Wasmi is an efficient and lightweight WebAssembly interpreter with a focus on constrained and embedded systems. In the WASMI Interpreter, an Out-of-bounds Buffer Write will arise if the host calls or resumes a Wasm function with more parameters than the default limit (128), as it will surpass the stack value. This doesn’t affect calls from Wasm to Wasm, only from host to Wasm. This vulnerability was patched in version 0.31.1.
Wasmi is an efficient and lightweight WebAssembly interpreter with a focus on constrained and embedded systems. In the WASMI Interpreter, an Out-of-bounds Buffer Write will arise if the host calls or resumes a Wasm function with more parameters than the default limit (128), as it will surpass the stack value. This doesn’t affect calls from Wasm to Wasm, only from host to Wasm. This vulnerability was patched in version 0.31.1.
Wasmi is an efficient and lightweight WebAssembly interpreter with a focus on constrained and embedded systems. In the WASMI Interpreter, an Out-of-bounds Buffer Write will arise if the host calls or resumes a Wasm function with more parameters than the default limit (128), as it will surpass the stack value. This doesn’t affect calls from Wasm to Wasm, only from host to Wasm. This vulnerability was patched in version 0.31.1.
### Summary
In the WASMI Interpreter, an [Out-of-bounds Buffer Write](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/787.html) will arise arise if the host calls or resumes a Wasm function with more parameters than the default limit (128), as it will surpass the stack value. This doesn’t affect calls from Wasm to Wasm, only from host to Wasm.
### Impact
After conducting an analysis of the dependent Polkadot systems of `wasmi`: [Pallet Contracts](https://github.com/paritytech/polkadot-sdk/tree/master/substrate/frame/contracts), [Parity Signer](https://github.com/paritytech/parity-signer), and [Smoldot](https://github.com/smol-dot/smoldot), we have found that none on those systems have been affected by the issue as they are calling host to Wasm function with a small limited amount of parameters always.
### Mitigations
If you are using `wasmi` betwen version 0.15.0 and 0.31.0, please update it to the [0.31.1](https://github.com/paritytech/wasmi/releases/tag/v0.31.1) patch release that we just published.
### Workarounds
Ensure no more than 128 parameters can be pass in a call from the host to a Wasm function.
### References
Patch PR: <PR>
### Special thanks
Special thanks to Stellar Development Foundation for reporting this security vulnerability.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Mar 8, 2024, 9:29:53 PM
dateUpdated: Aug 5, 2024, 6:14:48 PM
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Analyzed
Weakness classifications: CWE-787
Original publisher date fields
published: 2024-03-21T02:52:23.827
lastModified: 2026-06-17T07:21:00.827
1 source CPE criteria · context only
cpe:2.3:a:wasmi-labs:wasmi:*:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.