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Evmos' transaction execution not accounting for all state transition after interaction with precompiles

CVSS 3.1 9.1 CRITICALEUVD CVSS 3.1 9.1 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 9.1 CRITICALCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary 9.1 CRITICALCVSS_V3 Publisher rating CRITICALFixed by github.com/evmos/evmos/v16 17.0.0osv · severity unknownFixed by github.com/evmos/evmos/v17 17.0.0KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2024-32644

Published

Evmos is a scalable, high-throughput Proof-of-Stake EVM blockchain that is fully compatible and interoperable with Ethereum. Prior to 17.0.0, there is a way to mint arbitrary tokens due to the possibility to have two different states not in sync during the execution of a transaction. The exploit is based on the fact that to sync the Cosmos SDK state and the EVM one, we rely on the `stateDB.Commit()` method. When we call this method, we iterate though all the `dirtyStorage` and, **if and only if** it is different than the `originStorage`, we set the new state. Setting the new state means we update the Cosmos SDK KVStore. If a contract storage state that is the same before and after a transaction, but is changed during the transaction and can call an external contract after the change, it can be exploited to make the transaction similar to non-atomic. The vulnerability is **critical** since this could lead to drain of funds through creative SC interactions. The issue has been patched in versions >=V17.0.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2024-1080

Published

Evmos is a scalable, high-throughput Proof-of-Stake EVM blockchain that is fully compatible and interoperable with Ethereum. Prior to 17.0.0, there is a way to mint arbitrary tokens due to the possibility to have two different states not in sync during the execution of a transaction. The exploit is based on the fact that to sync the Cosmos SDK state and the EVM one, we rely on the `stateDB.Commit()` method. When we call this method, we iterate though all the `dirtyStorage` and, **if and only if** it is different than the `originStorage`, we set the new state. Setting the new state means we update the Cosmos SDK KVStore. If a contract storage state that is the same before and after a transaction, but is changed during the transaction and can call an external contract after the change, it can be exploited to make the transaction similar to non-atomic. The vulnerability is **critical** since this could lead to drain of funds through creative SC interactions. The issue has been patched in versions >=V17.0.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2024-32644

Published

Evmos is a scalable, high-throughput Proof-of-Stake EVM blockchain that is fully compatible and interoperable with Ethereum. Prior to 17.0.0, there is a way to mint arbitrary tokens due to the possibility to have two different states not in sync during the execution of a transaction. The exploit is based on the fact that to sync the Cosmos SDK state and the EVM one, we rely on the `stateDB.Commit()` method. When we call this method, we iterate though all the `dirtyStorage` and, **if and only if** it is different than the `originStorage`, we set the new state. Setting the new state means we update the Cosmos SDK KVStore. If a contract storage state that is the same before and after a transaction, but is changed during the transaction and can call an external contract after the change, it can be exploited to make the transaction similar to non-atomic. The vulnerability is **critical** since this could lead to drain of funds through creative SC interactions. The issue has been patched in versions >=V17.0.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-3fp5-2xwh-fxm6

