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External DNS requests from 'internal' networks could lead to data exfiltration

cve-program · CVE-2024-29018

Published

Moby is an open source container framework that is a key component of Docker Engine, Docker Desktop, and other distributions of container tooling or runtimes. Moby's networking implementation allows for many networks, each with their own IP address range and gateway, to be defined. This feature is frequently referred to as custom networks, as each network can have a different driver, set of parameters and thus behaviors. When creating a network, the `--internal` flag is used to designate a network as _internal_. The `internal` attribute in a docker-compose.yml file may also be used to mark a network _internal_, and other API clients may specify the `internal` parameter as well. When containers with networking are created, they are assigned unique network interfaces and IP addresses. The host serves as a router for non-internal networks, with a gateway IP that provides SNAT/DNAT to/from container IPs. Containers on an internal network may communicate between each other, but are precluded from communicating with any networks the host has access to (LAN or WAN) as no default route is configured, and firewall rules are set up to drop all outgoing traffic. Communication with the gateway IP address (and thus appropriately configured host services) is possible, and the host may communicate with any container IP directly. In addition to configuring the Linux kernel's various networking features to enable container networking, `dockerd` directly provides some services to container networks. Principal among these is serving as a resolver, enabling service discovery, and resolution of names from an upstream resolver. When a DNS request for a name that does not correspond to a container is received, the request is forwarded to the configured upstream resolver. This request is made from the container's network namespace: the level of access and routing of traffic is the same as if the request was made by the container itself. As a consequence of this design, containers solely attached to an internal network will be unable to resolve names using the upstream resolver, as the container itself is unable to communicate with that nameserver. Only the names of containers also attached to the internal network are able to be resolved. Many systems run a local forwarding DNS resolver. As the host and any containers have separate loopback devices, a consequence of the design described above is that containers are unable to resolve names from the host's configured resolver, as they cannot reach these addresses on the host loopback device. To bridge this gap, and to allow containers to properly resolve names even when a local forwarding resolver is used on a loopback address, `dockerd` detects this scenario and instead forward DNS requests from the host namework namespace. The loopback resolver then forwards the requests to its configured upstream resolvers, as expected. Because `dockerd` forwards DNS requests to the host loopback device, bypassing the container network namespace's normal routing semantics entirely, internal networks can unexpectedly forward DNS requests to an external nameserver. By registering a domain for which they control the authoritative nameservers, an attacker could arrange for a compromised container to exfiltrate data by encoding it in DNS queries that will eventually be answered by their nameservers. Docker Desktop is not affected, as Docker Desktop always runs an internal resolver on a RFC 1918 address. Moby releases 26.0.0, 25.0.4, and 23.0.11 are patched to prevent forwarding any DNS requests from internal networks. As a workaround, run containers intended to be solely attached to internal networks with a custom upstream address, which will force all upstream DNS queries to be resolved from the container's network namespace.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2024-0966

Published

Moby is an open source container framework that is a key component of Docker Engine, Docker Desktop, and other distributions of container tooling or runtimes. Moby's networking implementation allows for many networks, each with their own IP address range and gateway, to be defined. This feature is frequently referred to as custom networks, as each network can have a different driver, set of parameters and thus behaviors. When creating a network, the `--internal` flag is used to designate a network as _internal_. The `internal` attribute in a docker-compose.yml file may also be used to mark a network _internal_, and other API clients may specify the `internal` parameter as well. When containers with networking are created, they are assigned unique network interfaces and IP addresses. The host serves as a router for non-internal networks, with a gateway IP that provides SNAT/DNAT to/from container IPs. Containers on an internal network may communicate between each other, but are precluded from communicating with any networks the host has access to (LAN or WAN) as no default route is configured, and firewall rules are set up to drop all outgoing traffic. Communication with the gateway IP address (and thus appropriately configured host services) is possible, and the host may communicate with any container IP directly. In addition to configuring the Linux kernel's various networking features to enable container networking, `dockerd` directly provides some services to container networks. Principal among these is serving as a resolver, enabling service discovery, and resolution of names from an upstream resolver. When a DNS request for a name that does not correspond to a container is received, the request is forwarded to the configured upstream resolver. This request is made from the container's network namespace: the level of access and routing of traffic is the same as if the request was made by the container itself. As a consequence of this design, containers solely attached to an internal network will be unable to resolve names using the upstream resolver, as the container itself is unable to communicate with that nameserver. Only the names of containers also attached to the internal network are able to be resolved. Many systems run a local forwarding DNS resolver. As the host and any containers have separate loopback devices, a consequence of the design described above is that containers are unable to resolve names from the host's configured resolver, as they cannot reach these addresses on the host loopback device. To bridge this gap, and to allow containers to properly resolve names even when a local forwarding resolver is used on a loopback address, `dockerd` detects this scenario and instead forward DNS requests from the host namework namespace. The loopback resolver then forwards the requests to its configured upstream resolvers, as expected. Because `dockerd` forwards DNS requests to the host loopback device, bypassing the container network namespace's normal routing semantics entirely, internal networks can unexpectedly forward DNS requests to an external nameserver. By registering a domain for which they control the authoritative nameservers, an attacker could arrange for a compromised container to exfiltrate data by encoding it in DNS queries that will eventually be answered by their nameservers. Docker Desktop is not affected, as Docker Desktop always runs an internal resolver on a RFC 1918 address. Moby releases 26.0.0, 25.0.4, and 23.0.11 are patched to prevent forwarding any DNS requests from internal networks. As a workaround, run containers intended to be solely attached to internal networks with a custom upstream address, which will force all upstream DNS queries to be resolved from the container's network namespace.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2024-29018

