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sshpiper's Enabling of Proxy Protocol without proper feature flagging allows faking source address

CVSS 3.1 5.3 MEDIUMEUVD CVSS 3.1 5.3 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 5.3 MEDIUMCVSS_V3 Publisher rating MODERATEFixed by github.com/tg123/sshpiper 1.3.0osv · severity unknownFixed by github.com/tg123/sshpiper 1.3.0KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2024-35175

Published

sshpiper is a reverse proxy for sshd. Starting in version 1.0.50 and prior to version 1.3.0, the way the proxy protocol listener is implemented in sshpiper can allow an attacker to forge their connecting address. Commit 2ddd69876a1e1119059debc59fe869cb4e754430 added the proxy protocol listener as the only listener in sshpiper, with no option to toggle this functionality off. This means that any connection that sshpiper is directly (or in some cases indirectly) exposed to can use proxy protocol to forge its source address. Any users of sshpiper who need logs from it for whitelisting/rate limiting/security investigations could have them become much less useful if an attacker is sending a spoofed source address. Version 1.3.0 contains a patch for the issue.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2024-1427

Published

sshpiper is a reverse proxy for sshd. Starting in version 1.0.50 and prior to version 1.3.0, the way the proxy protocol listener is implemented in sshpiper can allow an attacker to forge their connecting address. Commit 2ddd69876a1e1119059debc59fe869cb4e754430 added the proxy protocol listener as the only listener in sshpiper, with no option to toggle this functionality off. This means that any connection that sshpiper is directly (or in some cases indirectly) exposed to can use proxy protocol to forge its source address. Any users of sshpiper who need logs from it for whitelisting/rate limiting/security investigations could have them become much less useful if an attacker is sending a spoofed source address. Version 1.3.0 contains a patch for the issue.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2024-35175

Published

sshpiper is a reverse proxy for sshd. Starting in version 1.0.50 and prior to version 1.3.0, the way the proxy protocol listener is implemented in sshpiper can allow an attacker to forge their connecting address. Commit 2ddd69876a1e1119059debc59fe869cb4e754430 added the proxy protocol listener as the only listener in sshpiper, with no option to toggle this functionality off. This means that any connection that sshpiper is directly (or in some cases indirectly) exposed to can use proxy protocol to forge its source address. Any users of sshpiper who need logs from it for whitelisting/rate limiting/security investigations could have them become much less useful if an attacker is sending a spoofed source address. Version 1.3.0 contains a patch for the issue.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-4w53-6jvp-gg52

Published

### Summary The way the proxy protocol listener is implemented in sshpiper can allow an attacker to forge their connecting address. ### Details [This commit](https://github.com/tg123/sshpiper/commit/2ddd69876a1e1119059debc59fe869cb4e754430) added the proxy protocol listener as the only listener in sshpiper, with no option to toggle this functionality off. This means that any connection that sshpiper is directly (or in some cases indirectly) exposed to can use proxy protocol to forge its source address. ### PoC You can use a configuration like this in HAProxy: ``` listen w-send-proxy mode tcp log global option tcplog bind *:27654 tcp-request connection set-src ipv4(1.1.1.1) server app1 ssh-piper-hostname:22 send-proxy ``` When connecting through HAProxy, sshpiper will log connections as originating from `1.1.1.1`. The proxy protocol data is designed to survive multiple load balancers or proxies and pass through to sshpiper at the end, so it should only be enabled trusted environments. This should be behind a configuration option or startup flag to prevent abuse when public connections can be made to sshpiper. This is also backed up by [the specification for proxy protocol](https://www.haproxy.org/download/1.8/doc/proxy-protocol.txt): > The receiver MUST be configured to only receive the protocol described in this specification and MUST not try to guess whether the protocol header is present or not. This means that the protocol explicitly prevents port sharing between public and private access. Otherwise it would open a major security breach by allowing untrusted parties to spoof their connection addresses. The receiver SHOULD ensure proper access filtering so that only trusted proxies are allowed to use this protocol. ### Impact Any users of sshpiper who need logs from it for whitelisting/rate limiting/security investigations could have them become much less useful if an attacker is sending a spoofed source address.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GO-2024-2853

Published

sshpiper's enabling of proxy protocol without proper feature flagging allows faking source address in github.com/tg123/sshpiper

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

cve-program · CVE-2024-35175

Published

sshpiper

Vendor product

Publisher's version information

Shown as published. These rules are not interpreted as NuGet package version ranges.

{
                    "vendor": "tg123",
                    "product": "sshpiper",
                    "versions": [
                        {
                            "version": ">= 1.0.50, < 1.3.0",
                            "status": "affected"
                        }
                    ]
                }

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

euvd · EUVD-2024-1427

Published

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: May 14, 2024, 10:05:11 PM

dateUpdated: Aug 2, 2024, 3:07:46 AM

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

nvd · CVE-2024-35175

Published

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-345

Original publisher date fields

published: 2024-05-14T22:15:10.213

lastModified: 2026-06-17T07:34:29.143

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

osv · GHSA-4w53-6jvp-gg52

Published

github.com/tg123/sshpiper

Go

SEMVER · introduced 1.0.50 → fixed 1.3.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

osv · GO-2024-2853

Published

github.com/tg123/sshpiper

Go

SEMVER · introduced 1.0.50 → fixed 1.3.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

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