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gin-vue-admin background arbitrary code coverage vulnerability

CVSS 3.1 7.7 HIGHEUVD CVSS 3.1 7.7 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 7.7 HIGHCVSS_V3 Publisher rating HIGHFixed by github.com/flipped-aurora/gin-vue-admin/server 0.0.0-20240409100909-b1b7427c6ea6osv · severity unknownFixed by github.com/flipped-aurora/gin-vue-admin/server 0.0.0-20240409100909-b1b7427c6ea6KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2024-31457

Published

gin-vue-admin is a backstage management system based on vue and gin, which separates the front and rear of the full stack. gin-vue-admin pseudoversion 0.0.0-20240407133540-7bc7c3051067, corresponding to version 2.6.1, has a code injection vulnerability in the backend. In the Plugin System -> Plugin Template feature, an attacker can perform directory traversal by manipulating the `plugName` parameter. They can create specific folders such as `api`, `config`, `global`, `model`, `router`, `service`, and `main.go` function within the specified traversal directory. Moreover, the Go files within these folders can have arbitrary code inserted based on a specific PoC parameter. The main reason for the existence of this vulnerability is the controllability of the PlugName field within the struct. Pseudoversion 0.0.0-20240409100909-b1b7427c6ea6, corresponding to commit b1b7427c6ea6c7a027fa188c6be557f3795e732b, contains a patch for the issue. As a workaround, one may manually use a filtering method available in the GitHub Security Advisory to rectify the directory traversal problem.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2024-1210

Published

gin-vue-admin is a backstage management system based on vue and gin, which separates the front and rear of the full stack. gin-vue-admin pseudoversion 0.0.0-20240407133540-7bc7c3051067, corresponding to version 2.6.1, has a code injection vulnerability in the backend. In the Plugin System -> Plugin Template feature, an attacker can perform directory traversal by manipulating the `plugName` parameter. They can create specific folders such as `api`, `config`, `global`, `model`, `router`, `service`, and `main.go` function within the specified traversal directory. Moreover, the Go files within these folders can have arbitrary code inserted based on a specific PoC parameter. The main reason for the existence of this vulnerability is the controllability of the PlugName field within the struct. Pseudoversion 0.0.0-20240409100909-b1b7427c6ea6, corresponding to commit b1b7427c6ea6c7a027fa188c6be557f3795e732b, contains a patch for the issue. As a workaround, one may manually use a filtering method available in the GitHub Security Advisory to rectify the directory traversal problem.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2024-31457

Published

gin-vue-admin is a backstage management system based on vue and gin, which separates the front and rear of the full stack. gin-vue-admin pseudoversion 0.0.0-20240407133540-7bc7c3051067, corresponding to version 2.6.1, has a code injection vulnerability in the backend. In the Plugin System -> Plugin Template feature, an attacker can perform directory traversal by manipulating the `plugName` parameter. They can create specific folders such as `api`, `config`, `global`, `model`, `router`, `service`, and `main.go` function within the specified traversal directory. Moreover, the Go files within these folders can have arbitrary code inserted based on a specific PoC parameter. The main reason for the existence of this vulnerability is the controllability of the PlugName field within the struct. Pseudoversion 0.0.0-20240409100909-b1b7427c6ea6, corresponding to commit b1b7427c6ea6c7a027fa188c6be557f3795e732b, contains a patch for the issue. As a workaround, one may manually use a filtering method available in the GitHub Security Advisory to rectify the directory traversal problem.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-gv3w-m57p-3wc4