Published

Moby is an open source container framework that is a key component of Docker Engine, Docker Desktop, and other distributions of container tooling or runtimes. Moby's networking implementation allows for many networks, each with their own IP address range and gateway, to be defined. This feature is frequently referred to as custom networks, as each network can have a different driver, set of parameters and thus behaviors. When creating a network, the `--internal` flag is used to designate a network as _internal_. The `internal` attribute in a docker-compose.yml file may also be used to mark a network _internal_, and other API clients may specify the `internal` parameter as well. When containers with networking are created, they are assigned unique network interfaces and IP addresses. The host serves as a router for non-internal networks, with a gateway IP that provides SNAT/DNAT to/from container IPs. Containers on an internal network may communicate between each other, but are precluded from communicating with any networks the host has access to (LAN or WAN) as no default route is configured, and firewall rules are set up to drop all outgoing traffic. Communication with the gateway IP address (and thus appropriately configured host services) is possible, and the host may communicate with any container IP directly. In addition to configuring the Linux kernel's various networking features to enable container networking, `dockerd` directly provides some services to container networks. Principal among these is serving as a resolver, enabling service discovery, and resolution of names from an upstream resolver. When a DNS request for a name that does not correspond to a container is received, the request is forwarded to the configured upstream resolver. This request is made from the container's network namespace: the level of access and routing of traffic is the same as if the request was made by the container itself. As a consequence of this design, containers solely attached to an internal network will be unable to resolve names using the upstream resolver, as the container itself is unable to communicate with that nameserver. Only the names of containers also attached to the internal network are able to be resolved. Many systems run a local forwarding DNS resolver. As the host and any containers have separate loopback devices, a consequence of the design described above is that containers are unable to resolve names from the host's configured resolver, as they cannot reach these addresses on the host loopback device. To bridge this gap, and to allow containers to properly resolve names even when a local forwarding resolver is used on a loopback address, `dockerd` detects this scenario and instead forward DNS requests from the host namework namespace. The loopback resolver then forwards the requests to its configured upstream resolvers, as expected. Because `dockerd` forwards DNS requests to the host loopback device, bypassing the container network namespace's normal routing semantics entirely, internal networks can unexpectedly forward DNS requests to an external nameserver. By registering a domain for which they control the authoritative nameservers, an attacker could arrange for a compromised container to exfiltrate data by encoding it in DNS queries that will eventually be answered by their nameservers. Docker Desktop is not affected, as Docker Desktop always runs an internal resolver on a RFC 1918 address. Moby releases 26.0.0, 25.0.4, and 23.0.11 are patched to prevent forwarding any DNS requests from internal networks. As a workaround, run containers intended to be solely attached to internal networks with a custom upstream address, which will force all upstream DNS queries to be resolved from the container's network namespace.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-mq39-4gv4-mvpx

Published

Moby is an open source container framework originally developed by Docker Inc. as Docker. It is a key component of Docker Engine, Docker Desktop, and other distributions of container tooling or runtimes. As a batteries-included container runtime, Moby comes with a built-in networking implementation that enables communication between containers, and between containers and external resources. Moby's networking implementation allows for creating and using many networks, each with their own subnet and gateway. This feature is frequently referred to as custom networks, as each network can have a different driver, set of parameters, and thus behaviors. When creating a network, the `--internal` flag is used to designate a network as _internal_. The `internal` attribute in a docker-compose.yml file may also be used to mark a network _internal_, and other API clients may specify the `internal` parameter as well. When containers with networking are created, they are assigned unique network interfaces and IP addresses (typically from a non-routable [RFC 1918](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc1918) subnet). The root network namespace (hereafter referred to as the 'host') serves as a router for non-internal networks, with a gateway IP that provides SNAT/DNAT to/from container IPs. Containers on an _internal_ network may communicate between each other, but are precluded from communicating with any networks the host has access to (LAN or WAN) as no default route is configured, and firewall rules are set up to drop all outgoing traffic. Communication with the gateway IP address (and thus appropriately configured host services) is possible, and the host may communicate with any container IP directly. In addition to configuring the Linux kernel's various networking features to enable container networking, `dockerd` directly provides some services to container networks. Principal among these is serving as a resolver, enabling service discovery (looking up other containers on the network by name), and resolution of names from an upstream resolver. When a DNS request for a name that does not correspond to a container is received, the request is forwarded to the configured upstream resolver (by default, the host's configured resolver). This request is made from the container network namespace: the level of access and routing of traffic is the same as if the request was made by the container itself. As a consequence of this design, containers solely attached to _internal_ network(s) will be unable to resolve names using the upstream resolver, as the container itself is unable to communicate with that nameserver. Only the names of containers also attached to the internal network are able to be resolved. Many systems will run a local forwarding DNS resolver, typically present on a loopback address (`127.0.0.0/8`), such as systemd-resolved or dnsmasq. Common loopback address examples include `127.0.0.1` or `127.0.0.53`. As the host and any containers have separate loopback devices, a consequence of the design described above is that containers are unable to resolve names from the host's configured resolver, as they cannot reach these addresses on the host loopback device. To bridge this gap, and to allow containers to properly resolve names even when a local forwarding resolver is used on a loopback address, `dockerd` will detect this scenario and instead forward DNS requests from the host/root network namespace. The loopback resolver will then forward the requests to its configured upstream resolvers, as expected. ## Impact Because `dockerd` will forward DNS requests to the host loopback device, bypassing the container network namespace's normal routing semantics entirely, _internal_ networks can unexpectedly forward DNS requests to an external nameserver. By registering a domain for which they control the authoritative nameservers, an attacker could arrange for a compromised container to exfiltrate data by encoding it in DNS queries that will eventually be answered by their nameservers. For example, if the domain `evil.example` was registered, the authoritative nameserver(s) for that domain could (eventually and indirectly) receive a request for `this-is-a-secret.evil.example`. Docker Desktop is not affected, as Docker Desktop always runs an internal resolver on a RFC 1918 address. ## Patches Moby releases 26.0.0-rc3, 25.0.5 (released) and 23.0.11 (to be released) are patched to prevent forwarding DNS requests from internal networks. ## Workarounds - Run containers intended to be solely attached to _internal_ networks with a custom upstream address (`--dns` argument to `docker run`, or API equivalent), which will force all upstream DNS queries to be resolved from the container network namespace. ## Background - yair zak originally reported this issue to the Docker security team. - PR <https://github.com/moby/moby/pull/46609> was opened in public to fix this issue, as it was not originally considered to have a security implication. - [The official documentation](https://docs.docker.com/network/drivers/ipvlan/#:~:text=If%20the%20parent,the%20network%20completely) claims that "the `--internal` flag that will completely isolate containers on a network from any communications external to that network," which necessitated this advisory and CVE.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GO-2024-2659

