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Cri-o: arbitrary command injection via pod annotation

cve-program · CVE-2024-3154

Published

A flaw was found in cri-o, where an arbitrary systemd property can be injected via a Pod annotation. Any user who can create a pod with an arbitrary annotation may perform an arbitrary action on the host system.

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euvd · EUVD-2024-1060

Published

A flaw was found in cri-o, where an arbitrary systemd property can be injected via a Pod annotation. Any user who can create a pod with an arbitrary annotation may perform an arbitrary action on the host system.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2024-3154

Published

A flaw was found in cri-o, where an arbitrary systemd property can be injected via a Pod annotation. Any user who can create a pod with an arbitrary annotation may perform an arbitrary action on the host system.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-2cgq-h8xw-2v5j

Published

### Impact On CRI-O, it looks like an arbitrary systemd property can be injected via a Pod annotation: ``` --- apiVersion: v1 kind: Pod metadata: name: poc-arbitrary-systemd-property-injection annotations: # I believe that ExecStart with an arbitrary command works here too, # but I haven't figured out how to marshalize the ExecStart struct to gvariant string. org.systemd.property.SuccessAction: "'poweroff-force'" spec: containers: - name: hello image: [quay.io/podman/hello](http://quay.io/podman/hello) ``` This means that any user who can create a pod with an arbitrary annotation may perform an arbitrary action on the host system. Tested with CRI-O v1.24 on minikube. I didn't test the latest v1.29 because it is incompatible with minikube: https://github.com/kubernetes/minikube/pull/18367 Thanks to Cédric Clerget (GitHub ID @cclerget) for finding out that CRI-O just passes pod annotations to OCI annotations: https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/pull/3923#discussion_r1532292536 CRI-O has to filter out annotations that have the prefix "org.systemd.property." See also: - https://github.com/opencontainers/runtime-spec/blob/main/features.md#unsafe-annotations-in-configjson - https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/pull/4217 ### Workarounds Unfortunately, the only workarounds would involve an external mutating webhook to disallow these annotations ### References

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osv · GO-2024-2791

Published

CRI-O vulnerable to an arbitrary systemd property injection in github.com/cri-o/cri-o

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Affected versions, risk and source history

Related advisories and sources

Publishers link these advisories through the identifiers shown below. A shared identifier or date alone does not tell you whether your software is affected or whether the advisories describe the same cause.

CVE-2024-3154 · CVE overview and exploitation status

EUVD-2024-1060

GHSA-2cgq-h8xw-2v5j

GO-2024-2791

cve-program · CVE-2024-3154

euvd · EUVD-2024-1060

nvd · CVE-2024-3154

osv · GHSA-2cgq-h8xw-2v5j

osv · GO-2024-2791

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