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Any authenticated user may obtain private message details from other users on the same instance

CVSS 3.1 7.5 HIGHEUVD CVSS 3.1 7.5 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 7.5 HIGHCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary 6.5 MEDIUMCVSS_V3 Publisher rating HIGHFixed by lemmy_server 0.19.1KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2024-23649

Published

Lemmy is a link aggregator and forum for the fediverse. Starting in version 0.17.0 and prior to version 0.19.1, users can report private messages, even when they're neither sender nor recipient of the message. The API response to creating a private message report contains the private message itself, which means any user can just iterate over message ids to (loudly) obtain all private messages of an instance. A user with instance admin privileges can also abuse this if the private message is removed from the response, as they're able to see the resulting reports. Creating a private message report by POSTing to `/api/v3/private_message/report` does not validate whether the reporter is the recipient of the message. lemmy-ui does not allow the sender to report the message; the API method should likely be restricted to accessible to recipients only. The API response when creating a report contains the `private_message_report_view` with all the details of the report, including the private message that has been reported: Any authenticated user can obtain arbitrary (untargeted) private message contents. Privileges required depend on the instance configuration; when registrations are enabled without application system, the privileges required are practically none. When registration applications are required, privileges required could be considered low, but this assessment heavily varies by instance. Version 0.19.1 contains a patch for this issue. A workaround is available. If an update to a fixed Lemmy version is not immediately possible, the API route can be blocked in the reverse proxy. This will prevent anyone from reporting private messages, but it will also prevent exploitation before the update has been applied.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2024-0411

Published

Lemmy is a link aggregator and forum for the fediverse. Starting in version 0.17.0 and prior to version 0.19.1, users can report private messages, even when they're neither sender nor recipient of the message. The API response to creating a private message report contains the private message itself, which means any user can just iterate over message ids to (loudly) obtain all private messages of an instance. A user with instance admin privileges can also abuse this if the private message is removed from the response, as they're able to see the resulting reports. Creating a private message report by POSTing to `/api/v3/private_message/report` does not validate whether the reporter is the recipient of the message. lemmy-ui does not allow the sender to report the message; the API method should likely be restricted to accessible to recipients only. The API response when creating a report contains the `private_message_report_view` with all the details of the report, including the private message that has been reported: Any authenticated user can obtain arbitrary (untargeted) private message contents. Privileges required depend on the instance configuration; when registrations are enabled without application system, the privileges required are practically none. When registration applications are required, privileges required could be considered low, but this assessment heavily varies by instance. Version 0.19.1 contains a patch for this issue. A workaround is available. If an update to a fixed Lemmy version is not immediately possible, the API route can be blocked in the reverse proxy. This will prevent anyone from reporting private messages, but it will also prevent exploitation before the update has been applied.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2024-23649

Published

Lemmy is a link aggregator and forum for the fediverse. Starting in version 0.17.0 and prior to version 0.19.1, users can report private messages, even when they're neither sender nor recipient of the message. The API response to creating a private message report contains the private message itself, which means any user can just iterate over message ids to (loudly) obtain all private messages of an instance. A user with instance admin privileges can also abuse this if the private message is removed from the response, as they're able to see the resulting reports. Creating a private message report by POSTing to `/api/v3/private_message/report` does not validate whether the reporter is the recipient of the message. lemmy-ui does not allow the sender to report the message; the API method should likely be restricted to accessible to recipients only. The API response when creating a report contains the `private_message_report_view` with all the details of the report, including the private message that has been reported: Any authenticated user can obtain arbitrary (untargeted) private message contents. Privileges required depend on the instance configuration; when registrations are enabled without application system, the privileges required are practically none. When registration applications are required, privileges required could be considered low, but this assessment heavily varies by instance. Version 0.19.1 contains a patch for this issue. A workaround is available. If an update to a fixed Lemmy version is not immediately possible, the API route can be blocked in the reverse proxy. This will prevent anyone from reporting private messages, but it will also prevent exploitation before the update has been applied.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-r64r-5h43-26qv