Published

dockerd forwards DNS requests to the host loopback device, bypassing the container network namespace's normal routing semantics, networks marked as 'internal' can unexpectedly forward DNS requests to an external nameserver. By registering a domain for which they control the authoritative nameservers, an attacker could arrange for a compromised container to exfiltrate data by encoding it in DNS queries that will eventually be answered by their nameservers.

Read the publisher's advisory

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cve-program · CVE-2024-29018

Published

External DNS requests from 'internal' networks could lead to data exfiltration

Moby is an open source container framework that is a key component of Docker Engine, Docker Desktop, and other distributions of container tooling or runtimes. Moby's networking implementation allows for many networks, each with their own IP address range and gateway, to be defined. This feature is frequently referred to as custom networks, as each network can have a different driver, set of parameters and thus behaviors. When creating a network, the `--internal` flag is used to designate a network as _internal_. The `internal` attribute in a docker-compose.yml file may also be used to mark a network _internal_, and other API clients may specify the `internal` parameter as well. When containers with networking are created, they are assigned unique network interfaces and IP addresses. The host serves as a router for non-internal networks, with a gateway IP that provides SNAT/DNAT to/from container IPs. Containers on an internal network may communicate between each other, but are precluded from communicating with any networks the host has access to (LAN or WAN) as no default route is configured, and firewall rules are set up to drop all outgoing traffic. Communication with the gateway IP address (and thus appropriately configured host services) is possible, and the host may communicate with any container IP directly. In addition to configuring the Linux kernel's various networking features to enable container networking, `dockerd` directly provides some services to container networks. Principal among these is serving as a resolver, enabling service discovery, and resolution of names from an upstream resolver. When a DNS request for a name that does not correspond to a container is received, the request is forwarded to the configured upstream resolver. This request is made from the container's network namespace: the level of access and routing of traffic is the same as if the request was made by the container itself. As a consequence of this design, containers solely attached to an internal network will be unable to resolve names using the upstream resolver, as the container itself is unable to communicate with that nameserver. Only the names of containers also attached to the internal network are able to be resolved. Many systems run a local forwarding DNS resolver. As the host and any containers have separate loopback devices, a consequence of the design described above is that containers are unable to resolve names from the host's configured resolver, as they cannot reach these addresses on the host loopback device. To bridge this gap, and to allow containers to properly resolve names even when a local forwarding resolver is used on a loopback address, `dockerd` detects this scenario and instead forward DNS requests from the host namework namespace. The loopback resolver then forwards the requests to its configured upstream resolvers, as expected. Because `dockerd` forwards DNS requests to the host loopback device, bypassing the container network namespace's normal routing semantics entirely, internal networks can unexpectedly forward DNS requests to an external nameserver. By registering a domain for which they control the authoritative nameservers, an attacker could arrange for a compromised container to exfiltrate data by encoding it in DNS queries that will eventually be answered by their nameservers. Docker Desktop is not affected, as Docker Desktop always runs an internal resolver on a RFC 1918 address. Moby releases 26.0.0, 25.0.4, and 23.0.11 are patched to prevent forwarding any DNS requests from internal networks. As a workaround, run containers intended to be solely attached to internal networks with a custom upstream address, which will force all upstream DNS queries to be resolved from the container's network namespace.

