quic-go is an implementation of the QUIC protocol (RFC 9000, RFC 9001, RFC 9002) in Go. An attacker can cause its peer to run out of memory sending a large number of PATH_CHALLENGE frames. The receiver is supposed to respond to each PATH_CHALLENGE frame with a PATH_RESPONSE frame. The attacker can prevent the receiver from sending out (the vast majority of) these PATH_RESPONSE frames by collapsing the peers congestion window (by selectively acknowledging received packets) and by manipulating the peer's RTT estimate. This vulnerability has been patched in versions 0.37.7, 0.38.2 and 0.39.4.
quic-go is an implementation of the QUIC protocol (RFC 9000, RFC 9001, RFC 9002) in Go. An attacker can cause its peer to run out of memory sending a large number of PATH_CHALLENGE frames. The receiver is supposed to respond to each PATH_CHALLENGE frame with a PATH_RESPONSE frame. The attacker can prevent the receiver from sending out (the vast majority of) these PATH_RESPONSE frames by collapsing the peers congestion window (by selectively acknowledging received packets) and by manipulating the peer's RTT estimate. This vulnerability has been patched in versions 0.37.7, 0.38.2 and 0.39.4.
quic-go is an implementation of the QUIC protocol (RFC 9000, RFC 9001, RFC 9002) in Go. An attacker can cause its peer to run out of memory sending a large number of PATH_CHALLENGE frames. The receiver is supposed to respond to each PATH_CHALLENGE frame with a PATH_RESPONSE frame. The attacker can prevent the receiver from sending out (the vast majority of) these PATH_RESPONSE frames by collapsing the peers congestion window (by selectively acknowledging received packets) and by manipulating the peer's RTT estimate. This vulnerability has been patched in versions 0.37.7, 0.38.2 and 0.39.4.
An attacker can cause its peer to run out of memory sending a large number of PATH_CHALLENGE frames. The receiver is supposed to respond to each PATH_CHALLENGE frame with a PATH_RESPONSE frame. The attacker can prevent the receiver from sending out (the vast majority of) these PATH_RESPONSE frames by collapsing the peers congestion window (by selectively acknowledging received packets) and by manipulating the peer's RTT estimate.
I published a more detailed description of the attack and its mitigation in this blog post: https://seemann.io/posts/2023-12-18-exploiting-quics-path-validation/
There's no way to mitigate this attack, please update quic-go to a version that contains the fix.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Jan 10, 2024, 9:40:58 PM
dateUpdated: Jun 17, 2025, 8:59:15 PM
6 related source bulletins · separate from aliases
openSUSE-RU-2026:21160-1: Recommended update for dnscrypt-proxy
WID-SEC-W-2024-0407: Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform: Schwachstelle ermöglicht Denial of Service
CVE-2023-49295
RHSA-2024:0855: Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.4 Product Security and Bug Fix Update
CVE-2023-49295
openSUSE-SU-2024:13570-1: syncthing-1.27.2-1.1 on GA media
CVE-2023-49295
openSUSE-SU-2025:14626-1: kubo-0.32.1-1.1 on GA media
CVE-2023-49295
msrc_CVE-2023-49295: quic-go's path validation mechanism can cause denial of service
CVE-2023-49295
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.