Published

### Summary Users can report private messages, even when they're neither sender nor recipient of the message. The API response to creating a private message report contains the private message itself, which means any user can just iterate over message ids to (loudly) obtain all private messages of an instance. A user with instance admin privileges can also abuse this if the private message is removed from the response, as they're able to see the resulting reports. ### Details Creating a private message report by POSTing to `/api/v3/private_message/report` does not validate whether the reporter is the recipient of the message. At least lemmy-ui does not allow the sender to report the message; the API method should likely be restricted to accessible to recipients only. The API response when creating a report contains the `private_message_report_view` with all the details of the report, including the private message that has been reported: <details> <summary>Example response</summary> In the report below, the creator with id 3 is different from the private message creator (id 2) and private message recipient (id 6). ```json { "private_message_report_view": { "private_message_report": { "id": 14, "creator_id": 3, "private_message_id": 7, "original_pm_text": "testfoo", "reason": "reporting id 7", "resolved": false, "published": "2023-12-15T19:23:03.441967Z" }, "private_message": { "id": 7, "creator_id": 2, "recipient_id": 6, "content": "testfoo", "deleted": false, "read": false, "published": "2023-12-15T19:21:41.920872Z", "ap_id": "https://1b1w56.lem.rocks/private_message/7", "local": true }, "private_message_creator": { "id": 2, "name": "admin", "banned": false, "published": "2023-12-14T23:45:05.055427Z", "actor_id": "https://1b1w56.lem.rocks/u/admin", "local": true, "deleted": false, "bot_account": false, "instance_id": 1 }, "creator": { "id": 3, "name": "testuser1", "banned": false, "published": "2023-12-14T23:47:57.571772Z", "actor_id": "https://1b1w56.lem.rocks/u/testuser1", "local": true, "deleted": false, "bot_account": false, "instance_id": 1 } } } ``` </details> If these details were not available in the response, but reports could still be created by any user, or at least by any admin, this would allow an instance admin to create reports and obtain the message contents from the report system. This was originally discovered from incorrect reports on a 0.18.5 instance and has been replicated in a 0.19.0 test environment. ### PoC ```bash curl -v 'https://myinstance.tld/api/v3/private_message/report' -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -H 'authorization: Bearer ...' --data-raw '{"private_message_id":1,"reason":"i like reports"}' ``` ### Impact Any authenticated user can obtain arbitrary (untargeted) private message contents. Privileges required depend on the instance configuration; when registratons are enabled without application system, the privileges required are practically none. When registration applications are required, privileges required could be considered low, but this assessment heavily varies by instance. ### Detection Any private message reports where the report creator is not equal to the private message recipient may be an attempt to exploit this. As this was originally discovered from an incorrect report, likely related to a bug in a client app, it should be noted that not all mismatching reports should be considered malicious; though a frequent occurrence of them likely indicates an exploitation attempt. ### Workaround when updating is not immediately possible If an update to a fixed Lemmy version is not immediately possible, the API route can be blocked in the reverse proxy. This will prevent anyone from reporting private messages, but it will also prevent exploitation before the update has been applied. nginx example: ```nginx location = /api/v3/private_message/report { default_type application/json; return 403 '{"error":"couldnt_create_report"}'; } ```

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

Exploitation and risk

Source status

CISA KEV lists vulnerabilities known to be exploited. FIRST EPSS estimates the likelihood of exploitation in the next 30 days. An unavailable score does not mean zero risk.

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This view includes predictions for CVE identifiers explicitly listed in public NuGet advisories. Microsoft release pages have their own prediction coverage. Check source status for the scope and latest checks.

