Vitess is a database clustering system for horizontal scaling of MySQL. When executing the following simple query, the `vtgate` will go into an endless loop that also keeps consuming memory and eventually will run out of memory. This vulnerability is fixed in 19.0.4, 18.0.5, and 17.0.7.
Vitess is a database clustering system for horizontal scaling of MySQL. When executing the following simple query, the `vtgate` will go into an endless loop that also keeps consuming memory and eventually will run out of memory. This vulnerability is fixed in 19.0.4, 18.0.5, and 17.0.7.
Vitess is a database clustering system for horizontal scaling of MySQL. When executing the following simple query, the `vtgate` will go into an endless loop that also keeps consuming memory and eventually will run out of memory. This vulnerability is fixed in 19.0.4, 18.0.5, and 17.0.7.
### Summary
When executing the following simple query, the `vtgate` will go into an endless loop that also keeps consuming memory and eventually will OOM.
### Details
When running the following query, the `evalengine` will try evaluate it and runs forever.
```
select _utf16 0xFF
```
The source of the bug lies in the collation logic that we have. The bug applies to all `utf16`, `utf32` and `ucs2` encodings. In general, the bug is there for any encoding where the minimal byte length for a single character is more than 1 byte.
The decoding functions for these collations all implement logic like the following to enforce the minimal character length:
https://github.com/vitessio/vitess/blob/8f6cfaaa643a08dc111395a75a2d250ee746cfa8/go/mysql/collations/charset/unicode/utf16.go#L69-L71
The problem is that all the callers of `DecodeRune` expect progress by returning the number of bytes consumed. This means that if there's only 1 byte left in an input, it will here return still `0` and the caller(s) don't consume the character.
One example of such a caller is the following:
https://github.com/vitessio/vitess/blob/8f6cfaaa643a08dc111395a75a2d250ee746cfa8/go/mysql/collations/charset/convert.go#L73-L79
The logic here moves forward the pointer in the input `[]byte` but if `DecodeRune` returns `0` in case of error, it will keep running forever. The OOM happens since it keeps adding the `?` as the invalid character to the destination buffer infinitely, growing forever until it runs out of memory.
The fix here would be to always return forward progress also on invalid strings.
There's also a separate bug here that even if progress is guaranteed, `select _utf16 0xFF` will return the wrong result currently. MySQL will pad here the input when the `_utf16` introducer is used with leading `0x00` bytes and then decode to UTF-16, resulting in the output of `ÿ` here.
### PoC
```
select _utf16 0xFF
```
### Impact
Denial of service attack by triggering unbounded memory usage.
When executing a query, the vtgate will go into an endless loop that also keeps consuming memory and eventually will OOM. This causes a denial of service.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: May 8, 2024, 2:10:24 PM
dateUpdated: Aug 2, 2024, 2:20:35 AM
1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases
msrc_CVE-2024-32886: Vitess vulnerable to infinite memory consumption and vtgate crash
CVE-2024-32886
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-835
Original publisher date fields
published: 2024-05-08T14:15:08.310
lastModified: 2026-06-17T07:30:37.087
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.