Source published
20 Mar 2024 20:27:00 UTC
Source modified
13 Aug 2024 17:00:25 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
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Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · 5.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

euvd · EUVD-2024-0966

Published

Moby is an open source container framework that is a key component of Docker Engine, Docker Desktop, and other distributions of container tooling or runtimes. Moby's networking implementation allows for many networks, each with their own IP…

Moby is an open source container framework that is a key component of Docker Engine, Docker Desktop, and other distributions of container tooling or runtimes. Moby's networking implementation allows for many networks, each with their own IP address range and gateway, to be defined. This feature is frequently referred to as custom networks, as each network can have a different driver, set of parameters and thus behaviors. When creating a network, the `--internal` flag is used to designate a network as _internal_. The `internal` attribute in a docker-compose.yml file may also be used to mark a network _internal_, and other API clients may specify the `internal` parameter as well. When containers with networking are created, they are assigned unique network interfaces and IP addresses. The host serves as a router for non-internal networks, with a gateway IP that provides SNAT/DNAT to/from container IPs. Containers on an internal network may communicate between each other, but are precluded from communicating with any networks the host has access to (LAN or WAN) as no default route is configured, and firewall rules are set up to drop all outgoing traffic. Communication with the gateway IP address (and thus appropriately configured host services) is possible, and the host may communicate with any container IP directly. In addition to configuring the Linux kernel's various networking features to enable container networking, `dockerd` directly provides some services to container networks. Principal among these is serving as a resolver, enabling service discovery, and resolution of names from an upstream resolver. When a DNS request for a name that does not correspond to a container is received, the request is forwarded to the configured upstream resolver. This request is made from the container's network namespace: the level of access and routing of traffic is the same as if the request was made by the container itself. As a consequence of this design, containers solely attached to an internal network will be unable to resolve names using the upstream resolver, as the container itself is unable to communicate with that nameserver. Only the names of containers also attached to the internal network are able to be resolved. Many systems run a local forwarding DNS resolver. As the host and any containers have separate loopback devices, a consequence of the design described above is that containers are unable to resolve names from the host's configured resolver, as they cannot reach these addresses on the host loopback device. To bridge this gap, and to allow containers to properly resolve names even when a local forwarding resolver is used on a loopback address, `dockerd` detects this scenario and instead forward DNS requests from the host namework namespace. The loopback resolver then forwards the requests to its configured upstream resolvers, as expected. Because `dockerd` forwards DNS requests to the host loopback device, bypassing the container network namespace's normal routing semantics entirely, internal networks can unexpectedly forward DNS requests to an external nameserver. By registering a domain for which they control the authoritative nameservers, an attacker could arrange for a compromised container to exfiltrate data by encoding it in DNS queries that will eventually be answered by their nameservers. Docker Desktop is not affected, as Docker Desktop always runs an internal resolver on a RFC 1918 address. Moby releases 26.0.0, 25.0.4, and 23.0.11 are patched to prevent forwarding any DNS requests from internal networks. As a workaround, run containers intended to be solely attached to internal networks with a custom upstream address, which will force all upstream DNS queries to be resolved from the container's network namespace.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

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datePublished: Mar 20, 2024, 8:27:00 PM

dateUpdated: Aug 13, 2024, 5:00:25 PM

17 related source bulletins · separate from aliases

SUSE-SU-2025:03545-1: Security update for docker-stable

CVE-2014-3499 · CVE-2014-5277 · CVE-2014-6407 · CVE-2014-6408 · CVE-2014-8178 · CVE-2014-8179 · CVE-2014-9356 · CVE-2014-9357 · CVE-2014-9358 · CVE-2015-3627 · CVE-2015-3629 · CVE-2015-3630 · CVE-2015-3631 · CVE-2016-3697 · CVE-2016-8867 · CVE-2016-9962 · CVE-2017-14992 · CVE-2017-16539 · CVE-2018-10892 · CVE-2018-15664 · CVE-2018-16873 · CVE-2018-16874 · CVE-2018-16875 · CVE-2018-20699 · CVE-2019-13509 · CVE-2019-14271 · CVE-2020-12912 · CVE-2020-13401 · CVE-2020-15257 · CVE-2020-8694 · CVE-2020-8695 · CVE-2021-21284 · CVE-2021-21285 · CVE-2021-41089 · CVE-2021-41091 · CVE-2021-41092 · CVE-2021-41103 · CVE-2021-41190 · CVE-2021-43565 · CVE-2022-24769 · CVE-2022-27191 · CVE-2022-36109 · CVE-2023-28840 · CVE-2023-28841 · CVE-2023-28842 · CVE-2024-23650 · CVE-2024-23651 · CVE-2024-23652 · CVE-2024-23653 · CVE-2024-29018 · CVE-2024-41110 · CVE-2025-22868 · CVE-2025-22869

msrc_CVE-2024-29018: External DNS requests from 'internal' networks could lead to data exfiltration

CVE-2024-29018

SUSE-SU-2025:0992-1: Security update for docker

CVE-2024-29018

WID-SEC-W-2025-1439: Dell Secure Connect Gateway: Mehrere Schwachstellen ermöglichen nicht spezifizierten Angriff

