G user in an authorization block can sometimes be used for unauthenticated access, even when the intention of the configuration was for each user to have an account. The earliest affected version is 2.2.0.

Source published
30 Oct 2023 00:00:00 UTC
Source modified
9 Sep 2024 20:30:00 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

euvd · EUVD-2023-2730

Published

NATS nats-server before 2.9.23 and 2.10.x before 2.10.2 has an authentication bypass. An implicit $G user in an authorization block can sometimes be used for unauthenticated access, even when the intention of the configuration was for each …

NATS nats-server before 2.9.23 and 2.10.x before 2.10.2 has an authentication bypass. An implicit $G user in an authorization block can sometimes be used for unauthenticated access, even when the intention of the configuration was for each user to have an account. The earliest affected version is 2.2.0.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Oct 30, 2023, 12:00:00 AM

dateUpdated: Sep 9, 2024, 8:30:00 PM

1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases

msrc_CVE-2023-47090: NATS nats-server before 2.9.23 and 2.10.x before 2.10.2 has an authentication bypass. An implicit $G user in an authorization block can sometimes be used for unauthenticated access even when the intention of the configuration was for each user to have an account. The earliest affected version is 2.2.0.

CVE-2023-47090

Source published
Oct 30, 2023, 12:00:00 AM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Sep 9, 2024, 8:30:00 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
15 Nov 2026 00:36:24 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

nvd · CVE-2023-47090

Published

NATS nats-server before 2.9.23 and 2.10.x before 2.10.2 has an authentication bypass. An implicit $G user in an authorization block can sometimes be used for unauthenticated access, even when the intention of the configuration was for each …

NATS nats-server before 2.9.23 and 2.10.x before 2.10.2 has an authentication bypass. An implicit $G user in an authorization block can sometimes be used for unauthenticated access, even when the intention of the configuration was for each user to have an account. The earliest affected version is 2.2.0.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Modified

Weakness classifications: CWE-863

Original publisher date fields

published: 2023-10-30T17:15:52.467

lastModified: 2026-06-17T06:32:07.110

1 source CPE criteria · context only
  • cpe:2.3:a:linuxfoundation:nats-server:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

Source published
30 Oct 2023 17:15:52 UTC
Source modified
17 Jun 2026 06:32:07 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 22:17:33 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary · 6.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

osv · GHSA-fr2g-9hjm-wr23

Published

NATS.io: Adding accounts for just the system account adds auth bypass

## Background NATS.io is a high performance open source pub-sub distributed communication technology, built for the cloud, on-premise, IoT, and edge computing. NATS users exist within accounts, and once using accounts, the old authorization block is not applicable. ## Problem Description Without any authorization rules in the nats-server, users can connect without authentication. Before nats-server 2.2.0, all authentication and authorization rules for a nats-server lived in an "authorization" block, defining users. With nats-server 2.2.0 all users live inside accounts. When using the authorization block, whose syntax predates this, those users will be placed into the implicit global account, "$G". Users inside accounts go into the newer "accounts" block. If an "accounts" block is defined, in simple deployment scenarios this is often used only to enable client access to the system account. When the only account added is the system account "$SYS", the nats-server would create an implicit user in "$G" and set it as the `no_auth_user` account, enabling the same "without authentication" logic as without any rules. This preserved the ability to connect simply, and then add one authenticated login for system access. But with an "authorization" block, this is wrong. Users exist in the global account, with login rules. And in simple testing, they might still connect fine without administrators seeing that authentication has been disabled. The blind-spot on our part came from encouraging and documenting a switch to using only "accounts", instead of "authorization". In the fixed versions, using an "authorization" block will inhibit the implicit creation of a "$G" user and setting it as the `no_auth_user` target. In unfixed versions, just creating a second account, with no users, will also inhibit this behavior. ## Affected versions NATS Server: * 2.2.0 up to and including 2.9.22 and 2.10.1 * Fixed with nats-io/nats-server: 2.10.2 and backported to 2.9.23 ## Workarounds In the "accounts" block, define a second non-system account, leave it empty. accounts { SYS: { users: [ { user: sysuser, password: makemeasandwich } ] } DUMMY: {} # for security, before 2.10.2 } system_account: SYS ## Solution Any one of these: 1. Upgrade the NATS server to at least 2.10.2 (or 2.9.23) 2. Or define a dummy account 3. Or complete the migration of authorization entries to be inside a named account in the "accounts" block ## Credits Problem reported by Alex Herrington. Addressed publicly in a GitHub Discussion prior to this advisory.

Source published
19 Oct 2023 16:13:03 UTC
Source modified
10 Sep 2026 03:50:03 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

Publisher rating · HIGH

osv · GO-2023-2133

Published

Authorization bypass in github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2

Without any authorization rules in the nats-server, users can connect without authentication. Before nats-server 2.2.0, all authentication and authorization rules for a nats-server lived in an "authorization" block, defining users. With nats-server 2.2.0 all users live inside accounts. When using the authorization block, whose syntax predates this, those users will be placed into the implicit global account, "$G". Users inside accounts go into the newer "accounts" block. If an "accounts" block is defined, in simple deployment scenarios this is often used only to enable client access to the system account. When the only account added is the system account "$SYS", the nats-server would create an implicit user in "$G" and set it as the "no_auth_user" account, enabling the same "without authentication" logic as without any rules. This preserved the ability to connect simply, and then add one authenticated login for system access. But with an "authorization" block, this is wrong. Users exist in the global account, with login rules. And in simple testing, they might still connect fine without administrators seeing that authentication has been disabled. In the fixed versions, using an "authorization" block will inhibit the implicit creation of a "$G" user and setting it as the "no_auth_user" target. In unfixed versions, just creating a second account, with no users, will also inhibit this behavior.

Source published
24 Oct 2023 20:27:36 UTC
Source modified
4 Feb 2026 04:13:50 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 16 Nov 17:03 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 250 fully read · 20 waiting for GitHub's hourly limit · documentation 469/469 current