Published

### Impact "gin-vue-admin<=v2.6.1 has a code injection vulnerability in the backend. In the Plugin System -> Plugin Template feature, an attacker can perform directory traversal by manipulating the 'plugName' parameter. They can create specific folders such as 'api', 'config', 'global', 'model', 'router', 'service', and 'main.go' function within the specified traversal directory. Moreover, the Go files within these folders can have arbitrary code inserted based on a specific PoC parameter." Affected code: https://github.com/flipped-aurora/gin-vue-admin/blob/746af378990ebf3367f8bb3d4e9684936df152e7/server/api/v1/system/sys_auto_code.go:239. Let's take a look at the method 'AutoPlug' within the 'AutoCodeApi' struct. ```go func (autoApi *AutoCodeApi) AutoPlug(c *gin.Context) { var a system.AutoPlugReq err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&a) if err != nil { response.FailWithMessage(err.Error(), c) return } a.Snake = strings.ToLower(a.PlugName) a.NeedModel = a.HasRequest || a.HasResponse err = autoCodeService.CreatePlug(a) if err != nil { global.GVA_LOG.Error("预览失败!", zap.Error(err)) response.FailWithMessage("预览失败", c) return } response.Ok(c) } ``` The main reason for the existence of this vulnerability is the controllability of the PlugName field within the struct. ```go type AutoPlugReq struct { PlugName string `json:"plugName"` // 必然大写开头 Snake string `json:"snake"` // 后端自动转为 snake RouterGroup string `json:"routerGroup"` HasGlobal bool `json:"hasGlobal"` HasRequest bool `json:"hasRequest"` HasResponse bool `json:"hasResponse"` NeedModel bool `json:"needModel"` Global []AutoPlugInfo `json:"global,omitempty"` Request []AutoPlugInfo `json:"request,omitempty"` Response []AutoPlugInfo `json:"response,omitempty"` } ``` POC: ``` POST /api/autoCode/createPlug HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.31.18:8080 Content-Length: 326 Accept: application/json, text/plain, */* x-token: eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJVVUlEIjoiNzJlZWQ4OTUtYzUwOC00MDFiLWIyYzQtMTk2MWMyOTlkOWNhIiwiSUQiOjEsIlVzZXJuYW1lIjoiYWRtaW4iLCJOaWNrTmFtZSI6Ik1yLuWlh-a3vCIsIkF1dGhvcml0eUlkIjo4ODgsIkJ1ZmZlclRpbWUiOjg2NDAwLCJpc3MiOiJxbVBsdXMiLCJhdWQiOlsiR1ZBIl0sImV4cCI6MTcxMjIxMTM4MywibmJmIjoxNzExNjA2NTgzfQ.uq61pJNi4kzUXb8lEkVa7NBCBvp_Ye59fee-TJV_rpE User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/123.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 x-user-id: 1 Content-Type: application/json Origin: http://192.168.31.18:8080 Referer: http://192.168.31.18:8080/ Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7,ja;q=0.6 Cookie: x-token=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJVVUlEIjoiNzJlZWQ4OTUtYzUwOC00MDFiLWIyYzQtMTk2MWMyOTlkOWNhIiwiSUQiOjEsIlVzZXJuYW1lIjoiYWRtaW4iLCJOaWNrTmFtZSI6Ik1yLuWlh-a3vCIsIkF1dGhvcml0eUlkIjo4ODgsIkJ1ZmZlclRpbWUiOjg2NDAwLCJpc3MiOiJxbVBsdXMiLCJhdWQiOlsiR1ZBIl0sImV4cCI6MTcxMjIyMDA4NiwibmJmIjoxNzExNjE1Mjg2fQ.XVV97Ky17E9pUO_byVgK--FnAp9ye4Tpab2jnma6dBU Connection: close {"plugName":"../../../server/","routerGroup":"111" ,"hasGlobal":true,"hasRequest":false,"hasResponse":false,"global":[{"key":"1","type":"1","desc":"1"},{"key":"type","value":"faspohgoahgioahgioahgioashogia","desc":"1","type":"string"}],"request":[{"key":"","type":"","desc":""}],"response":[{"key":"","type":"","desc":""}]} ``` By performing directory traversal and creating directories such as api, config, global, model, router, and service within the gin-vue-admin/server directory, an attacker can tamper with the source code and the main.go file. They can potentially overwrite or tamper with the Go source code files located in the directory C:\代码审计\server to further compromise the system. ![image](https://github.com/flipped-aurora/gin-vue-admin/assets/142187061/c2cad65a-6401-41c2-ba0d-6eb5e3760516) ![image](https://github.com/flipped-aurora/gin-vue-admin/assets/142187061/681ca156-c125-4a9f-9443-825a34a89b2d) ![image](https://github.com/flipped-aurora/gin-vue-admin/assets/142187061/6870ce90-8166-48c7-a02c-29c4429283d4) ### Patches Please wait for the latest patch ### Workarounds You can use the following filtering methods to rectify the directory traversal problem if strings.Index(plugPath, "..") > -1 {         fmt.Println("no bypass",plugPath)     } ### References https://github.com/flipped-aurora/gin-vue-admin

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GO-2024-2702

Published

Gin-vue-admin has a code injection vulnerability in the backend. In the Plugin System -> Plugin Template feature, an attacker can perform directory traversal by manipulating the 'plugName' parameter. They can create specific folders such as 'api', 'config', 'global', 'model', 'router', 'service', and 'main.go' function within the specified traversal directory. Moreover, the Go files within these folders can have arbitrary code inserted based on a specific PoC parameter.

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

Related advisories and sources

Publishers link these advisories through the identifiers shown below. A shared identifier or date alone does not tell you whether your software is affected or whether the advisories describe the same cause.

CVE-2024-31457 · CVE overview and exploitation status

EUVD-2024-1210

GHSA-gv3w-m57p-3wc4

GO-2024-2702

cve-program · CVE-2024-31457

euvd · EUVD-2024-1210

nvd · CVE-2024-31457

osv · GHSA-gv3w-m57p-3wc4

osv · GO-2024-2702

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