CVE-2022-39028 · CVE-2023-4016 · CVE-2023-40403 · CVE-2023-46316 · CVE-2023-52426 · CVE-2023-52831 · CVE-2023-52924 · CVE-2023-52925 · CVE-2023-52926 · CVE-2023-52927 · CVE-2024-10041 · CVE-2024-11168 · CVE-2024-12243 · CVE-2024-26634 · CVE-2024-26708 · CVE-2024-26810 · CVE-2024-26873 · CVE-2024-29018 · CVE-2024-35826 · CVE-2024-35910 · CVE-2024-38606 · CVE-2024-40635 · CVE-2024-40980 · CVE-2024-41005 · CVE-2024-41055 · CVE-2024-41077 · CVE-2024-41149 · CVE-2024-42307 · CVE-2024-43790 · CVE-2024-43802 · CVE-2024-43820 · CVE-2024-44974 · CVE-2024-45009 · CVE-2024-45010 · CVE-2024-45306 · CVE-2024-46736 · CVE-2024-46782 · CVE-2024-46796 · CVE-2024-47220 · CVE-2024-47408 · CVE-2024-47794 · CVE-2024-49571 · CVE-2024-49761 · CVE-2024-49924 · CVE-2024-49940 · CVE-2024-49994 · CVE-2024-50029 · CVE-2024-50036 · CVE-2024-50056 · CVE-2024-50085 · CVE-2024-50126 · CVE-2024-50140 · CVE-2024-50152 · CVE-2024-50185 · CVE-2024-50290 · CVE-2024-50294 · CVE-2024-52559 · CVE-2024-53057 · CVE-2024-53063 · CVE-2024-53123 · CVE-2024-53140 · CVE-2024-53147 · CVE-2024-53163 · CVE-2024-53176 · CVE-2024-53177 · CVE-2024-53178 · CVE-2024-53226 · CVE-2024-53680 · CVE-2024-54683 · CVE-2024-55549 · CVE-2024-56171 · CVE-2024-56568 · CVE-2024-56579 · CVE-2024-56633 · CVE-2024-56638 · CVE-2024-56640 · CVE-2024-56647 · CVE-2024-56702 · CVE-2024-56703 · CVE-2024-56718 · CVE-2024-56719 · CVE-2024-56720 · CVE-2024-56751 · CVE-2024-56758 · CVE-2024-56770 · CVE-2024-57807 · CVE-2024-57834 · CVE-2024-57889 · CVE-2024-57900 · CVE-2024-57947 · CVE-2024-57948 · CVE-2024-57973 · CVE-2024-57974 · CVE-2024-57978 · CVE-2024-57979 · CVE-2024-57980 · CVE-2024-57981 · CVE-2024-57986 · CVE-2024-57990 · CVE-2024-57993 · CVE-2024-57994 · CVE-2024-57996 · CVE-2024-57997 · CVE-2024-57999 · CVE-2024-58002 · CVE-2024-58005 · CVE-2024-58006 · CVE-2024-58007 · CVE-2024-58009 · CVE-2024-58011 · CVE-2024-58012 · CVE-2024-58013 · CVE-2024-58014 · CVE-2024-58017 · CVE-2024-58019 · CVE-2024-58020 · CVE-2024-58034 · CVE-2024-58051 · CVE-2024-58052 · CVE-2024-58054 · CVE-2024-58055 · CVE-2024-58056 · CVE-2024-58057 · CVE-2024-58058 · CVE-2024-58061 · CVE-2024-58063 · CVE-2024-58069 · CVE-2024-58072 · CVE-2024-58076 · CVE-2024-58078 · CVE-2024-58079 · CVE-2024-58080 · CVE-2024-58083 · CVE-2024-58085 · CVE-2024-58086 · CVE-2024-8176 · CVE-2025-0395 · CVE-2025-1094 · CVE-2025-1215 · CVE-2025-1795 · CVE-2025-21631 · CVE-2025-21635 · CVE-2025-21636 · CVE-2025-21637 · CVE-2025-21638 · CVE-2025-21639 · CVE-2025-21640 · CVE-2025-21647 · CVE-2025-21659 · CVE-2025-21665 · CVE-2025-21667 · CVE-2025-21668 · CVE-2025-21671 · CVE-2025-21673 · CVE-2025-21680 · CVE-2025-21681 · CVE-2025-21684 · CVE-2025-21687 · CVE-2025-21688 · CVE-2025-21689 · CVE-2025-21690 · CVE-2025-21692 · CVE-2025-21693 · CVE-2025-21697 · CVE-2025-21699 · CVE-2025-21700 · CVE-2025-21701 · CVE-2025-21703 · CVE-2025-21704 · CVE-2025-21705 · CVE-2025-21706 · CVE-2025-21708 · CVE-2025-21711 · CVE-2025-21714 · CVE-2025-21715 · CVE-2025-21716 · CVE-2025-21718 · CVE-2025-21719 · CVE-2025-21723 · CVE-2025-21724 · CVE-2025-21725 · CVE-2025-21726 · CVE-2025-21727 · CVE-2025-21728 · CVE-2025-21731 · CVE-2025-21732 · CVE-2025-21733 · CVE-2025-21734 · CVE-2025-21735 · CVE-2025-21736 · CVE-2025-21738 · CVE-2025-21739 · CVE-2025-21741 · CVE-2025-21742 · CVE-2025-21743 · CVE-2025-21744 · CVE-2025-21745 · CVE-2025-21749 · CVE-2025-21750 · CVE-2025-21753 · CVE-2025-21754 · CVE-2025-21756 · CVE-2025-21759 · CVE-2025-21760 · CVE-2025-21761 · CVE-2025-21762 · CVE-2025-21763 · CVE-2025-21764 · CVE-2025-21765 · CVE-2025-21766 · CVE-2025-21767 · CVE-2025-21772 · CVE-2025-21773 · CVE-2025-21775 · CVE-2025-21776 · CVE-2025-21779 · CVE-2025-21780 · CVE-2025-21781 · CVE-2025-21782 · CVE-2025-21784 · CVE-2025-21785 · CVE-2025-21790 · CVE-2025-21791 · CVE-2025-21793 · CVE-2025-21794 · CVE-2025-21795 · CVE-2025-21796 · CVE-2025-21799 · CVE-2025-21802 · CVE-2025-21804 · CVE-2025-21810 · CVE-2025-21815 · CVE-2025-21819 · CVE-2025-21820 · CVE-2025-21821 · CVE-2025-21823 · CVE-2025-21825 · CVE-2025-21828 · CVE-2025-21829 · CVE-2025-21830 · CVE-2025-21831 · CVE-2025-21832 · CVE-2025-21835 · CVE-2025-21838 · CVE-2025-21844 · CVE-2025-21846 · CVE-2025-21847 · CVE-2025-21848 · CVE-2025-21850 · CVE-2025-21855 · CVE-2025-21856 · CVE-2025-21857 · CVE-2025-21858 · CVE-2025-21859 · CVE-2025-21861 · CVE-2025-21862 · CVE-2025-21864 · CVE-2025-21865 · CVE-2025-21866 · CVE-2025-21869 · CVE-2025-21870 · CVE-2025-21871 · CVE-2025-21876 · CVE-2025-21877 · CVE-2025-21878 · CVE-2025-21883 · CVE-2025-21885 · CVE-2025-21886 · CVE-2025-21888 · CVE-2025-21890 · CVE-2025-21891 · CVE-2025-21892 · CVE-2025-22134 · CVE-2025-22228 · CVE-2025-22247 · CVE-2025-22868 · CVE-2025-22869 · CVE-2025-24014 · CVE-2025-24813 · CVE-2025-24855 · CVE-2025-24928 · CVE-2025-2588 · CVE-2025-26465 · CVE-2025-26466 · CVE-2025-26597 · CVE-2025-27113 · CVE-2025-27219 · CVE-2025-27220 · CVE-2025-27363 · CVE-2025-29087 · CVE-2025-29088 · CVE-2025-31115 · CVE-2025-31335 · CVE-2025-31650 · CVE-2025-31651 · CVE-2025-32414 · CVE-2025-32415 · CVE-2025-32728 · CVE-2025-3360 · CVE-2025-4207 · CVE-2025-4382 · CVE-2025-47268 · CVE-2025-4802 · CVE-2025-48734

