Minder's `HandleGithubWebhook` is susceptible to a denial of service attack from an untrusted HTTP request. The vulnerability exists before the request has been validated, and as such the request is still untrusted at the point of failure. This allows an attacker with the ability to send requests to `HandleGithubWebhook` to crash the Minder controlplane and deny other users from using it. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.0.48.
Minder's `HandleGithubWebhook` is susceptible to a denial of service attack from an untrusted HTTP request. The vulnerability exists before the request has been validated, and as such the request is still untrusted at the point of failure. This allows an attacker with the ability to send requests to `HandleGithubWebhook` to crash the Minder controlplane and deny other users from using it. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.0.48.
Minder's `HandleGithubWebhook` is susceptible to a denial of service attack from an untrusted HTTP request. The vulnerability exists before the request has been validated, and as such the request is still untrusted at the point of failure. This allows an attacker with the ability to send requests to `HandleGithubWebhook` to crash the Minder controlplane and deny other users from using it. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.0.48.
Minder's `HandleGithubWebhook` is susceptible to a denial of service attack from an untrusted HTTP request. The vulnerability exists before the request has been validated, and as such the request is still untrusted at the point of failure. This allows an attacker with the ability to send requests to `HandleGithubWebhook` to crash the Minder controlplane and deny other users from using it.
One of the first things that `HandleGithubWebhook` does is to validate the payload signature. This is done by way of the internal helper `validatePayloadSignature`:
https://github.com/stacklok/minder/blob/ee66f6c0763212503c898cfefb65ce1450c7f5ac/internal/controlplane/handlers_githubwebhooks.go#L213-L218
`validatePayloadSignature` generates a reader from the incoming request by way of the internal helper `readerFromRequest`:
https://github.com/stacklok/minder/blob/ee66f6c0763212503c898cfefb65ce1450c7f5ac/internal/controlplane/handlers_githubwebhooks.go#L337-L342
To create a reader from the incoming request, `readerFromRequest` first reads the request body entirely into memory on line 368:
https://github.com/stacklok/minder/blob/ee66f6c0763212503c898cfefb65ce1450c7f5ac/internal/controlplane/handlers_githubwebhooks.go#L367-L377
This is a vulnerability, since an HTTP request with a large body can exhaust the memory of the machine running Minder and cause the Go runtime to crash Minder.
Note that this occurs before Minder has validated the request, and as such, the request is still untrusted.
To test this out, we can use the existing `TestHandleWebHookRepository` unit test and modify the HTTP request body to be large.
To do that, change these lines:
https://github.com/stacklok/minder/blob/ee66f6c0763212503c898cfefb65ce1450c7f5ac/internal/controlplane/handlers_githubwebhooks_test.go#L278-L283
... to these lines:
```go
packageJson, err := json.Marshal(event)
require.NoError(t, err, "failed to marshal package event")
maliciousBody := strings.NewReader(strings.Repeat("1337", 1000000000))
maliciousBodyReader := io.MultiReader(maliciousBody, maliciousBody, maliciousBody, maliciousBody, maliciousBody)
_ = packageJson
client := &http.Client{}
req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", fmt.Sprintf("http://%s", addr), maliciousBodyReader)
require.NoError(t, err, "failed to create request")
```
Then run the unit test again. WARNING, SAVE ALL WORK BEFORE DOING THIS.
On my local machine, this causes the machine to freeze, and Go finally performs a sigkill:
```
signal: killed
FAIL github.com/stacklok/minder/internal/controlplane 30.759s
FAIL
```
HandleGithubWebhook is susceptible to a denial of service attack from an untrusted HTTP request. An untrusted request can cause the server to allocate large amounts of memory resulting in a denial of service.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: May 7, 2024, 2:12:19 PM
dateUpdated: Aug 2, 2024, 2:42:59 AM
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-400
Original publisher date fields
published: 2024-05-07T15:15:09.540
lastModified: 2026-06-17T07:32:52.450
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.