Public mode

No access to your tenant or devices. Every item links to its source. What this means

Sources need attention Customize Public modeDiscuss ChangeIntel on Discord

Cosign vulnerable to system-wide denial of service via malicious attachments

CVSS 3.1 4.2 MEDIUMEUVD CVSS 3.1 4.2 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 4.2 MEDIUMCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary 5.9 MEDIUMCVSS_V3 Publisher rating MODERATEFixed by github.com/sigstore/cosign/v2 2.2.4osv · severity unknownFixed by github.com/sigstore/cosign/v2 2.2.4KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2024-29902

Published

Cosign provides code signing and transparency for containers and binaries. Prior to version 2.2.4, a remote image with a malicious attachment can cause denial of service of the host machine running Cosign. This can impact other services on the machine that rely on having memory available such as a Redis database which can result in data loss. It can also impact the availability of other services on the machine that will not be available for the duration of the machine denial. The root cause of this issue is that Cosign reads the attachment from a remote image entirely into memory without checking the size of the attachment first. As such, a large attachment can make Cosign read a large attachment into memory; If the attachments size is larger than the machine has memory available, the machine will be denied of service. The Go runtime will make a SigKill after a few seconds of system-wide denial. This issue can allow a supply-chain escalation from a compromised registry to the Cosign user: If an attacher has compromised a registry or the account of an image vendor, they can include a malicious attachment and hurt the image consumer. Version 2.2.4 contains a patch for the vulnerability.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2024-1155

Published

Cosign provides code signing and transparency for containers and binaries. Prior to version 2.2.4, a remote image with a malicious attachment can cause denial of service of the host machine running Cosign. This can impact other services on the machine that rely on having memory available such as a Redis database which can result in data loss. It can also impact the availability of other services on the machine that will not be available for the duration of the machine denial. The root cause of this issue is that Cosign reads the attachment from a remote image entirely into memory without checking the size of the attachment first. As such, a large attachment can make Cosign read a large attachment into memory; If the attachments size is larger than the machine has memory available, the machine will be denied of service. The Go runtime will make a SigKill after a few seconds of system-wide denial. This issue can allow a supply-chain escalation from a compromised registry to the Cosign user: If an attacher has compromised a registry or the account of an image vendor, they can include a malicious attachment and hurt the image consumer. Version 2.2.4 contains a patch for the vulnerability.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2024-29902

Published

Cosign provides code signing and transparency for containers and binaries. Prior to version 2.2.4, a remote image with a malicious attachment can cause denial of service of the host machine running Cosign. This can impact other services on the machine that rely on having memory available such as a Redis database which can result in data loss. It can also impact the availability of other services on the machine that will not be available for the duration of the machine denial. The root cause of this issue is that Cosign reads the attachment from a remote image entirely into memory without checking the size of the attachment first. As such, a large attachment can make Cosign read a large attachment into memory; If the attachments size is larger than the machine has memory available, the machine will be denied of service. The Go runtime will make a SigKill after a few seconds of system-wide denial. This issue can allow a supply-chain escalation from a compromised registry to the Cosign user: If an attacher has compromised a registry or the account of an image vendor, they can include a malicious attachment and hurt the image consumer. Version 2.2.4 contains a patch for the vulnerability.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-88jx-383q-w4qc

Published

### Summary A remote image with a malicious attachment can cause denial of service of the host machine running Cosign. This can impact other services on the machine that rely on having memory available such as a Redis database which can result in data loss. It can also impact the availability of other services on the machine that will not be available for the duration of the machine denial. ### Details The root cause of this issue is that Cosign reads the attachment from a remote image entirely into memory without checking the size of the attachment first. As such, a large attachment can make Cosign read a large attachment into memory; If the attachments size is larger than the machine has memory available, the machine will be denied of service. The Go runtime will make a `SIGKILL` after a few seconds of system-wide denial. The root cause is that Cosign reads the contents of the attachments entirely into memory on line 238 below: https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/blob/9bc3ee309bf35d2f6e17f5d23f231a3d8bf580bc/pkg/oci/remote/remote.go#L228-L239 ...and prior to that, neither Cosign nor go-containerregistry checks the size of the attachment and enforces a max cap. In the case of a remote layer of `f *attached`, go-containerregistry will invoke this API: https://github.com/google/go-containerregistry/blob/a0658aa1d0cc7a7f1bcc4a3af9155335b6943f40/pkg/v1/remote/layer.go#L36-L40 ```golang func (rl *remoteLayer) Compressed() (io.ReadCloser, error) { // We don't want to log binary layers -- this can break terminals. ctx := redact.NewContext(rl.ctx, "omitting binary blobs from logs") return rl.fetcher.fetchBlob(ctx, verify.SizeUnknown, rl.digest) } ``` Notice that the second argument to `rl.fetcher.fetchBlob` is `verify.SizeUnknown` which results in not using the `io.LimitReader` in `verify.ReadCloser`: https://github.com/google/go-containerregistry/blob/a0658aa1d0cc7a7f1bcc4a3af9155335b6943f40/internal/verify/verify.go#L82-L100 ```golang func ReadCloser(r io.ReadCloser, size int64, h v1.Hash) (io.ReadCloser, error) { w, err := v1.Hasher(h.Algorithm) if err != nil { return nil, err } r2 := io.TeeReader(r, w) // pass all writes to the hasher. if size != SizeUnknown { r2 = io.LimitReader(r2, size) // if we know the size, limit to that size. } return &and.ReadCloser{ Reader: &verifyReader{ inner: r2, hasher: w, expected: h, wantSize: size, }, CloseFunc: r.Close, }, nil } ``` ### Impact This issue can allow a supply-chain escalation from a compromised registry to the Cosign user: If an attacher has compromised a registry or the account of an image vendor, they can include a malicious attachment and hurt the image consumer. ### Remediation Update to the latest version of Cosign, which limits the number of attachments. An environment variable can override this value.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GO-2024-2718

Published

Cosign malicious attachments can cause system-wide denial of service in github.com/sigstore/cosign

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

Related advisories and sources

Publishers link these advisories through the identifiers shown below. A shared identifier or date alone does not tell you whether your software is affected or whether the advisories describe the same cause.

CVE-2024-29902 · CVE overview and exploitation status

EUVD-2024-1155

GHSA-88jx-383q-w4qc

BIT-cosign-2024-29902

GO-2024-2718

cve-program · CVE-2024-29902

euvd · EUVD-2024-1155

nvd · CVE-2024-29902

osv · GHSA-88jx-383q-w4qc

osv · GO-2024-2718

Related changes

Linked by CVE identifier

No related changes are available here.

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 16 Nov 14:56 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 250 fully read · 20 waiting for GitHub's hourly limit · documentation 469/469 current