SUSE-SU-2025:20205-1: Security update for docker

CVE-2024-29018 · CVE-2025-0495 · CVE-2025-22868 · CVE-2025-22869

openSUSE-SU-2024:14597-1: docker-27.4.1_ce-12.1 on GA media

CVE-2024-29018

SUSE-SU-2025:03540-1: Security update for docker-stable

CVE-2014-3499 · CVE-2014-5277 · CVE-2014-6407 · CVE-2014-6408 · CVE-2014-8178 · CVE-2014-8179 · CVE-2014-9356 · CVE-2014-9357 · CVE-2014-9358 · CVE-2015-3627 · CVE-2015-3629 · CVE-2015-3630 · CVE-2015-3631 · CVE-2016-3697 · CVE-2016-8867 · CVE-2016-9962 · CVE-2017-14992 · CVE-2017-16539 · CVE-2018-10892 · CVE-2018-15664 · CVE-2018-16873 · CVE-2018-16874 · CVE-2018-16875 · CVE-2018-20699 · CVE-2019-13509 · CVE-2019-14271 · CVE-2020-12912 · CVE-2020-13401 · CVE-2020-15257 · CVE-2020-8694 · CVE-2020-8695 · CVE-2021-21284 · CVE-2021-21285 · CVE-2021-41089 · CVE-2021-41091 · CVE-2021-41092 · CVE-2021-41103 · CVE-2021-41190 · CVE-2021-43565 · CVE-2022-24769 · CVE-2022-27191 · CVE-2022-36109 · CVE-2023-28840 · CVE-2023-28841 · CVE-2023-28842 · CVE-2024-23650 · CVE-2024-23651 · CVE-2024-23652 · CVE-2024-23653 · CVE-2024-29018 · CVE-2024-41110 · CVE-2025-22868 · CVE-2025-22869