Published

### Context - [`stateObject`](https://github.com/evmos/evmos/blob/b196a522ba4951890b40992e9f97aa610f8b5f9c/x/evm/statedb/state_object.go#L53-L68): represents the state of an account and is used to store its updates during a state transition. This is accomplished using two in memory Storage variables: `originStorage` and `dirtyStorage` - [`StateDB`](https://github.com/evmos/evmos/blob/b196a522ba4951890b40992e9f97aa610f8b5f9c/x/evm/statedb/statedb.go#L33-L55): it is the general interface to retrieve accounts and holds a map of stateObjects. ### Impact An external contributor, @iczc, discovered a way to mint arbitrary tokens due to the possibility to have two different states not in sync during the execution of a transaction. The exploit is based on the fact that to sync the Cosmos SDK state and the EVM one, we rely on the `stateDB.Commit()` method. When we call this method, we iterate though all the `dirtyStorage` and, **if and only if** it is different than the `originStorage`, we [set the new state](https://github.com/evmos/evmos/blob/b196a522ba4951890b40992e9f97aa610f8b5f9c/x/evm/statedb/statedb.go#L460-L465). Setting the new state means we update the Cosmos SDK KVStore. Below, are described the steps to perform the attack: - User send a tx to a smart contract (SC) that is calling a precompile. - The SC perform a state transition of its state from A to B. - The SC call the precompile. - The SC perform a state transition of its state from B to A (revert of the previous). - Once the transaction is executed, and the final **Commit** is performed, the state A will not be committed to the store because A is the same as `originStorage`. If the tx is executed correctly, this is what happens at the store level: - Initial state A is loaded from the KVStore and the dirtyStorage is set to B. - Before running the precompile, the `dirtyStorage` is committed to the KVStore without changing the `originStorage`. - Now, since we have a `dirtyStorage`, it is updated to the previous value A without changing the `originStorage`. Since the tx executed correctly, the evm calls the commit to persist the dirtyStorage. However, since dirtyStorage is equal to originStorage, nothing will be changed. To summarize, if a contract storage state that is the same before and after a transaction, but is changed during the transaction and can call an external contract after the change, it can be exploited to make the transaction similar to non-atomic. The vulnerability is **critical** since this could lead to drain of funds through creative SC interactions. ### Severity Based on [ImmuneFi Severity Classification System](https://immunefisupport.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/13332717597585-Severity-Classification-System) the severity was evaluated to `Critical` since the attack could have lead to direct loss of funds. ### Patches The issue has been patched in versions >=V17.0.0. ## For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: Reach out to the Core Team in [Discord](https://discord.gg/evmos) Open a discussion in [evmos/evmos](https://github.com/evmos/evmos/discussions) Email us at [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected]) for security questions

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GO-2024-2715

Published

Evmos transaction execution not accounting for all state transition after interaction with precompiles in github.com/evmos/evmos

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

cve-program · CVE-2024-32644

Published

evmos

Vendor product

Publisher's version information

Shown as published. These rules are not interpreted as NuGet package version ranges.

{
                    "vendor": "evmos",
                    "product": "evmos",
                    "versions": [
                        {
                            "version": "< 17.0.0",
                            "status": "affected"
                        }
                    ]
                }

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

euvd · EUVD-2024-1080

Published

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Apr 19, 2024, 2:53:44 PM

dateUpdated: Aug 2, 2024, 2:13:40 AM

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

nvd · CVE-2024-32644

Published

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Analyzed

Weakness classifications: CWE-662 · NVD-CWE-noinfo

Original publisher date fields

published: 2024-04-19T15:15:50.960

lastModified: 2026-06-17T07:30:01.047

1 source CPE criteria · context only
  • cpe:2.3:a:evmos:evmos:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

osv · GHSA-3fp5-2xwh-fxm6

Published

github.com/evmos/evmos/v16

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 17.0.0

github.com/evmos/evmos/v7

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → last_affected 7.0.0

github.com/evmos/evmos/v6

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → last_affected 6.0.4

github.com/evmos/evmos/v5

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → last_affected 5.0.0

github.com/tharsis/evmos

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → last_affected 1.1.3

github.com/tharsis/evmos/v2

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → last_affected 2.0.2

github.com/tharsis/evmos/v3

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → last_affected 3.0.3

github.com/tharsis/evmos/v4

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → last_affected 4.0.2

github.com/tharsis/evmos/v5

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → last_affected 5.0.1

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

osv · GO-2024-2715

Published

github.com/evmos/evmos

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0

github.com/evmos/evmos/v2

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0

github.com/evmos/evmos/v3

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0

github.com/evmos/evmos/v4

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0

github.com/evmos/evmos/v5

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0

github.com/evmos/evmos/v6

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0

github.com/evmos/evmos/v7

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0

github.com/evmos/evmos/v8

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0

github.com/evmos/evmos/v9

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0

github.com/evmos/evmos/v10

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0

github.com/evmos/evmos/v11

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0

github.com/evmos/evmos/v12

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0

github.com/evmos/evmos/v13

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0

github.com/evmos/evmos/v14

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0

github.com/evmos/evmos/v15

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0

github.com/evmos/evmos/v16

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0

github.com/evmos/evmos/v17

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 17.0.0

github.com/tharsis/evmos

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0

github.com/tharsis/evmos/v2

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0

github.com/tharsis/evmos/v3

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0

github.com/tharsis/evmos/v4

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0

github.com/tharsis/evmos/v5

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

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