No exploitation or prediction data is available here for these CVEs. This does not mean they are safe or unlikely to be exploited.

cve-program · CVE-2024-23649

Published

Any authenticated user may obtain private message details from other users on the same instance

Lemmy is a link aggregator and forum for the fediverse. Starting in version 0.17.0 and prior to version 0.19.1, users can report private messages, even when they're neither sender nor recipient of the message. The API response to creating a private message report contains the private message itself, which means any user can just iterate over message ids to (loudly) obtain all private messages of an instance. A user with instance admin privileges can also abuse this if the private message is removed from the response, as they're able to see the resulting reports. Creating a private message report by POSTing to `/api/v3/private_message/report` does not validate whether the reporter is the recipient of the message. lemmy-ui does not allow the sender to report the message; the API method should likely be restricted to accessible to recipients only. The API response when creating a report contains the `private_message_report_view` with all the details of the report, including the private message that has been reported: Any authenticated user can obtain arbitrary (untargeted) private message contents. Privileges required depend on the instance configuration; when registrations are enabled without application system, the privileges required are practically none. When registration applications are required, privileges required could be considered low, but this assessment heavily varies by instance. Version 0.19.1 contains a patch for this issue. A workaround is available. If an update to a fixed Lemmy version is not immediately possible, the API route can be blocked in the reverse proxy. This will prevent anyone from reporting private messages, but it will also prevent exploitation before the update has been applied.

Source published
24 Jan 2024 18:09:30 UTC
Source modified
30 May 2025 14:16:25 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

euvd · EUVD-2024-0411

Published

Lemmy is a link aggregator and forum for the fediverse. Starting in version 0.17.0 and prior to version 0.19.1, users can report private messages, even when they're neither sender nor recipient of the message. The API response to creating a…

Lemmy is a link aggregator and forum for the fediverse. Starting in version 0.17.0 and prior to version 0.19.1, users can report private messages, even when they're neither sender nor recipient of the message. The API response to creating a private message report contains the private message itself, which means any user can just iterate over message ids to (loudly) obtain all private messages of an instance. A user with instance admin privileges can also abuse this if the private message is removed from the response, as they're able to see the resulting reports. Creating a private message report by POSTing to `/api/v3/private_message/report` does not validate whether the reporter is the recipient of the message. lemmy-ui does not allow the sender to report the message; the API method should likely be restricted to accessible to recipients only. The API response when creating a report contains the `private_message_report_view` with all the details of the report, including the private message that has been reported: Any authenticated user can obtain arbitrary (untargeted) private message contents. Privileges required depend on the instance configuration; when registrations are enabled without application system, the privileges required are practically none. When registration applications are required, privileges required could be considered low, but this assessment heavily varies by instance. Version 0.19.1 contains a patch for this issue. A workaround is available. If an update to a fixed Lemmy version is not immediately possible, the API route can be blocked in the reverse proxy. This will prevent anyone from reporting private messages, but it will also prevent exploitation before the update has been applied.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Jan 24, 2024, 6:09:30 PM

dateUpdated: May 30, 2025, 2:16:25 PM

Source published
Jan 24, 2024, 6:09:30 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
May 30, 2025, 2:16:25 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
15 Nov 2026 01:49:16 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

nvd · CVE-2024-23649

Published

Lemmy is a link aggregator and forum for the fediverse. Starting in version 0.17.0 and prior to version 0.19.1, users can report private messages, even when they're neither sender nor recipient of the message. The API response to creating a…

Lemmy is a link aggregator and forum for the fediverse. Starting in version 0.17.0 and prior to version 0.19.1, users can report private messages, even when they're neither sender nor recipient of the message. The API response to creating a private message report contains the private message itself, which means any user can just iterate over message ids to (loudly) obtain all private messages of an instance. A user with instance admin privileges can also abuse this if the private message is removed from the response, as they're able to see the resulting reports. Creating a private message report by POSTing to `/api/v3/private_message/report` does not validate whether the reporter is the recipient of the message. lemmy-ui does not allow the sender to report the message; the API method should likely be restricted to accessible to recipients only. The API response when creating a report contains the `private_message_report_view` with all the details of the report, including the private message that has been reported: Any authenticated user can obtain arbitrary (untargeted) private message contents. Privileges required depend on the instance configuration; when registrations are enabled without application system, the privileges required are practically none. When registration applications are required, privileges required could be considered low, but this assessment heavily varies by instance. Version 0.19.1 contains a patch for this issue. A workaround is available. If an update to a fixed Lemmy version is not immediately possible, the API route can be blocked in the reverse proxy. This will prevent anyone from reporting private messages, but it will also prevent exploitation before the update has been applied.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Modified