SUSE-SU-2025:0226-1: Security update for docker-stable

CVE-2024-23650 · CVE-2024-23653 · CVE-2024-29018 · CVE-2024-41110

SUSE-SU-2025:1102-1: Security update for docker, docker-stable

CVE-2024-23650 · CVE-2024-23653 · CVE-2024-29018 · CVE-2024-41110 · CVE-2025-22868 · CVE-2025-22869

SUSE-SU-2026:1118-1: Security update for docker-stable

CVE-2024-23650 · CVE-2024-29018 · CVE-2024-41110 · CVE-2025-22868 · CVE-2025-22869 · CVE-2025-30204 · CVE-2025-58181

SUSE-SU-2026:0972-1: Security update for docker-stable

CVE-2024-23650 · CVE-2024-29018 · CVE-2024-41110 · CVE-2025-22868 · CVE-2025-22869 · CVE-2025-30204 · CVE-2025-58181

WID-SEC-W-2024-0684: docker: Schwachstelle ermöglicht Offenlegung von Informationen

CVE-2024-29018

openSUSE-SU-2024:14598-1: docker-stable-24.0.9_ce-6.1 on GA media

CVE-2024-2365 · CVE-2024-23650 · CVE-2024-29018

SUSE-SU-2025:0776-1: Security update for docker

CVE-2024-29018

RHSA-2024:7164: Red Hat Security Advisory: Migration Toolkit for Containers (MTC) 1.8.4 security and bug fix update

CVE-2019-25211 · CVE-2023-45288 · CVE-2023-45289 · CVE-2024-3727 · CVE-2024-4068 · CVE-2024-24788 · CVE-2024-28180 · CVE-2024-28849 · CVE-2024-28863 · CVE-2024-29018 · CVE-2024-29041 · CVE-2024-29180 · CVE-2024-39338

SUSE-SU-2025:20259-1: Security update for docker

CVE-2023-45142 · CVE-2023-47108 · CVE-2024-29018 · CVE-2024-41110

SUSE-SU-2025:1062-1: Security update for docker, docker-stable

CVE-2024-23650 · CVE-2024-29018 · CVE-2024-41110 · CVE-2025-22868 · CVE-2025-22869

Source published
Mar 20, 2024, 8:27:00 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Aug 13, 2024, 5:00:25 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
15 Nov 2026 07:46:25 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 5.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

nvd · CVE-2024-29018

Published

Moby is an open source container framework that is a key component of Docker Engine, Docker Desktop, and other distributions of container tooling or runtimes. Moby's networking implementation allows for many networks, each with their own IP…

Moby is an open source container framework that is a key component of Docker Engine, Docker Desktop, and other distributions of container tooling or runtimes. Moby's networking implementation allows for many networks, each with their own IP address range and gateway, to be defined. This feature is frequently referred to as custom networks, as each network can have a different driver, set of parameters and thus behaviors. When creating a network, the `--internal` flag is used to designate a network as _internal_. The `internal` attribute in a docker-compose.yml file may also be used to mark a network _internal_, and other API clients may specify the `internal` parameter as well. When containers with networking are created, they are assigned unique network interfaces and IP addresses. The host serves as a router for non-internal networks, with a gateway IP that provides SNAT/DNAT to/from container IPs. Containers on an internal network may communicate between each other, but are precluded from communicating with any networks the host has access to (LAN or WAN) as no default route is configured, and firewall rules are set up to drop all outgoing traffic. Communication with the gateway IP address (and thus appropriately configured host services) is possible, and the host may communicate with any container IP directly. In addition to configuring the Linux kernel's various networking features to enable container networking, `dockerd` directly provides some services to container networks. Principal among these is serving as a resolver, enabling service discovery, and resolution of names from an upstream resolver. When a DNS request for a name that does not correspond to a container is received, the request is forwarded to the configured upstream resolver. This request is made from the container's network namespace: the level of access and routing of traffic is the same as if the request was made by the container itself. As a consequence of this design, containers solely attached to an internal network will be unable to resolve names using the upstream resolver, as the container itself is unable to communicate with that nameserver. Only the names of containers also attached to the internal network are able to be resolved. Many systems run a local forwarding DNS resolver. As the host and any containers have separate loopback devices, a consequence of the design described above is that containers are unable to resolve names from the host's configured resolver, as they cannot reach these addresses on the host loopback device. To bridge this gap, and to allow containers to properly resolve names even when a local forwarding resolver is used on a loopback address, `dockerd` detects this scenario and instead forward DNS requests from the host namework namespace. The loopback resolver then forwards the requests to its configured upstream resolvers, as expected. Because `dockerd` forwards DNS requests to the host loopback device, bypassing the container network namespace's normal routing semantics entirely, internal networks can unexpectedly forward DNS requests to an external nameserver. By registering a domain for which they control the authoritative nameservers, an attacker could arrange for a compromised container to exfiltrate data by encoding it in DNS queries that will eventually be answered by their nameservers. Docker Desktop is not affected, as Docker Desktop always runs an internal resolver on a RFC 1918 address. Moby releases 26.0.0, 25.0.4, and 23.0.11 are patched to prevent forwarding any DNS requests from internal networks. As a workaround, run containers intended to be solely attached to internal networks with a custom upstream address, which will force all upstream DNS queries to be resolved from the container's network namespace.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Analyzed

Weakness classifications: CWE-669

Original publisher date fields

published: 2024-03-20T21:15:31.113

lastModified: 2026-06-17T07:22:15.720

4 source CPE criteria · context only
  • cpe:2.3:a:mobyproject:moby:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mobyproject:moby:26.0.0:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mobyproject:moby:26.0.0:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mobyproject:moby:26.0.0:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

