sshpiper is a reverse proxy for sshd. Starting in version 1.0.50 and prior to version 1.3.0, the way the proxy protocol listener is implemented in sshpiper can allow an attacker to forge their connecting address. Commit 2ddd69876a1e1119059debc59fe869cb4e754430 added the proxy protocol listener as the only listener in sshpiper, with no option to toggle this functionality off. This means that any connection that sshpiper is directly (or in some cases indirectly) exposed to can use proxy protocol to forge its source address. Any users of sshpiper who need logs from it for whitelisting/rate limiting/security investigations could have them become much less useful if an attacker is sending a spoofed source address. Version 1.3.0 contains a patch for the issue.
sshpiper is a reverse proxy for sshd. Starting in version 1.0.50 and prior to version 1.3.0, the way the proxy protocol listener is implemented in sshpiper can allow an attacker to forge their connecting address. Commit 2ddd69876a1e1119059debc59fe869cb4e754430 added the proxy protocol listener as the only listener in sshpiper, with no option to toggle this functionality off. This means that any connection that sshpiper is directly (or in some cases indirectly) exposed to can use proxy protocol to forge its source address. Any users of sshpiper who need logs from it for whitelisting/rate limiting/security investigations could have them become much less useful if an attacker is sending a spoofed source address. Version 1.3.0 contains a patch for the issue.
sshpiper is a reverse proxy for sshd. Starting in version 1.0.50 and prior to version 1.3.0, the way the proxy protocol listener is implemented in sshpiper can allow an attacker to forge their connecting address. Commit 2ddd69876a1e1119059debc59fe869cb4e754430 added the proxy protocol listener as the only listener in sshpiper, with no option to toggle this functionality off. This means that any connection that sshpiper is directly (or in some cases indirectly) exposed to can use proxy protocol to forge its source address. Any users of sshpiper who need logs from it for whitelisting/rate limiting/security investigations could have them become much less useful if an attacker is sending a spoofed source address. Version 1.3.0 contains a patch for the issue.
### Summary
The way the proxy protocol listener is implemented in sshpiper can allow an attacker to forge their connecting address.
### Details
[This commit](https://github.com/tg123/sshpiper/commit/2ddd69876a1e1119059debc59fe869cb4e754430) added the proxy protocol listener as the only listener in sshpiper, with no option to toggle this functionality off. This means that any connection that sshpiper is directly (or in some cases indirectly) exposed to can use proxy protocol to forge its source address.
### PoC
You can use a configuration like this in HAProxy:
```
listen w-send-proxy
mode tcp
log global
option tcplog
bind *:27654
tcp-request connection set-src ipv4(1.1.1.1)
server app1 ssh-piper-hostname:22 send-proxy
```
When connecting through HAProxy, sshpiper will log connections as originating from `1.1.1.1`. The proxy protocol data is designed to survive multiple load balancers or proxies and pass through to sshpiper at the end, so it should only be enabled trusted environments. This should be behind a configuration option or startup flag to prevent abuse when public connections can be made to sshpiper.
This is also backed up by [the specification for proxy protocol](https://www.haproxy.org/download/1.8/doc/proxy-protocol.txt):
> The receiver MUST be configured to only receive the protocol described in this
specification and MUST not try to guess whether the protocol header is present
or not. This means that the protocol explicitly prevents port sharing between
public and private access. Otherwise it would open a major security breach by
allowing untrusted parties to spoof their connection addresses. The receiver
SHOULD ensure proper access filtering so that only trusted proxies are allowed
to use this protocol.
### Impact
Any users of sshpiper who need logs from it for whitelisting/rate limiting/security investigations could have them become much less useful if an attacker is sending a spoofed source address.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: May 14, 2024, 10:05:11 PM
dateUpdated: Aug 2, 2024, 3:07:46 AM
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-345
Original publisher date fields
published: 2024-05-14T22:15:10.213
lastModified: 2026-06-17T07:34:29.143
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.