Weakness classifications: CWE-200 · CWE-285 · NVD-CWE-noinfo

Original publisher date fields

published: 2024-01-24T18:15:09.103

lastModified: 2026-06-17T07:13:18.353

1 source CPE criteria · context only
  • cpe:2.3:a:join-lemmy:lemmy:*:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

Source published
24 Jan 2024 18:15:09 UTC
Source modified
17 Jun 2026 07:13:18 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 23:17:22 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary · 6.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

osv · GHSA-r64r-5h43-26qv

Published

Any authenticated user may obtain private message details from other users on the same instance

### Summary Users can report private messages, even when they're neither sender nor recipient of the message. The API response to creating a private message report contains the private message itself, which means any user can just iterate over message ids to (loudly) obtain all private messages of an instance. A user with instance admin privileges can also abuse this if the private message is removed from the response, as they're able to see the resulting reports. ### Details Creating a private message report by POSTing to `/api/v3/private_message/report` does not validate whether the reporter is the recipient of the message. At least lemmy-ui does not allow the sender to report the message; the API method should likely be restricted to accessible to recipients only. The API response when creating a report contains the `private_message_report_view` with all the details of the report, including the private message that has been reported: <details> <summary>Example response</summary> In the report below, the creator with id 3 is different from the private message creator (id 2) and private message recipient (id 6). ```json { "private_message_report_view": { "private_message_report": { "id": 14, "creator_id": 3, "private_message_id": 7, "original_pm_text": "testfoo", "reason": "reporting id 7", "resolved": false, "published": "2023-12-15T19:23:03.441967Z" }, "private_message": { "id": 7, "creator_id": 2, "recipient_id": 6, "content": "testfoo", "deleted": false, "read": false, "published": "2023-12-15T19:21:41.920872Z", "ap_id": "https://1b1w56.lem.rocks/private_message/7", "local": true }, "private_message_creator": { "id": 2, "name": "admin", "banned": false, "published": "2023-12-14T23:45:05.055427Z", "actor_id": "https://1b1w56.lem.rocks/u/admin", "local": true, "deleted": false, "bot_account": false, "instance_id": 1 }, "creator": { "id": 3, "name": "testuser1", "banned": false, "published": "2023-12-14T23:47:57.571772Z", "actor_id": "https://1b1w56.lem.rocks/u/testuser1", "local": true, "deleted": false, "bot_account": false, "instance_id": 1 } } } ``` </details> If these details were not available in the response, but reports could still be created by any user, or at least by any admin, this would allow an instance admin to create reports and obtain the message contents from the report system. This was originally discovered from incorrect reports on a 0.18.5 instance and has been replicated in a 0.19.0 test environment. ### PoC ```bash curl -v 'https://myinstance.tld/api/v3/private_message/report' -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -H 'authorization: Bearer ...' --data-raw '{"private_message_id":1,"reason":"i like reports"}' ``` ### Impact Any authenticated user can obtain arbitrary (untargeted) private message contents. Privileges required depend on the instance configuration; when registratons are enabled without application system, the privileges required are practically none. When registration applications are required, privileges required could be considered low, but this assessment heavily varies by instance. ### Detection Any private message reports where the report creator is not equal to the private message recipient may be an attempt to exploit this. As this was originally discovered from an incorrect report, likely related to a bug in a client app, it should be noted that not all mismatching reports should be considered malicious; though a frequent occurrence of them likely indicates an exploitation attempt. ### Workaround when updating is not immediately possible If an update to a fixed Lemmy version is not immediately possible, the API route can be blocked in the reverse proxy. This will prevent anyone from reporting private messages, but it will also prevent exploitation before the update has been applied. nginx example: ```nginx location = /api/v3/private_message/report { default_type application/json; return 403 '{"error":"couldnt_create_report"}'; } ```

Source published
24 Jan 2024 21:13:39 UTC
Source modified
10 Sep 2026 03:50:05 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:54 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Publisher rating · HIGH

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

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