Source published
20 Mar 2024 21:15:31 UTC
Source modified
17 Jun 2026 07:22:15 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 23:17:34 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 5.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

osv · GHSA-mq39-4gv4-mvpx

Published

Moby's external DNS requests from 'internal' networks could lead to data exfiltration

Moby is an open source container framework originally developed by Docker Inc. as Docker. It is a key component of Docker Engine, Docker Desktop, and other distributions of container tooling or runtimes. As a batteries-included container runtime, Moby comes with a built-in networking implementation that enables communication between containers, and between containers and external resources. Moby's networking implementation allows for creating and using many networks, each with their own subnet and gateway. This feature is frequently referred to as custom networks, as each network can have a different driver, set of parameters, and thus behaviors. When creating a network, the `--internal` flag is used to designate a network as _internal_. The `internal` attribute in a docker-compose.yml file may also be used to mark a network _internal_, and other API clients may specify the `internal` parameter as well. When containers with networking are created, they are assigned unique network interfaces and IP addresses (typically from a non-routable [RFC 1918](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc1918) subnet). The root network namespace (hereafter referred to as the 'host') serves as a router for non-internal networks, with a gateway IP that provides SNAT/DNAT to/from container IPs. Containers on an _internal_ network may communicate between each other, but are precluded from communicating with any networks the host has access to (LAN or WAN) as no default route is configured, and firewall rules are set up to drop all outgoing traffic. Communication with the gateway IP address (and thus appropriately configured host services) is possible, and the host may communicate with any container IP directly. In addition to configuring the Linux kernel's various networking features to enable container networking, `dockerd` directly provides some services to container networks. Principal among these is serving as a resolver, enabling service discovery (looking up other containers on the network by name), and resolution of names from an upstream resolver. When a DNS request for a name that does not correspond to a container is received, the request is forwarded to the configured upstream resolver (by default, the host's configured resolver). This request is made from the container network namespace: the level of access and routing of traffic is the same as if the request was made by the container itself. As a consequence of this design, containers solely attached to _internal_ network(s) will be unable to resolve names using the upstream resolver, as the container itself is unable to communicate with that nameserver. Only the names of containers also attached to the internal network are able to be resolved. Many systems will run a local forwarding DNS resolver, typically present on a loopback address (`127.0.0.0/8`), such as systemd-resolved or dnsmasq. Common loopback address examples include `127.0.0.1` or `127.0.0.53`. As the host and any containers have separate loopback devices, a consequence of the design described above is that containers are unable to resolve names from the host's configured resolver, as they cannot reach these addresses on the host loopback device. To bridge this gap, and to allow containers to properly resolve names even when a local forwarding resolver is used on a loopback address, `dockerd` will detect this scenario and instead forward DNS requests from the host/root network namespace. The loopback resolver will then forward the requests to its configured upstream resolvers, as expected. ## Impact Because `dockerd` will forward DNS requests to the host loopback device, bypassing the container network namespace's normal routing semantics entirely, _internal_ networks can unexpectedly forward DNS requests to an external nameserver. By registering a domain for which they control the authoritative nameservers, an attacker could arrange for a compromised container to exfiltrate data by encoding it in DNS queries that will eventually be answered by their nameservers. For example, if the domain `evil.example` was registered, the authoritative nameserver(s) for that domain could (eventually and indirectly) receive a request for `this-is-a-secret.evil.example`. Docker Desktop is not affected, as Docker Desktop always runs an internal resolver on a RFC 1918 address. ## Patches Moby releases 26.0.0-rc3, 25.0.5 (released) and 23.0.11 (to be released) are patched to prevent forwarding DNS requests from internal networks. ## Workarounds - Run containers intended to be solely attached to _internal_ networks with a custom upstream address (`--dns` argument to `docker run`, or API equivalent), which will force all upstream DNS queries to be resolved from the container network namespace. ## Background - yair zak originally reported this issue to the Docker security team. - PR <https://github.com/moby/moby/pull/46609> was opened in public to fix this issue, as it was not originally considered to have a security implication. - [The official documentation](https://docs.docker.com/network/drivers/ipvlan/#:~:text=If%20the%20parent,the%20network%20completely) claims that "the `--internal` flag that will completely isolate containers on a network from any communications external to that network," which necessitated this advisory and CVE.

Source published
20 Mar 2024 17:59:52 UTC
Source modified
10 Sep 2026 03:50:10 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Publisher rating · MODERATE

osv · GO-2024-2659

Published

Data exfiltration from internal networks in github.com/docker/docker

dockerd forwards DNS requests to the host loopback device, bypassing the container network namespace's normal routing semantics, networks marked as 'internal' can unexpectedly forward DNS requests to an external nameserver. By registering a domain for which they control the authoritative nameservers, an attacker could arrange for a compromised container to exfiltrate data by encoding it in DNS queries that will eventually be answered by their nameservers.

Source published
22 Mar 2024 18:49:03 UTC
Source modified
4 Feb 2026 03:49:59 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 16 Nov 15:59 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 250 fully read · 20 waiting for GitHub's hourly limit · documentation 469/469 current